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ABSTRACT
A Moment in the Pragmatic Political Style:
The Rhetoric of Louis D. Brandeis. (August 2004)
Paul Henry Stob, B.A., Calvin College
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. James Arnt Aune
     This thesis examines the rhetoric of Louis D. Brandeis in light of
pragmatism—specifically, the philosophical pragmatism of William James and John
Dewey.  While a number of scholars claim that pragmatism has nothing to offer politics,
rhetoric, or decision-making, this thesis argues that Brandeis’s method of acting
politically, speaking publicly, and solving problems exemplifies the pragmatic political
style—a style of political operation that is characteristically pragmatic, a direct extension
of James and Dewey’s philosophy.  This thesis illustrates Brandeis’s pragmatic political
style through an analysis of his rhetoric prior to taking his seat on the United States
Supreme Court, his rhetoric while on the Supreme Court, and his rhetoric as one of
America’s most prominent Zionists.  This thesis shows that pragmatism (at least William
James and John Dewey’s classical American pragmatism—the pragmatism Brandeis
exemplifies rhetorically) can be a fruitful part of political operation.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT .............................................................................................................. iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... iv
CHAPTER
I INTRODUCTION................................................................................... 1
II PRAGMATISM AS INDIVIDUALISM: LOUIS BRANDEIS’S
PRE-COURT RHETORIC...................................................................... 36
The Upshot of “The Right to Privacy” ............................................ 38
Individualism and Industrial Democracy......................................... 51
Consequences and the Rhetorical Power of the Brandeis Brief ...... 61
The Language of Pragmatism as Individualism .............................. 74
III LEGAL PRAGMATISM AND SOCIETY: LOUIS BRANDEIS’S
SUPREME COURT RHETORIC........................................................... 79
Eloquence, Dissent, and the Prospects of Liberty ........................... 90
The Organic Structure of the Law and Society................................ 114
The Language of the Law and Social Relations .............................. 132
IV PRAGMATISM AS RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: LOUIS
BRANDEIS’S ZIONIST RHETORIC.................................................... 139
Religious Roots in American Pragmatism....................................... 141
American Pragmatism, American Zionism ..................................... 150
The Language of Pragmatism as Religious ..................................... 171
V CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 174
NOTES ...................................................................................................................... 192
Notes to Chapter I ............................................................................ 192
Notes to Chapter II........................................................................... 200
iv
Page
Notes to Chapter III ......................................................................... 205
Notes to Chapter IV ......................................................................... 214
Notes to Chapter V .......................................................................... 217
REFERENCES.......................................................................................................... 221
VITA ......................................................................................................................... 227
v
1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
     Rhetoric scholars continually want to know what difference “theory” makes.1  “So
what?” is the question.  For rhetoric scholars interested in political discourse the
question is, “What difference does a given theory make for the study of political
rhetoric?”  What does theory add to social, cultural, political exchanges?  Why prefer
one theory to another?  Why care about “theory” at all?2
     Those familiar with William James’s work will recognize these questions; they are
questions derived from the same spirit with which James spoke about the “pragmatic
method”: “The pragmatic method in such cases is to try to interpret each notion by
tracing its respective practical consequences.  What difference would it practically make
to any one if this notion rather than that notion were true?”3  James was disdainful of
theory without “feet,” of ideas that had no “cash value,” of philosophical conundrums
that had no bearing on the way in which one had one’s experiences.  This was James’s
theoretical dictum:
There can be no difference anywhere that does n’t make a difference
elsewhere—no difference in concrete fact and in conduct consequent upon that
fact, imposed on somebody, somehow, somewhere and somewhen.  The whole
function of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite difference it will
make to you and me, at definite instants of our life, if this world-formula or that
This thesis follows the style of Rhetoric & Public Affairs.
2world-formula be the true one.4
James championed pragmatism as a method of inquiry that sought to offer answers to the
“so what” question.  Pragmatism emerged, under James’s guidance, as a means of
probing theory and experience to see what concrete, practical differences given
philosophies made.  He wrote,
You must bring out of each word its practical cash-value, set it at work within the
stream of your experience.  It appears less as a solution, then, than as a program
for more work, and more particularly as an indication of the ways in which
existing realities may be changed.
Theories thus become instruments, not answers to enigmas, in which we can
rest.  We don’t lie back upon them, we move forward, and, on occasion, make
nature over again by their aid.  Pragmatism unstiffens all our theories, limbers
them up and sets each one at work.5
     Recently, however, scholars have been trying to out-James James.  That is,
scholars—even scholars who consider themselves pragmatists—have turned the tables
on James’s formulation of pragmatism and asked, What concrete, practical difference
does pragmatism make?  What is pragmatism’s cash-value?  What does pragmatism add
to the discussion?  For social, political, and rhetorical theory, the question becomes,
What difference does pragmatism make for discussions of society, politics, and rhetoric?
     On many occasions, the answer comes back, Pragmatism makes no difference for
discussions of society, politics, and rhetoric; pragmatism makes no concrete, practical
difference.  It adds nothing to sociopolitical exchanges. “Pragmatism has no political
3valence,” says Richard Posner.6  Stanley Fish concludes, “If pragmatism points out that
its rivals cannot deliver what they promise—once-and-for-all answers to always relevant
questions—pragmatism should itself know enough not to promise anything, or even to
recommend anything.  If pragmatism is true, it has nothing to say to us; no politics
follows from it or is blocked by it; no morality attaches to it or is enjoyed by it.”7  John
Diggins turns the point specifically on the early American pragmatists, William James
and John Dewey, and their vision of philosophy as experience: “The concept of
experience is not only cognitively dubious, it is politically mischievous.”8  Elsewhere,
Diggins echoes the sentiment of Arthur O. Lovejoy, a contemporary of James:
“pragmatism cannot provide useful knowledge at all.  Unable to certify as truthful that
which we need to know before we act, pragmatic philosophy cannot provide knowledge
precisely when it is most valuable.  Verified ex post facto wisdom can tell us little about
how to face the future if the past is behind us.”9
     These sentiments would have baffled James.  James championed pragmatism
specifically because of what he saw as pragmatism’s cash-value as a philosophical
method or attitude.  Pragmatism, James said, stands for a “perfectly familiar attitude in
philosophy. . . . At the same time it does not stand for any special results.  It is a method
only.”10  Pragmatism has no special results indeed, but it does have an aim; as John
McDermott writes,  “In ideal terms, a person comes to consciousness and begins to work
out one’s place, one’s version, and one’s taste for this or that.  Yet we now know that the
burgeoning self is fraught with personal freight. . . .  [T]he fundamental challenge is to
convert the personal weaknesses into strengths and to drive our strengths into the teeth
4of a personally neutral but relatively pregnant world.”11  As James saw it, pragmatism
was a method, mood or attitude for navigating a world of experience and relations, a
world forever in-the-making, a world that was ripe with novelty, possibility, danger,
insensitivity, chaos and potential flourishings.  The pragmatic upshot was the attempt to
figure out how to nourish oneself through one’s environment, how to thrive.  This is
why, despite having the reputation as a rugged individualist, James was undyingly
concerned with social, political, cultural and communal issues of his day.12  He was a
philosopher concerned with the individual, but not at the expense of the community.
James paid attention to politics.  As a dedicated New England anti-imperialist during the
Philippine conflict, James spoke and wrote publicly numerous times on what he saw as
an American community in danger of losing its soul.  James lamented America’s
involvement in the Philippines with rhetoric reflecting the profound spiritual crisis he
saw ensuing:
We used to believe then that we were of a different clay from other nations, that
there was something deep in the American heart that answered to our happy
birth, free from the hereditary burden which the nations of Europe bear, and
which obliges them to grow by preying on their neighbors.  Idle dream! pure
Fourth of July fancy, scattered in five minutes by the first temptation.  In every
national soul there lie potentialities of the most barefaced piracy, and our own
American soul is no exception to the rule.13
In private correspondence, James remarked to his friend Granville Stanley Hall, “What
makes me sickest in our whole barbaric imperialism is our Turkish superstition about the
5holiness of our peculiar type of civilization.”  James continued, “As if anything could be
of value anywhere that had no native historic roots.  We have destroyed in Luzon the one
sacred thing in the world, the spontaneous budding of a national life; we are destroying
their souls even more than their bodies, and we think that the violent imposition of our
own entirely desperate ideals will be an act of charity!  Oh the big idiots that we are!”14
     James’s political concerns have deep roots in his philosophical outlook.  In James’s
philosophy, humans are part of a wider spiritual consciousness.15  This is James’s
philosophy of being in a pluralistic universe; it is “essentially a social philosophy, a
philosophy of ‘co’ in which conjunctions do the work.”16  Thus politics become
extremely important for James.  “Let me repeat once more,” James says, “that a man’s
vision is the great fact about him.”17  Both philosophy and politics flow from one’s
vision.  Both are integral aspects of personhood and community.  Both are forever in-
the-making.  And both are tools for practically steering one’s course in life.
     My project in this thesis is to explore the import of pragmatism into political speech,
into rhetoric.  Contrary to Posner, Fish, Diggins and those who see pragmatism as a
philosophical attitude with nothing to offer politics, rhetoric and public life, I offer
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis as an exemplar of the pragmatic political style (a
term discussed later).  My contention is that Brandeis articulated the pragmatic political
style in accord with the passion, spirit, depth and meaning James envisaged for
pragmatism and John Dewey nurtured.  Contrary to the contemporary usage of the term,
which sees pragmatism as “practical and business-like, ‘no-nonsense,’ disdainful of
abstract theory and intellectual pretension, contemptuous of moralizers and utopian
6dreamers,”18 the pragmatic political style articulated by Brandeis helps individuals, the
community and society to flourish in the fabric of human experience.
     It would be best to pause here and explain what I mean by “pragmatism.”  But
offering a straightforward definition of the term is not as easy, nor as beneficial, as one
may think.  James tried to offer a simple definition of pragmatism and found himself in a
hornet’s nest of philosophical controversy.  This controversy led him almost three years
later to rail against those who misunderstood pragmatism, critics who James said “labor
under an inability almost pathetic, to understand the thesis which they seek to refute.”19
     Not only did James face a multitude of critics in his own time, but pragmatism as a
term has taken a long, strange journey throughout the twentieth century.20  James offered
a seemingly straightforward definition of the term and misunderstandings of pragmatism
erupted.
     Pragmatism’s difficulties stem from its definition of truth.  “True ideas are those that
we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify,” James wrote of pragmatism’s
definition of truth.  “False ideas are those that we can not.”21  James was quickly
slammed with charges of subjectivism and relativism.22  Guilty by association, Dewey
too found himself having to respond to criticism that pragmatism was a philosophy
justifying “whatever makes you feel good.”23  The subjectivist/relativist criticism
followed pragmatism throughout the twentieth century and continues today.  (Richard
Rorty, among others, currently faces the same criticism.)
7     But notice the language of James’s pragmatic definition of truth: assimilation,
validation, corroboration, and verification—these are terms of “science.”  On the flip-
side of the subjectivist/relativist criticism, pragmatism, because of James’s definition,
became closely associated with positivism.  Reviewing James’s Pragmatism for The
Philosophical Review, Charles M. Bakewell called pragmatism “simply the modern
analogue of positivism.”24 Contemporarily, Richard Posner has called the battle between
positivism and pragmatism a “family quarrel.”25  Nothing could be further from the truth.
Whereas James used “verify” while defining pragmatism, and Dewey repeatedly used
“science” to describe his mode of inquiry, the connotations of the term “science” under
the positivists ran far astray from the way in which James and Dewey understood the
term.  James and Dewey did not adhere to a spectator theory of knowledge, nor were
they verificationists in the correspondence theory sense of the term, nor did they believe
the purpose of inquiry was to get at the Truth of Reality.  James and Dewey viewed
science organically, naturalistically, experimentally and radically.  Science was for them
bound in the unending project of striving for a better life, a better society.  As a means of
helping the individual and society diagnose experiences and make those experiences
grow meaningfully for the individual and society, science was no different than art,
reflection, the pursuit of happiness, and the health of humanity.  By using the terms of
science, James and Dewey did not, contrary to Posner’s understanding, seek to define
science narrowly and dismiss as unscientific, and therefore meaningless, pursuits of
moral and political theory.  Robert Westbrook notes that Dewey’s use of the term
science
8was so liberal that Dewey often comfortably used science as a synonym for
reason, intelligence, and reflective thought, a practice that did not manifest, as
some have charged, an unduly narrow notion of the latter terms but rather a
willingness to offer relatively relaxed entrance requirements to the house of
science.  Scientific thinking, Dewey insisted to popular as well as professional
audiences, was but a refinement of the ordinary procedures for fixing belief.26
For James and for Dewey, there was no natural separation between theory and practice.
Rather, both believed that theory and practice proceeded organically, bound inexorably
in experimentations in the fabric of experience.
     Largely because James and Dewey mixed “subjectivist” and “positivistic” language,
James and Dewey and pragmatism were throughout the twentieth century subjected to
criticisms from squishy liberal humanists and cold, hard-nosed scientists.27  This put
pragmatism in a bad place.  On the one hand, some said it was too ambiguous and vague
to assist in decision-making or arriving at definite conclusions.  On the other hand,
others said it pretended to be so rigorous and scientific that it neglected issues of
morality and spirituality.  In a sense, pragmatism became the ugly stepchild of twentieth
century philosophy.
     Because its use of terms has rarely been assessed correctly, I will offer no cut-and-
dried, one-sentence definition of “pragmatism.”  By not offering such a definition, I am
trying to avoid the fate of misunderstanding that both James and Dewey suffered and
continue to suffer.  Instead of offering a one-sentence definition of the term and
proceeding as though the matter were settled, I will offer a list of distinguishing
9characteristics of pragmatism, which, throughout this study of Brandeis and the
pragmatic political style, will continually resurface as themes organically moving
through texts.
     For strategic purposes, I have purposefully written these characteristics without using
the word “is.”  I do not say pragmatism “is” this or that, that pragmatism “equals” this or
that.  I avoid using “is” in order to distance my portrait of the pragmatic style from a
static, stagnate “checklist” of equations.  Instead of saying pragmatism “is” this or that,
the hope is to capture the pragmatic style by understanding what it does.  Pragmatism
acts this way or that, rather than equals this or that.  The hope is to paint a picture of
pragmatism’s dynamic, fluid, unfolding, experientially evolving method of engaging the
world.  The hope is to apprehend what James described as pragmatism’s “various and
flexible” manners, “rich and endless” resources, leading to conclusions that are “as
friendly as those of mother nature.”28  In describing pragmatism as such, James was
trying to make clear that pragmatism operates as a method.29  To that end, I frame these
five characteristics in terms of the “pragmatic method.”  As I hope to show throughout
this thesis, pragmatism entails style, attitude, approach, and process of inquiry; calling it
a “method” attempts to capture that sense of undertaking.  In the end, offering these
characteristics will allow for a more rich, in-depth, thorough and meaningful
understanding of pragmatism as a philosophical attitude and political style.
     1) The pragmatic method seizes truth through consequences.  Upon reintroducing
Peirce’s conception of pragmatism, which had vanished from philosophical minds for
almost twenty years, William James in 1898 said that “to develop a thought’s meaning
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we need only determine what conduct it is fitted to produce; that conduct is for us its
sole significance. . . .  [W]e need only to consider what effects of a conceivably practical
kind the object may involve—what sensation we are to expect from it, and what
reactions we must prepare.”30  The pragmatist wants to know where a given idea will
lead, where a belief may take an inquirer, what effects may result from theories and
practices, what concrete difference beliefs and conduct may make.  “We live in a world
of realities that can be infinitely useful or infinitely harmful,” wrote James.  “The
possession of truth, so far from being here an end in itself, is only a preliminary means
towards other vital satisfactions.”31  Where will beliefs or actions fall on the spectrum of
the infinitely useful or infinitely harmful?  How do true beliefs add to or detract from
given projects, individual or social?  Simply put, what are the consequences of given
habits of action?  In the process of answering these questions, the inquirer seizes the
truth of the matter at hand as a means of successfully furthering inquiry.
     John McDermott calls pragmatism’s concern with consequences the pragmatic
upshot, which he defines as “the dealing of the significance of imagination and
speculation on the way in which we undergo our experiences.”32  The mission of the
early American philosophers, he says, “was to address concrete problems from a
perspective which was both speculative and alert to the stubbornness of reality as
actually experienced.”33  In Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey explains that
Deliberation is not calculation of indeterminate future results.  The present, not
the future, is ours. . . .  The moral is to develop conscientiousness, ability to
judge the significance of what we are doing and to use that judgment in directing
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what we do, not by means of direct cultivation of something called conscience, or
reason, or a faculty of moral knowledge, but by fostering those impulses and
habits which experience has shown to make us sensitive, generous, imaginative,
impartial in perceiving the tendency of our inchoate dawning activities.34
Humans strive to understand consequences, and thus to seize truth and direct the present
toward a better future, by engaging their changing environments.  The important point
for the pragmatist is that the pragmatic upshot is lived, it is experienced, it is part of the
organic context in which individuals pursue meaning.  The pragmatic method seizes
truth through consequences because the individual directly experiences consequences in
the fabric of life and comes to know truth through the process of living.
     The pragmatic upshot, seizing truth through consequences, has direct relevance for
the study of rhetoric: the pragmatist wants to know what consequences will result from
using language in a given way.  What will be the practical results of formulating a
sentence thisly or thusly?  How can one practically steer one’s environment through
language?  Where will one’s rhetoric fall on the spectrum of the infinitely useful or
infinitely harmful?  Rhetoricians have been asking these questions for millennia,35 and
that is why pragmatism’s concern with consequences is so understandable for
rhetoricians.  Both rhetoricians and pragmatists want to know what concrete difference
language will make on the way in which one has one’s experiences.  This meaningful
intersection between pragmatism and rhetoric comes to fruition in Dewey’s chapter on
communication in Experience and Nature: “When events have communicable meaning,
they have marks, notation, and are capable of con-notation and de-notation.  They are
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more than mere occurrences; they have implications.”36  Toward the end of the chapter
he writes, “As to be a tool, or to be used as a means for consequences, is to have and to
endow with meaning, language, being the tool or tools, is the cherishing mother of all
significance.”37
     2) The pragmatic method strives to cope with a world unfinished, in-the-making, and
malleable to the human touch.  The world is forever undergoing formation.  In addition,
it is forever undergoing formation because individuals and societies are adding to it,
subtracting from it, redirecting it, and living in it.  The individual experiences the world
as much as the world experiences the individual.  “The universe continually grows in
quantity by new experiences that graft themselves upon the old mass,” says James.
“[B]ut these very new experiences often help the mass to a more consolidated form.”38
A world incomplete, forever in-the-making and continuously undergoing change is for
Dewey not a matter of despair but the primary mark of possibility: “We long, amid a
trouble world, for perfect being.  We forget that what gives meaning to the notion of
perfection is the events that create longing, and that, apart from them, a ‘perfect’ world
would mean just an unchanging brute existential thing. . . .  In a world where everything
is complete, nothing requires anything else for its completion.”39
     In a world forever changing, forever in-the-making, individuals and communities
must forge their way through the muddle, struggle, novelty, possibility, gains and loses
of experience.  The purpose of proceeding in a world unfinished and forever in-the-
making is not to uncover those eternal truths that make the world complete and absolute;
the purpose is to forge a life that blossoms amidst danger.  “Life shall [be built in] doing
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and suffering and creating,” says James.40  The pragmatic method becomes crucial
because it pushes the individual away from faith in Universals, the Absolute, and
transcendental Principles, and toward a life of full-bodied participation in the fabric of
experience.  The pragmatic method, James says, entails the “attitude of looking away
from first things, principles, ‘categories,’ supposed necessities; and of looking towards
last things, fruits, consequences, facts.”41  By directing individuals away from Absolute
fictions, the pragmatic method strives to cope with a world without a preordained
teleology.  Recognizing the indeterminate character of the future, the pragmatic method
explores possibilities that can direct the present through the perpetual flux into a future
of growth and fruitfulness.  “Her only test of probable truth,” says James, “is what works
best in the way of leading us, what fits every part of life best and combines with the
collectivity of experience’s demands, nothing being omitted.”42
     The human world is a world of patchwork creations that more or less serve human
interests.  Patchwork creations are never final, but, more or less, work well for the
purposes at hand.  This leaves the rhetorician in an awkward position.  Not only are the
consequences of the way in which one formulates one’s sentences fundamentally
important, but the rhetorical task is never done.  Possibility and danger lurk around every
corner.  The only means of coping with this position is to understand that involvement in
the creation of meaning is unending.  The rhetorician’s task is never said and done.  This
is why James said that “our environment encourages us not to be philosophers but
partisans.”43  The purpose of being partisans is not to settle once and for all the questions
of the universe but to struggle and fight, to undergo experiences and to grow.  Language
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is a primary means by which one copes.  The task of rhetoric, therefore, and of the
pragmatic method, is to enable the individual to cope with a world forever in-the-
making.  “Where communication exists,” writes Dewey, “things in acquiring meaning,
thereby acquire representatives, surrogates, signs and implicates, which are infinitely
more amenable to management, more permanent and more accommodating, than events
in their first estate.”44  Rhetoric operates with chance, experimentation, novelty and
possibility; it strives to engage effectively a pregnant world.
     3) The pragmatic method rejects close-systems of thinking and meaning and instead
pursues novelty and possibility with every undertaking.  Forging a world of meaning is a
task never finished.  As coping mechanisms, theory, philosophy and rhetoric do not
dictate meaning but follow the individual through the fabric of experience.  This is one
of James’s brilliant insights: “The intellectual life of man consists almost wholly in his
substitution of a conceptual order for the perceptual order in which his experience
originally comes.”45  This, again, leads to an understanding of coping mechanisms in a
reality forever changing:
All these are ways of handling the perceptual flux and meeting distant parts of it;
and as far as this primary function of conception goes, we can only conclude it to
be what I began by calling it, a faculty superadded to our barely perceptual
consciousness for it use in practically adapting us to a larger environment than
that of which brutes take account.  We harness perceptual reality in concepts in
order to drive it better to our ends.46
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     The upshot of this is that, just as the world is never finished, systems of thought
should never be finished.  Closed-systems of thinking47—systems that dictate meaning,
derail experiences, encourage second-handedness, and stunt growth—are ad hoc
constructs that starve individual and social development.  John McDermott calls this
outcome relation starvation:
Repetition becomes so comforting that genuine novelty is reduced to prior
experience.  The width of our vision shrinks.  We become more defensive about
what we already know, less open to what we do not know.  Relation starvation is
the incarnation of the a priori.  All that happens has happened, for us, before.  At
least we think so.  And that is because we focus only on familiarity, sameness.
The novel is repressed, transformed into the familiar.48
Closed-systems of meaning are akin to death: they lead to decomposition in the organic
life.  If a healthy life depends on growth, change and varieties of experience, closed-
systems of meaning shut down life’s progress by encouraging starvation, sameness, and
monolithic experience.
     Meaning, therefore, must remain open—always and forever striving to grow and
remake, to discover depth and make fruits, to pursue novelty and possibility at every
opportunity.  James says that life produces a concrete character and expression—that of
“involving a muddle and a struggle, with an ‘ever not quite’ to all our formulas, and
novelty and possibility forever leaking in.”49  The “ever not quite,” a phrase James uses
repeatedly, represents pragmatism’s aversion to closed-systems.  “Novelty and
possibility forever leaking in” means that the fruit of the aversion to closed-systems
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stems from the unending potential for human growth.  “[O]ur choice is between the
development of a technique by which intelligence will become an intervening partner,”
Dewey writes, “and a continuation of a regime of accident, waste and distress.”50
     For the rhetorician, this means that language is not absolute.  Rhetoricians can easily
fall into the trap of thinking that “language is all there is,” of thinking that all humanity’s
problems will go away if only people stumble upon or create a one true discourse, a
discourse that is all-inclusive, fine-tuned to the structure of the universe, and able to
solve all problems—philosophical, cultural, social, individual or otherwise—in a single
vocabulary.  Problem-solving requires just the right words, and that’s it.  For the
pragmatist, language, while being a tremendously helpful coping mechanism, is certainly
not all there is, and any hope for an ultimate discourse is unrealistic.  Language is
precarious and unstable, but competent enough to be a useful tool.  Contrary to what
rhetoricians often persuade themselves into believing, life does not all come down to
language.  The pragmatic rhetorician knows that a closed-system of language—one that
believes all of life’s problems can be solved by formulating just the right sentences—is
just as detrimental to growth as are closed-systems of philosophy, society, economics
and politics.  Language is always revisable, for the good of the individual and society,
for the growth of the human organism.  James says, “[W]e have to live to-day by what
truth we can get to-day, and be ready to-morrow to call it falsehood.”51  Engaging a
continually changing world through language means continually formulating new ways
of understanding experience.  Richard Rorty’s conception of irony reflects the endless
revisability of the languages individuals use to engage reality:
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[The ironist] has radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary she
currently uses, because she has been impressed by other vocabularies,
vocabularies taken as final by people or books she has encountered; she realizes
that argument phrased in her present vocabulary can neither underwrite nor
dissolve these doubts; insofar as she philosophizes about her situation, she does
not think that her vocabulary is closer to reality than others, that it is in touch
with a power not herself.52
     This is the precarious state of language, a state that represents the rhetorician’s
muddle and struggle.  But this also represents the rhetorician’s opportunity to engage
novelty and possibility at every turn.  By being so precarious and unfinished, language is
the perfect tool for experimentation, for searching through the endless “final
vocabularies” that offer individuals chances to rework, recreate, and practically steer the
flow of experience.
     4) The pragmatic method replaces the quest for certainty with the quest for meaning.
Pragmatists are firm believers in meaning without certainty.  James opens his magnum
opus The Principles of Psychology by boldly stating, “It is . . . the reinstatement of the
vague and inarticulate to its proper place in our mental life which I am so anxious to
press on the attention.”53  James thinks the pursuit of certainty is neither possible nor
valuable.  “Truth’s fullness is elusive; ever not quite, not quite!”54  Dewey, in fact, faults
the “quest for certainty” for the problems that have created a practical stalemate in
philosophy: “Man’s distrust of himself has caused him to desire to get beyond and above
himself; in pure knowledge he has thought he could attain this self-transcendence.”55
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Distrust of one’s practical abilities has sidetracked philosophy for much too long, Dewey
believes.  One of the foremost deceptions in contemporary philosophy is to believe that
transcendence is ultimately valuable.  It is this desire for transcendence and certainty in
epistemological and metaphysical inquiry that Dewey seeks to rid from experience: “The
consequences of substituting a search for security by practical means in place of quest of
absolute certainty by cognitive means will then be considered in its bearing upon the
problem of our judgment regarding the values which control conduct, especially its
social phases.”56
     A primary distinction that runs throughout both James and Dewey’s work is the
distinction between the quest for certainty and the desire to pursue a meaningful, fruitful,
nourishing life.  The quest for meaning, not certainty, is the spring of life; it represents
the most intimate potential for growth in the human organism.  Dewey makes this point
in his attempt to reinvigorate the unification of theory and practice:  “The problem of the
relation of theory and practice is not a problem of theory alone; it is that, but it is also the
most practical problem of life.  For it is the question of how intelligence may inform
action, and how action may bear upon the fruit of increased insight into meaning: a clear
view of the values that are worth while and of the means by which they are to be made
secure in experienced objects.”57  Rorty offers the same point about the American
experience: “I think there is no point in asking whether Lincoln or Whitman or Dewey
got America right.  Stories about what a nation has been and should try to be are not
attempts at accurate representation, but rather attempts to forge a moral identity.”58
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There is no point in struggling fruitlessly with the quest for certainty when it is a
meaningful existence for which America strives.
     Accurate representation in language—akin to the quest for certainty in epistemology
and metaphysics—has plagued rhetoricians for millennia.  For much of Western
civilization, rhetoric has been seen as the intellectually insignificant stepchild of logic, a
subordinate to logic.  The belief has been that to be meaningful, rhetoric must accurately
represent the logical structure of the universe.  This was a point Dewey railed against in
Experience and Nature:
Logic was . . . supposed to have its basis in what is beyond human conduct and
relationships, and in consequence the separation of the physical and the rational,
the actual and the ideal, received its traditional formulation. . . .  Social
interaction and institutions have been treated as products of a ready-made
specific physical or mental endowment of a self-sufficing individual, wherein
language acts as a mechanical go-between to convey observations and ideas that
have prior and independent existence.  Speech is thus regarded as a practical
convenience but not of fundamental intellectual significance.  It consists of
“mere words,” sound, that happen to be associated with perceptions, sentiments
and thoughts which are complete prior to language.59
But to shift significance from the quest for certainty to the pursuit of meaning, to believe
that meaning is desirable and possible but certainty undesirable and impossible, entails a
hope that the projects of here and now are projects that will create or sustain meaning.
Projects that will not create or sustain meaning must be left behind.  The goal should be
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to find meaning through the novelty and possibility at work in everyday experience.  The
goal should be to steer practically and aesthetically the pulses of experience so as to
forge a meaningful life.  The goal must be the same for the American experience, says
John McDermott: “America can no longer strut before the world as one above many.
Much of our previous rhetoric, political and religious, is outworn and sterile, when it is
not offensive.  The task seems clear: we must develop a new celebratory language,
rooted in contemporary American experience, pluralistic in style and able to resonate
creatively throughout the fabric of world culture.”60
     There is no certainty with regards to language.  Because it operates in a flow of
experience, because it pounces forward in an endless flux, language represents only the
possibility for success.  There is no assurance that rhetoric will be successful, that it will
“gain an adherence of minds.”  There is, however, the very live possibility that rhetoric
can imbue experience with meaning.  Dewey puts the point masterfully:
That things should be able to pass from the plane of external pushing and pulling
to that of revealing themselves to man, and thereby to themselves; and that the
fruit of communication should be participation, sharing, is a wonder by the side
of which transubstantiation pales.  When communication occurs, all natural
events are subject to reconsideration and revision; they are re-adapted to meet the
requirements of conversation, whether it be public discourse or that preliminary
discourse termed thinking.  Events turn into objects, things with a meaning.61
     5) The pragmatic method chooses meliorism in the face of uncertainty.  If optimism is
the attitude that “everything will work out in the end” or, as James says, “the doctrine
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that thinks the world’s salvation inevitable,” and pessimism the attitude that “we are
damned from the get-go,” or, as James says, the doctrine that “the salvation of the world
is impossible,” then the pragmatist views both of these attitudes as unrealistic,
unworkable, and misleading.62  Pragmatism takes a stand halfway between pessimism
and optimism, adopting the attitude of meliorism, which “treats salvation as neither
necessary nor impossible.  It treats it as a possibility, which becomes more and more of a
probability the more numerous the actual conditions of salvation become.”63  Meliorism
is the attitude that the world can get better, that through the human touch, through
forging meaningful experiences and seizing truth through consequences, individuals can
make life better.  The attitude is not that life will get better but that it can get better, that
the possibilities for a better organism—individual or social—are present in the flow of
experience.  This is why James says that the world, instead of being ready-made and
complete, “may be eternally incomplete, and at all times subject to addition or liable to
loss.”64  James’s point is that, as it now stands, the world can be otherwise, more or less
depraved, more or less destructive, more or less rewarding, more or less enriching, more
or less congenial to human purposes, depending on the enactment of human powers.
John McDermott summarizes Dewey’s meliorism by saying, “[T]he entire human
endeavor should be an effort to apply the method of creative intelligence in order to
achieve optimum possibilities in the never-ending moral struggle to harmonize the
means-end relationship for the purpose of enhancing human life and achieving
growth.”65
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     Meliorism applied to rhetorical practices means nothing more than language is
potentially saving and potentially damning; which one—saving or damning—depends
on the use of it.  In the pursuit of enhancing human life and achieving growth, rhetorical
practice is one mode of operation that can contribute to well-being.  In the project of
trying to make life better—for the individual and society—rhetoric represents a
potentiality, the potentiality that, as a “natural function of human association,” the
organic nature of the human situation derives “meaning or significance.”66  While
James’s following point does not directly address rhetoric, its significance for orators is
unmistakable:
The great point is that the possibilities are really here.  Whether it be we who
solve them, or he working though us, at those soul-trying moments when fate’s
scales seem to quiver, and good snatches the victory from evil or shrinks
nerveless from the fight, is of small account, so long as we admit that the issue is
decided nowhere else than here and now.  That is what gives the palpitating
reality to our moral life and makes it tingle. . . .67
     These characteristics represents pragmatism’s attempt to probe the surface and depths
of experience, to promote meaning and authenticity, to avoid second-handedness, to
pursue a life worth living.  These characteristics have metaphysical implications: the
world is forever in-the-making, and reality has a character, but that character is
constantly changing.  These characteristics have epistemological implications: the quest
for certainty is distracting, and in fact detrimental, to the solving the tasks at hand; it is
much better to strive to understand the possibilities for meaning in the flow of
23
experience, for meaning is possible, certainty unrealistic.  These characteristics have
ontological implications: whatever being is, it is undergoing change, interacting with its
environment and reconstituting its own future, a future that will represent a new being.
These characteristics have teleological implications: the ends of social and personal
undertakings have yet to be set; undertakings are never-ending struggles to forge ends
that are more or less congenial to human desires. But perhaps most important for the
present purposes, these characteristics have methodological implications, for pragmatists
believe they have captured a method of problem-solving that embodies the way in which
individuals actually engage the world and have their experiences.  The dynamic structure
of this methodology, insofar as the pragmatic method has bearing on politics and
rhetoric, is the subject of this thesis.  My argument is that, despite what a host of
scholars, pragmatists and non-pragmatists alike, claim—that pragmatism can offer
nothing to politics—the pragmatic method can function fruitfully in political discussion.
Pragmatism can be a political style.
     But what does political style mean?  Robert Hariman argues that political experience
is stylized.  In the multifaceted, continually changing world of contemporary political
exchange—be that exchange in the office, the school, the church, family life,
institutional life, etc.—anywhere political experience is engaged, “relations of control
and autonomy are negotiated through the artful composition of speech, gesture,
ornament, décor, and any other means for modulating perception and shaping
response.”68  Hariman’s point is that there are unique modes of operation, or styles, that
emerge in day-to-day political experience.  He outlines four such styles: the realist,
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courtly, republican, and bureaucratic.  Each of these styles, says Hariman, can be
understood by examining specific texts that articulate these attitudes.  Machiavelli’s
Prince articulates the realist style, for example.  Ryszard Kapuscinski’s The Emperor:
Downfall of an Autocrat articulates the courtly style, Cicero’s letters the republican, and
Franz Kafka’s The Castle the bureaucratic.  These texts contain sets of indicators
pointing individuals to features of a form of stylized political experience.  As Hariman
concludes, “These texts provided not the mirror of nature, but something closer to the
hallway mirror that reflects, frames, and creates a moment for critical assessment of the
figure standing in front of it, looking herself over, before she steps out for the evening.”69
The styles that Hariman outlines are attitudes, approaches, and coping mechanisms for a
world filled with moments of political negotiation.  And each of the styles offers a
unique, particular means of engaging those moments.  “As people use discourses
strategically to fashion ‘equipment for living,’” Hariman writes, taking a cue from
Kenneth Burke, “they also become shaped by their designs, seeing the world as they
would compose it and responding according to the formal pressures of their
compositions.”70
     Furthermore, Hariman argues that these political styles each take a specific attitude
toward the role of language in political exchange.  The realist style, for example, views
political discourses as obstacles to true political operation; in the realist style, texts get in
the way of decision-making.  As Hariman says, “[The realist style] devalues other
political actors because they are too discursive, too caught up in their textual designs to
engage in rational calculation.”71  Just as the realist style takes a specific attitude toward
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texts, the republican style carries its own discursive approach: “The republican style
begins with a relish for the pleasures of composing and delivering persuasive public
discourse, it includes other modes of exchange and becomes a more focused mode of
action by defining consensus as the foundational means and end of governance, and it
culminates in a model of leadership that features personal embodiment of the civic
culture.”72  The methodological point is that political style is marked off by a specific
approach toward decision-making; the rhetorical point, an extension of the
methodological point, is that political style carries with it an attitude or set of attitudes in
relation to the discursive elements of decision-making.73
     Pragmatism lends itself directly to this notion of political style.  Pragmatism is a
discourse strategically fashioned to see, compose and respond to a world of political
experience.  Pragmatism offers a unique attitude, approach, and method for engaging the
various contexts of contemporary political exchange.  Just as much as the realist, courtly,
republican, or bureaucratic, the pragmatic is a particular political style.  Following
Hariman’s lead, I will also offer a text, or more rightly, a body of texts from a rhetor
who articulates the pragmatic method, as evidence that there is a uniquely pragmatic
way of engaging political exchanges.  The rhetor exemplifying this pragmatic method is
Louis Brandeis.  As I will show, Brandeis’s rhetoric—from the beginning of his social
advocacy, through his leadership in American Zionism, to the end of his tenure on the
Supreme Court—exemplifies characteristically pragmatic attitudes, in the James-Dewey
vein of classical American pragmatism.  Simply put, Brandeis articulates the pragmatic
political style.
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     But why Brandeis?  Why “marry” Brandeis to pragmatism?  The simple answer is
that Brandeis’ rhetoric helps shed light on evidence of pragmatism operating rhetorically
and politically.  While Brandeis never explicitly labeled himself a “pragmatist”—boxing
himself in with a philosophical label would have never appealed to Brandeis—his
rhetoric offers a window into the fruitful possibilities of the pragmatic approach to
politics and rhetoric.  But before I proceed into the workings of the pragmatic style in
Brandeis’s rhetoric, a brief biographical sketch of his life may be helpful.74
     Louis Dembitz (formerly David)75 Brandeis was born on November 13, 1856, in
Louisville, Kentucky.  His parents were part of a German-Jewish merchant class who
immigrated to the United States after social, political and economic chaos ensued
following the 1848 German revolutionary movement.  Brandeis’s parents and extended
family settled in Kentucky and opened a successful produce store and operated several
factories and mills.  They also became quickly convinced of the promise of the
American dream.  The Brandeis family was socially and politically active, stressing the
importance of the pursuit of prosperity and the expression of liberty.  They were
convicted abolitionists and believed strongly in the social and economic possibilities of
the American experience.  Hard-work, individual and social amelioration, intellectual
progress, cultural exploration, liberty, equality, dignity and political participation were
the values with which Brandeis was raised.
     Brandeis’s life with the law began in 1875 when he entered Harvard Law School.  He
was the youngest person ever to enter and graduate that institution.  He excelled in every
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part of his academic training, thoroughly impressing the dean of the Law School,
Christopher Columbus Langdell, and the president of Harvard, Charles Eliot.  Brandeis
left Harvard in 1878, having achieved the highest scholastic record of any Harvard law
student, a record that remains unsurpassed to this day.76
     His life with the law continued when, after graduating Harvard, Brandeis and his
classmate Samuel Warren opened a private law practice in Boston.  Brandeis’s wealth
and reputation soon began to grow.  He became part of the social, political and
intellectual elite of Boston.  Being socially revered and wealthy aligned Brandeis with
the Brahmins of Boston, the intellectually and culturally well-to-do class of New
England.  By 1910, not only was he the most famous lawyer in America, he had amassed
personal wealth well over one million dollars.  (It was up to three million by the time he
retired from the Court.)
     In 1891 Brandeis married his second cousin Alice Goldmark.  (Coincidentally,
William James, John Dewey, and Louis Brandeis each married a woman named Alice.)
Louis and Alice had two children together: Susan, born in 1893, and Elizabeth, born in
1896.  Following in their father’s footsteps, Susan became a successful lawyer and
Elizabeth a respected economist.  Throughout their lives Brandeis was active in family
life.  For Brandeis, family life was inseparable from a life of education.  He traveled with
his family all across America and Europe and worked to give his children the best
education available.  The importance of family and education were values Brandeis
carried with him always.
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     Brandeis was publicly active in the most important social and political issues of turn-
of-the-century America, fighting against “bigness” in all its forms.  He fought against
political corruption, transportation trusts, energy trusts, industrial trusts, and the
consolidation of political, economic, and social power wherever it proved to threaten
social and individual well-being.  In the 1890s, Brandeis fought against private
corporations that wanted to monopolize public transportation throughout Boston.  While
he argued both successfully and unsuccessfully in this fight, the opportunity to act as an
advocate for public causes gave Brandeis the chance to hone his political skills.
Brandeis called his fight against the private transportation corporations his “first
important public work.”77
     His important works extended into areas such as industrial life insurance and the
establishment of savings bank life policies.  Brandeis’s book Other People’s Money was
his sociological analysis of the relationship between industry, the economy and society.
It was also in that book that Brandeis coined the phrase the “Curse of Bigness.”  As
Brandeis described, “Size, we are told, is not a crime.  But size may, at least, become
noxious by reason of the means through which it was attained or the uses to which it is
put.  And it is size attained by combination, instead of natural growth, which has
contributed so largely to our financial concentration.”78   But these social and political
concerns had less to do with what made sound economic sense and more to do with his
interest in the lives of industrial laborers.  Brandeis was concerned with how a laborer
could live securely, freely, happily, and meaningfully in the face of consolidated power.
Brandeis supported unions because he believed workers had a right to be secure in their
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pursuit of prosperity.  This was also the reason he fought for a limit on the number of
hours women could work in a day, a fight that lead to the now famous “Brandeis Brief.”
With the “Brandeis Brief,” his biographer Philippa Strum writes, he “changed the course
of American legal history.”79  The “Brandeis Brief” foreshadowed much of what
Brandeis would be doing on the Supreme Court.
     His journey to the Supreme Court began in 1912 when he campaigned for the
presidency of Robert La Follette.  Brandeis went on speaking tours across the Midwest
and North East campaigning for La Follette, and his national political notoriety began to
grow even more.  Ironically, it was through campaigning for La Follette that Brandeis
got to know Woodrow Wilson, one of La Follotte’s competitors for the presidency.  It
was Wilson who appointed Brandeis to the Court in 1916.
     In January of 1916, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Lamar died.  Wilson immediately
thought of Brandeis.  What followed in the Senate was, according to Strum, “one of the
most controversial [nominations] in the history of the Supreme Court.”80  And as Trevor
Parry-Giles describes,
So notorious was Brandeis’ reputation, so complete and well known his
progressivism that the possibility of his ascending to the highest court in the land
sent shivers throughout the political worlds of Boston and Washington. His
nomination became a signature moment in the early twentieth century and it
demarcated the parameters of Supreme Court confirmations for much of the
century, forever altering this critical constitutional ritual in American political
life.81
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Brandeis’s confirmation process took more than six months, and both the Senate
Judiciary Committee and the full Senate voted down party lines.  But that was enough.
Louis Brandeis became Justice Louis Brandeis on June 5, 1916.
     His tenure on the court lasted until February 13, 1939.  By the time he retired, he was
the most influential Supreme Court justice still alive.  His opinions have been considered
some of the most eloquent and influential, especially in areas such as civil liberties and
the structure of government.  His influence on twentieth century American jurisprudence
is almost unparalleled: “Brandeis’s approach to sociological jurisprudence gradually
became the jurisprudence of the Court and eventually of the entire federal system,”
writes Strum.82
     When he was appointed to the Court, Brandeis resigned from his duties in social and
political organizations, except for one.  From 1910 until his death, Brandeis was one of
the most visible and respected leaders of the modern Zionist movement.  Brandeis’s
uncle Dembitz was an orthodox Jew, a lawyer, a social advocate, and a tremendous
influence on Brandeis.  In fact, it was the enduring influence of his uncle that helped
Brandeis embrace Zionism.  Before his appointment to the court, Brandeis was an
outspoken proponent of American Zionism, leading the movement within the United
States and earning an international reputation for his activism.  In 1919, after three years
on the court, Brandeis even traveled to Palestine to consult with international Zionist
leagues and to witness firsthand the struggles of Middle Eastern Jews.  He considered
the trip one of the greatest events of his life.  Throughout his time on the court, Zionism
was the only topic he spoke on publicly.
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     Louis Brandeis suffered a heart attack on October 1, 1941 and died on October 5.
     The remainder of this thesis will explore the ways in which Louis Brandeis articulates
the pragmatic political style.  It is important to keep in mind, however, that by saying he
articulates the pragmatic political style, I am not saying that his pragmatic style is the
only pragmatic style, that it is the final word on pragmatism, or that Brandeis was even
self-consciously a pragmatist.
     There are, however, a number of interesting historical connections between Brandeis
and James and Dewey.  Brandeis knew James personally, mainly through Brandeis’s
wife Alice, whom James knew well as part of the Goldmark family of Boston.  Also, in
August of 1906 James wrote to his wife, “Henry walked too much yesterday so couldn’t
walk, and I went off in the forenoon, saw Miss Hillard, went to the Goldmarks where
were the Brandeises and the Stewardsons.  Very pleasant & very beautiful.  After my
nap, found Brandeis sitting with Henry and accompanied him back to the Adler’s who
were pleasant. . . .  Brandeis I like.”83  Brandeis apparently thought the same of James.
From his early days at Harvard, Brandeis’s notebooks, writes Philippa Strum, “were
replete with quotations from Emerson and William James.”84  Brandeis did not know
Dewey personally, but was well aware of Dewey’s philosophical and social-political
work.85  And Dewey included Brandeis along with Holmes as the most important jurists
of the twentieth century: “Holmes and Brandeis are notable not only for their sturdy
defense of civil liberties but even more for the fact that they based their defense on the
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indispensable value of free inquiry and free discussion to the normal development of
public welfare, not upon anything inherent in the individual as such.”86
     But for all his connections with James and Dewey, Brandeis would never have said
that his project was to be a pragmatist.  Hariman’s work on political style analyzes
exemplar texts not because those texts self-consciously operate as specific political
styles, under the directives of stylistic commands, but because such texts will help those
interested in stylized negotiations of power better understand the possibilities and
limitations of the role of language in political exchange.  As Hariman rightly points out,
political style is largely a rhetorical matter, “a catalog of the means of persuasion
characteristic of a particular political culture that could be used by anyone attempting to
secure advantage.”87  The aim of this thesis is to show how Brandeis used pragmatic
means of persuasion to secure advantage.
     The next chapter will discuss Brandeis’s rhetoric prior to his tenure on the Supreme
Court.  The aim of this chapter will be to explore through Brandeis’s pre-Court rhetoric
the relationship between pragmatism and individualism.  Brandeis’s political activities
prior to the Court focused on “bigness.”  “[T]he race must steadily insist upon preserving
its moral vigor unweakened,” Brandeis counseled against bigness.  “It is not good for us
that we should ever lose the fighting quality, the stamina, and the courage to battle for
what we want when we are convinced that we are entitled to it, and other means fail.”88
This chapter will show how pragmatism opposes “bigness” because bigness threatens the
growth of the individual.  Brandeis advocated extensively for reform in industry,
especially in manufacturing, insurance and transportation; he did so because he feared
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for the well-being of the individual in industrial society.  Brandeis also explored privacy
issues, expressed in his grounding breaking essay “The Right to Privacy,” because he
feared for individuals threatened by bigness in numerous forms—political,
technological, industrial, cultural, social and religious forms.  Perhaps the most
important part of this chapter will be the analysis of the “Brandeis brief,” which wove
sociological, statistical, economic and physiological evidence through the argument that
the government should regulate the number of hours women are allowed to work in a
single day.  Indeed, it was the “Brandeis Brief” that set the tone for his entire rhetorical
corpus.
     In chapter three I will explore Brandeis’s tenure on the Supreme Court, a tenure in
which Brandeis became a hallmark of judicial eloquence and influence for the remainder
of the twentieth century.  Brandeis’s judicial rhetoric was nothing short of remarkable, as
the following, frequently quoted excerpt shows:
The makers of our Constitution understood the significance of man’s spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.  They knew that only a part of the pain,
pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things.  They sought
to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations.  They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let
alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men.89
This chapter will explore the relationship between pragmatism and society.  While
pragmatism is often charged with being too individualistic, this chapter aims to show
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that its individualism does not come at the expense of community and society.
Pragmatism is congenial to both the needs of the individual and of society—the aim, in
fact, is balance between the two.  I will develop this argument by analyzing Brandeis’s
opinions concerning civil liberties and the structure of government and society.
     Following that I will analyze Brandeis’s Zionist rhetoric.  During his life Brandeis
was one of the most influential Zionists, in America and abroad.  While on the Court,
Zionism was the only issue he advocated publicly apart from the Court’s activities.
Perhaps that helps explain why Brandeis saw the modern Zionist movement as so
complementary with American democracy.  “America’s fundamental law,” wrote
Brandeis, “seeks to make real the brotherhood of man.  That brotherhood became the
Jewish fundamental law more than twenty-five hundred years ago.  America’s insistent
demand in the twentieth century is for social justice.  That also has been the Jews’
striving for ages. . . .  The Jewish spirit, the product of their religion and experiences, is
essentially modern and essentially American.”90  Pragmatism is, nowadays, not
immediately associated with religious or spiritual matters.  But I will show that
Brandeis’s passion for Zionism, instead of separating him from pragmatism, keeps him
fully in line with the pragmatic desire to create a meaningful life.  In that way,
Brandeis’s life represents the culmination of the pragmatic style.
     The fifth and final chapter will summarize this project’s findings.  I will reiterate the
main arguments and the importance of this study.  As a final word, I will suggest
directions for further scholarship.  Pragmatism as an attitude, as an approach, as a way of
engaging the world has much to offer communication and rhetorical studies.  At this
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time, communication scholars have done little work on it.  Pragmatism is a rich body of
discourse indeed, and particularly relevant if one is to engage the social, political and
cultural intricacies that constitute the American experience.91
     There is indeed something unique about the American experience.  There is
something that makes it directly relevant to contemporary society—the American
experience is ongoing, it is a current undertaking, it is happening right now.  My project
will draw on figures in the former half of the twentieth century as a way of shedding
light on the current situation of the American experience.  Because communication
scholars have largely overlooked pragmatism, and because it represents a rich body of
literature relevant to the ongoing American experience, this study will act as an attempt
to integrate the wisdom of the pragmatic attitude into common parlance, into the
contemporary understanding of what it means to continue the project of forging a moral
identity.
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CHAPTER II
PRAGMATISM AS INDIVIDUALISM:
LOUIS BRANDEIS’S PRE-COURT RHETORIC
     The common perception of William James, says John McDermott, is as “a thinker so
notoriously concerned with the individual and so singularly free of apparent insight to
matters social or to the sociological context for inquiry.”1  James surely was an
individualist.  But the term “individualist,” applied to James without qualification, can
be horribly misleading, for individualist carries with it the unfortunate connotations of
being for the individual and against society.  The perception is that since James was an
individualist, his insights carry no significance for society.  Thus pragmatism, attached
to the misleading connotations of individualism, becomes a philosophy of self-interest,
of personal satisfaction, of boorish self-fulfillment.  Pragmatism becomes a philosophy
of fulfilling one’s desires by any means necessary, of antisocial self-promotion, of ends
justifying means on the way to personal advancement.  Pragmatism comes to mean
individualism at the expense of the community.
     This understanding of James’s individualism misses the point of his philosophy.
James does believe that the meaning of one’s experiences emerges from one’s own will.
He says, “Every human being must sometime decide for himself whether life is worth
living.”2  And later he says, “The inmost nature of the reality is congenial to powers
which you possess.”3  In that way, James’s individualism is clear.  Yet James also
describes his philosophy as “being essentially a social philosophy, a philosophy of ‘co,’
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in which conjunctions do the work.”4  James’s philosophy is a philosophy of relations, of
the experiential fabric of life.  The reality of human experience is a reality of movement
in the relational manifold, wherein one is bound more or less directly, more or less
indirectly, to countless others in the flow.
     Brandeis believed in individualism of the Jamesian variety.  In May of 1905 he told
industrial workers in Boston, “it rests with you whether and to what extent the approach
to perfection shall be made.  It is you who can determine how far this experiment shall
go.”5  Brandeis was speaking of experiments in cooperation between workers and
employers specifically.  But his sentiment was one he carried with him always—social
amelioration can only come about by the powers of individuals; and it is up to
individuals to try to develop their powers, whatever limitations they may face, and
pursue the better life.  And like James, Brandeis’s individualism in no way neglected
society and the community.  The full meaning of life, for Brandeis, emerged through the
individual’s creative intelligence in the context of personal and social relations.
     The purpose of this chapter is to explore this notion of individualism as it relates to
pragmatism, and more specifically, as articulated in Brandeis’s pragmatic political style.
My contention is that the importance of individualism was not only one of Brandeis’s
most cherished beliefs, it was also one of his most enacted rhetorical devises.  No matter
what the specific point of his address, Brandeis arrived at his point by focusing on the
individual and the individual’s place in society.  In that way his messages worked to
focus the audience’s attention on the promises of individualism.  Stressing the
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importance of individualism was the rhetorical lynchpin of Brandeis’s pre-Court
rhetoric.
     Although known primarily as a Supreme Court Justice, Brandeis was a very busy
orator prior to his term on the Court.  This chapter will focus primarily on three texts or
areas of his pre-Court rhetoric.  First I will analyze Brandeis’s ground-breaking essay,
which he co-wrote with his law partner Samuel Warren, “The Right to Privacy.”  The
essay represents Brandeis and Warren’s attempt to focus attention on the importance of
individualism in American society.  Second I will analyze Brandeis’s views on industry
and democracy through various speeches, articles, interviews and testimonies he gave
prior to taking his seat on the Court.  These various texts on industry and democracy
highlight the problems and possibilities the individual faces in society.  Third I will
analyze what many scholars consider to be the crowning jewel of his pre-Court
activities, the Brandeis Brief.  Although by no means an eloquent document, the
Brandeis Brief is nonetheless rhetorically powerful; it is, at the same time, thoroughly
pragmatic.
The Upshot of “The Right to Privacy”
     It is not exactly clear why Brandeis and Warren wrote “The Right to Privacy.”  The
general speculation is that they wrote it in reaction to disclosures of Warren’s private life
in Boston’s Saturday Evening Gazette.  Philippa Strum believes it was Brandeis and
Warren’s distress from “the lurid newspaper coverage given to Warren’s engagement
and marriage to the daughter of Senator Thomas Baynard.”6  Stephen Baskerville finds
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this explanation unconvincing.  It was not the portrayal of Warren’s private life in the
papers but the portrayal of a popular Broadway actress, including pictures of the actress
in tights taken without her permission, that inspired Brandeis and Warren to write.7
Lewis Paper agrees with Baskerville and extends the insight.  It was not the Boston
Gazette’s reporting on Warren that urged Brandeis and Warren to write the article; it was
the way the Boston press in general treated Warren’s father-in-law, Senator Baynard,
that made Warren so sensitive to the publishing of private matters in the press.8
     Baskerville also believes Brandeis and Warren were influenced by E. L. Godkin’s
essay, “The Rights of the Citizen: To His Own reputation,” published in Scribner’s
Magazine in July of 1890.  Unfortunately, a letter from Brandeis to Warren in 1905
disputes that claim.  “My own recollection,” wrote Brandeis, “is that it was not Godkin’s
article but a specific suggestion of yours, as well as your deepseated abhorrence of the
invasions of social privacy, which led to our taking up the inquiry.”9  The real reason
Brandeis and Warren wrote “The Right to Privacy” probably has something to do with a
combination of Warren in the papers, of Warren’s father-in-law in the papers, and with
the way in which newspapers in general treated citizens.
     But for the present purposes, what inspired Brandeis and Warren is of less concern
than the fact that through the article they impacted the entire legal community.  Brandeis
hoped the article would get public opinion behind a law protecting the right to privacy
and “make people see that invasions of privacy are not necessarily borne—and then
make them ashamed of the pleasure they take in subjecting themselves to such
invasions.”10  Roscoe Pound, founder of sociological jurisprudence and Dean of the
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Harvard Law School, said the article did “nothing less than add a new chapter” to the
law.11  Other scholars referred to the article as “the outstanding example of the influence
of legal periodicals upon the American law,” and, “perhaps the most influential law
journal piece ever published.”12  When he was helping compile The Curse of Bigness,
Brandeis suggested “The Right to Privacy” be included in the volume because it was “of
more interest to the general public and the profession” than any other of his pre-Court
writings.13
     Brandeis and Warren believed “The Right to Privacy” necessary because, as they said
in the article, “Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and vicious, but has become a
trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery.”14  What the press has done,
believed Brandeis and Warren, is an affront to the organizational spaces of contemporary
life: “Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred
precincts of private and domestic life” (291).  And the consequences of this invasion into
the “sacred precincts” of the private sphere are disastrous:
Each crop of unseemly gossip, thus harvested, becomes the seed of more, and, in
direct proportion to its circulation, results in a lowering of social standards and of
morality.  Even gossip apparently harmless, when widely and persistently
circulated, is potent for evil.  It both belittles and perverts.  It belittles by
inverting the relative importance of things, thus dwarfing the thoughts and
aspirations of a people.  When personal gossip attaints the dignity of print, and
crowds the space available for matters of real interest to the community, what
wonder that the ignorant and thoughtless mistake its relative importance (292).
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     In their article Brandeis and Warren argue that the law, while it has paid careful
attention to affirming the individual’s property rights, has paid scant attention to the
individual’s right to be “let alone.”  The law must recognize, they argue, that “the
individual shall have full protection in person and in property” (289).  At stake is not
only the health and well-being of the individual, but also the security of society: “[T]he
protection of society must come mainly through a recognition of the rights of the
individual” (315).  And through that recognition of the rights of the individual must also
come the individual’s responsibility to affirm society: “Each man is responsible for his
own acts and omissions only.  If he condones what he reprobates, with a weapon at hand
equal to his defense, he is responsible for the results.  If he resists, public opinion will
rally to his support” (315).  The individual is responsible for his or her individuality
because such individuality is an integral part of social well-being.  Again, the
individualism of which Brandeis speaks is not individualism over and against the
community; it is not individualism with interest in self-promotion alone.  The
individualism of which Brandeis speaks is individualism bound to society, bound to the
needs, interests, health and well-being of the community.
     Themes of pragmatism abound in “The Right to Privacy.”  Brandeis and Warren
consider the law fluid, dynamic, operative within an endless changing social
environment: “Political, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new
rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society”
(289).  The key phrase is “in its eternal youth.”  Pragmatists, recall, are against closed-
systems of meaning.  Meaning arises, rather, from experiencing the risks and
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possibilities of the world.  The meaning of the law, therefore, emerges from society’s
interaction with the challenges it faces.  The common law is in its “eternal youth”
because the challenges society faces are forever changing, forever posing new obstacles
to social flourishing.  The law must “grow” in order to equip society with the tools
necessary for thriving in the flow of experience.  The law in that sense is “always
becoming,” a point best put by Benjamin Cardozo, with whom Brandeis shared many
intellectual convictions.15  Cardozo writes,
Real law . . . is not found anywhere except in the judgment of a court.  In that
view, even past decisions are not law.  The courts may overrule them.  For the
same reason present decisions are not law, except for the parties litigant.  Men go
about their business from day to day, and govern their conduct by an ignis fatuus.
The rules to which they yield obedience are in truth not law at all.  Law never is,
but is always about to be.  It is realized only when embodied in a judgment, and
in being realized, expires.  There are no such things as rules or principles: there
are only isolated dooms.16
     This point speaks to Dewey’s understanding of social life—the recognition that
individuals are called to cope with perpetually changing circumstances: “Nothing is
blinder than the supposition that we live in a society and world so static that either
nothing new will happen or else it will happen because of the use of violence.  Social
change is here as a fact, a fact having multifarious forms and marked in intensity.”17  Just
as Brandeis believed that liberating the individual in the face of menacing social
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conditions meant giving the individual responsibility for his or her existence, so Dewey
believes that society must relinquish control of human powers to the wills of individuals:
Flux does not have to be created.  But it does have to be directed.  It has to be so
controlled that it will move to some end in accordance with the principles of life,
since life itself is development.  Liberalism is committed to an end that is at once
enduring and flexible: the liberation of individuals so that realization of their
capacities may be the law of their life.  It is committed to the use of freed
intelligence as the method of directing change.18
For Brandeis and Warren, this is exactly what being an individual in society means: “the
right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life—the right to be let alone, the right
to liberty secures the exercise of extensive civil privileges” (289).
     The law serves society by evolving with the dynamic character of the social
environment so as to liberate the individuals who comprise society.  Yet while Brandeis
and Warren criticize the law for not properly accounting for the right to be let alone,
their criticism would not be complete without the attempt to help the law, to help the law
become better and serve social needs more effectively.  Brandeis and Warren do this
through a series of six guidelines that, they hope, will allow the law to serve the
individual’s interest in being let along while maintaining society’s need to function.
Their six propositions try to answer James’s question of what practical difference will it
make if this or that world-formula be true.  “First,” Brandeis and Warren write, “The
right to privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter which is of public or general
interest” (310).  They believe there is no cut-and-dried way to calculate which matters
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are of public or general interest and which matters are not.  Application of the law is
never that easy.  Nevertheless, information of a clearly public interest must be made
available to the public.19  “Second,” Brandeis and Warren write, “The right to privacy
does not prohibit the communication of any matter, though in its nature private, when
the publication is made under circumstances which would render it a privileged
communication according to the law of slander and libel” (312).  This guideline says that
private matters cease to be private when, through the proper channels, private matters
become a part of the public record.  When private matters are communicated publicly,
they cease to be private.  “Third,” they write, “The law would probably not grant any
redress for the invasion of privacy by oral publication in the absence of special damage”
(313).  Brandeis says “would probably” because no guideline is absolute and
circumstances always admit exceptions.  This guideline also points to the distinction
between oral and written publications that has been a common distinction in the law
throughout the twentieth century.20  “Fourth,” write Brandeis and Warren, “The right to
privacy ceases upon the publication of the facts by the individual, or with his consent”
(313).  This guideline is a more specific instance of the second guideline: if the
individual chooses to publicize private matters, such matters cease to be private.  “Fifth,”
they say, “The truth of the matter published does not afford a defense” (313-14).  The
end of uncovering “the truth” does not justify the means by which it is uncovered.
Activities of one’s private life are by definition private matters, not public, and therefore
the public has no interest in information regarding private matters whether or not such
information be true or false.  “Sixth,” Brandeis and Warren write, “The absence of
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‘malice’ in the publisher does not afford a defense” (314).  Just because the publisher did
not intentionally mean to invade or harm one’s private life is no reason the publisher is
not culpable.  “Viewed as a wrong to the individual, this rule is the same pervading the
whole law of torts, by which one is held responsible for his intentional acts, even though
they are committed with no sinister intent” (314).
     Brandeis and Warren’s application of the right to privacy attempts to integrate the
principles of the right to privacy into the existing legal structure.  There is no utopianism
in their view; there is only the recognition that a problem exists and that there is a way to
deal with the problem.  Brandeis and Warren face up to the same difficulty James sees
for philosophers: “we are born into a society whose ideals are largely ordered already.”21
Brandeis and Warren face up to a system of laws that overlooks the need for a right to
privacy and they act as partisans for those who should be given the right to be let alone.
     Perhaps the most interesting aspect, at least for the present purposes, of “The Right to
Privacy” is the way in which Brandeis and Warren enact individuality as a rhetorical
devise.  They open their essay surveying the historical ground of legal development.
They note how the law’s “right to life” affirmation once meant only the protection from
physical harm.  Then the “right to life” came to mean the right to be secure in one’s
property.  It finally came to recognize the individual’s spiritual nature, and in
contemporary society it means the right to enjoy life:
The intense intellectual and emotional life, and the heightening of sensation
which came with the advance of civilization, made it clear to man that only a part
of the pain, pleasure, and profit of life lay in physical things.  Thoughts,
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emotions, and sensations demanded legal recognition, and the beautiful capacity
for growth which characterizes the common law enabled the judges to afford the
requisite protection, without the interposition of the legislature (291).
Essentially, the “right to life” culminates in recognizing the qualities of
individuality—the qualities of personal, spiritual, emotional, and intellectual growth.  In
its most operative sense, the “right to life” recognizes the elements most important for
individuality—the feelings, interests, beliefs and desires that mark the person as an
individual.
     The problem, say Brandeis and Warren, is that “recent inventions and business
methods” have threatened the right to develop one’s individuality.  They survey the
contemporary landscape, uncover the growing threat to the right to enjoy life, and stress
“the necessity” of developing legal protections to secure the individual’s right to pursue
individuality.  The struggle, indeed, is between the endlessly developing machine of
industrial society and the wonders of the cultivation of individuality:
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have
rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the refining
influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and
privacy have become more essential to the individual; but modern enterprise and
invention have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain
and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury (292).
Brandeis and Warren’s point is not that the individual must act over and against society
to cultivate individuality; their point is rather that sacrificing the project of forging an
47
individual identity can be disastrous.  There can be no benefit from facilitating the
growth of industrial democracy while destroying the potential of the individual
organism.  “Triviality destroys at once robustness of thought and delicacy of feeling.  No
enthusiasm,” they write, “can flourish, no generous impulse can survive under its
blighting influence” (292).
     Their eloquence points to Dewey’s belief—one of his most cherished beliefs—in the
importance of individual growth.  The purpose of education, says Dewey in How We
Think, is
to cultivate deep-seated and effective habits of discriminating tested beliefs from
mere assertions, guesses, and opinions; to develop a lively, sincere, and open-
minded preference for conclusions that are properly grounded and to ingrain into
the individual’s working habits methods of inquiry and reasoning appropriate to
the various problems that present themselves.  No matter how much an individual
knows as a matter of hearsay and information, if he has not attitudes and habits
of this sort, he is not intellectually educated.22
Dewey and Brandeis’s words are the same.  The meaning of life emerges in the process
of cultivating individuality, of nurturing individual powers, of grappling with the
dangers of contemporary society, of rejecting second-handed individuality in all its
forms.  The result of pursuing meaning in this way is nothing less than human freedom
in its fullest sense.  “Genuine freedom, in short,” writes Dewey, “is intellectual; it rests
in the trained power of thought, in the ability to ‘turn things over,’ to look at matters
deliberately, to judge whether the amount and kind of evidence requisite for decision is
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at hand, and if not, to tell here and how to seek such evidence.”23  The danger in modern
society is, of course, the opposite of freedom: enslavement.  “To cultivate unhindered,
unreflective external activity,” Dewey concludes, “is to foster enslavement, for it leaves
the person at the mercy of appetite, sense, and circumstance.”24
     Throughout their article Brandeis and Warren survey legal decisions from across the
ocean, in England and France, and conclude that the progress of the civilized world
demands a recognition of the right to be let alone: “The right of property in its widest
sense, including all possession, including all rights and privileges, and hence embracing
the right to an inviolate personality, affords alone that broad basis upon which the
protection which the individual demands can be rested” (307).  The right to be let alone
is, in fact, nothing new.  Societies across the world have recognized it, say Brandeis and
Warren, because the nature of contemporary society shows that individuals must be
protected in their pursuits of individuality.  They write,
We must therefore conclude that the rights, so protected, whatever their exact
nature, are not rights arising from contract or from special trust, but are rights as
against the world. . . .  The principle which protects personal writings and any
other productions of the intellect or of the emotions, is the right to privacy, and
the law has no new principle to formulate when it extends this protection to the
personal appearance, sayings, acts, and to personal relations, domestic or
otherwise (308-09).
For America to turn a blind eye to the most advanced developments of the law of
humanity, to reject the importance of individuality in society, would be to take a step
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backwards in human progress.  “It is believed that the common law provides [the
individual with the right to privacy], forged in the slow fire of the centuries, and today
fitly tempered to his hand,” Brandeis and Warren conclude.  “The common law has
always recognized a man’s house as his castle, impregnable, often even to its own
officers engaged in the execution of its commands.  Shall the courts thus close the front
entrance to constituted authority, and open wide the back door to idle or prurient
curiosity?” (315).
     The rhetorical force of “The Right to Privacy,” the power of its arguments, the
strength of its presentation, all stem from its rhetorical enactment of individuality.
While they specifically advocate for a legal recognition of personal privacy—in its most
broad sense—they do so through an analysis of the place of the individual in
contemporary society.  Brandeis and Warren search the annals of historical development,
they peruse the landscape of international political culture, they analyze the character of
industrial society, and they conclude that it all comes down to the cultivation of
individuality.  To forget that would be to forget humanity’s progress.  And to neglect the
cultivation of individuality would be to stunt humanity’s growth.
     The rhetorical structure of Brandeis and Warren’s “The Right to Privacy”—the
movement of the text from the annals of human history to the promotion of
individuality—is the same rhetorical structure of James’s “The Sentiment of
Rationality.”  Like Brandeis and Warren, James attempts to revive faith in the
importance of individuality in the presence of external opposition.  The external
opposition to individuality James focuses on is not industrial society, as it is in Brandeis
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and Warren’s article (even though James would concur with Brandeis and Warren’s
analysis), but James’s concern is with philosophy in general.  The general purpose of
philosophy, James says, is “to attain a conception of the frame of things which shall on
the whole be more rational than that somewhat chaotic view which every one by nature
carries about with him under his hat.”25  The usual philosophic approach is to banish
individual beliefs and desires from the pursuit of rational investigation.  By blocking
individuality from rational inquiry, by seeking to transcend the individual’s chaotic
understanding of reality, philosophy’s goal is to “banish uncertainty from the future.”26
The philosopher’s goal is to reduce the universe to a rational structure—and thereby
achieve universality through reason—and leave behind the plague of individual
insecurity.
     But James objects adamantly.  The meaning of life does not come with certainty or
rationality, says James, but comes with the cultivation of individuality.  The meaning of
life comes in pouncing ahead in the fabric of experience with faith in one’s ability to live
a good life.  Faith, in short, creates meaning: “Believe, and you shall be right, for you
shall save yourself; doubt, and you shall again be right, for you shall perish.  The only
difference is that to believe is greatly to your advantage” (337).  Philosophy needs to
leave behind the meaningless quest for certainty, for self-transcendence, James
proclaims, and focus on what makes life worth living, what makes the individual able to
feed individuality.  “[T]he highest good can be achieved only by our getting our proper
life,” says James.  “[A]nd that can come about only by help of a moral energy born of
the faith that in some way or other we shall succeed in getting it if we try pertinaciously
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enough.  This world is good, we must say, since it is what we make it,—and we shall
make it good” (340).  Just as Brandeis and Warren did, James ends with the belief that if
the history of human development teaches one thing, it teaches the importance of
individuality: “All that the human heart wants is its chance.  It will willingly forego
certainty in universal matters if only it can be allowed to feel that in them it has that
same inalienable right to run risks, which no one dreams of refusing to it in the pettiest
practical affairs” (344-45).
     “The Right to Privacy” and the “Sentiment of Rationality” both try to reinsert the
promise of individualism into public life.  Pragmatists believe individuality is of the
utmost importance if one is to have a meaningful life.  The rhetorical project of both
“The Right to Privacy” and “The Sentiment of Rationality” is to struggle with the
prospects of human potential and arrive at a fully developed understanding of what it
means to be an individual in contemporary society.  Brandeis believes the key to
understanding what it means to be an individual in contemporary society lies in the
prospect of industrial democracy.  It is to Brandeis’s take on industrial democracy that I
turn.
Individualism and Industrial Democracy
     Industrial democracy for Brandeis represents the potential for equality in industrial
relations—be those relations social, economic, political, or hierarchical.  It represents
only the “potential” because for Brandeis no outcome is certain.  Industrial democracy
represents a hope, not a positive end to industrial strife.  There will always be difficulty
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in industrial relations, Brandeis says, because the nature of those problems is always
changing; reality is always changing, and there is no final solution, only amelioration.
As Brandeis writes in a letter to Robert W. Bruere:
Refuse to accept as inevitable any evil in business (e.g., irregularity of
employment).  Refuse to tolerate any immoral practice (e.g., espionage).  But do
not believe that you can find a universal remedy for evil conditions or immoral
practices in effecting a fundamental change in society (as by State Socialism). . .
.  Seek for betterment within the broad lines of existing institutions.  Do so by
attacking evil in situ; and proceed from the individual to the general.  Remember
that progress is necessarily slow; that remedies are necessarily tentative; that
because of varying conditions there must be much and constant inquiry into facts
. . . and much experimentation; and that always and everywhere the intellectual,
moral, and spiritual development of those concerned will remain an
essential—and the main factor—in real betterment.27
The project of industrial democracy is to strive for individual and social betterment, to
undergo change, to pursue liberation.  It is not an end in itself and it is not a means to an
industrial utopia;  it is, given the experiences of history, the best option available.
     Rhetorically, Brandeis’s view on industrial democracy is an extension of his view on
American democracy.  Whereas American democracy was created to leave behind the
evils of aristocracy and monarchy, so industrial democracy is the project of leaving
behind industrial despotism.  In a 1904 address in Boston, Brandeis said: “Industrial
liberty must attend political liberty.  The lead which America takes in the industrial
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world is no doubt due to our unbounded resources; but of these resources none are so
great as the spirit and the ability incident to a free people.”28  A year later, in May of
1905, Brandeis made the analogy of democracy to monarchy more explicit:
One hundred years ago the civilized world did not believe that it was possible
that the people could rule themselves; they did not believe that it was possible to
have government of the people, by the people, and for the people.  America in
the last century proved that democracy is a success.
The civilized world today believes that in the industrial world self-government
is impossible; that we must adhere to the system which we have known as the
monarchical system, the system of master and servant, or, as now more politely
called, employer and employee.  It rests with this century and perhaps with
America to prove that as we have in the political world shown what self-
government can do, we are to pursue the same lines in the industrial world.29
Creating industrial democracy will surely be a struggle; it will be a struggle just as the
creation of American political democracy was a struggle—an unending struggle at that.
But industrial democracy is much better than the alternative, industrial monarchy or
oligarchy.
     A metaphor running continuously through Brandeis’s comparison of industrial
democracy to industrial monarchy is the metaphor of master and slave, ruler and subject.
In an address before the Ethical Cultural Meeting House in Boston, February 1912,
Brandeis said, “[The industrial life nowadays] is a life so inhuman as to make our former
Negro slavery infinitely preferable, for the master owned the slave, and tried to keep his
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property in working order for his own interest.”  Shortly thereafter he said, “Here you
have a corporation that has made it its cardinal principle of action that its employees
must be absolutely subject to its will.  It is treason for an employee to participate with
other employees for combination.”30  What society cannot allow is the creation of an
industrial kingdom, wherein the very few rule the many.  The issue is democracy versus
monarchy, and the lessons of history speak of which is the better system:
A large part of the American people realize today that competition is in no sense
inconsistent with large-scale production and distribution.  They realize that the
maintenance of competition does not necessarily involve destructive and
unrestrained competition, any more than the maintenance of liberty implies
license or anarchy.  We learned long ago that liberty could be preserved only by
limiting in some way the freedom of action of individuals; that otherwise liberty
would necessarily lead to absolutism and in the same way we have learned that
unless there be regulation of competition, its excesses will lead to the destruction
of competition, and monopoly will take its place.31
The issue is improving the structure of the system in which industry operates so as to
promote freedom, liberty, equality and well-being for all those participating in industrial
relations.
     But underlying the metaphors of democracy and monarchy, of master and slave, ruler
and subject, is the belief that Brandeis holds most dear: the importance of the individual.
Industrial democracy is pursued because it will free the individual from the tyranny of
monarchical rule.  The pursuit of industrial democracy is inexorably bound to the well-
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being of the individual’s life: “Either political liberty will be extinguished or industrial
liberty must be restored.”32  The problems of industry are problems for everyone in
America: “What America needs is not that we do anything for these, our fellow citizens,
but that we keep open the path of opportunity to enable them to do for themselves.”33
Brandeis wants to facilitate the individual’s own pursuit of well-being in social and
industrial relations.  He wants to take the rule of the individual away from the
monarchical power-brokers and leave the responsibility for individual progress with the
individual person.  Industrial democracy will entail, as Brandeis proclaims, “obedience
to the laws which the people make for themselves in a business, and not the laws which
are made for them and in the making of which they have no part.”34  If there is to be a
master in industrial relations, industrial democracy demands that individuals be
“master[s] of themselves.”35  And he wants every worker to come away with a clear
message: “you must take that responsibility as a citizen of a free community takes his
responsibility—something, that is, to be proud of; something that bears with it at times
heavy burdens, not lightly but joyously.”36
     “I abhor averages,” Brandeis told a reporter for the New York Times.  “I like the
individual case.”37  He made this clear rhetorically by ending his speeches on industrial
democracy by highlighting the importance of the individual, for it is the individual’s life
that is at stake in the struggle for industrial power.  It is with the individual that the
promise of industrial democracy lies: “You cannot eliminate [corporate] waste unless
you secure the co-operation of the worker, and you cannot secure his co-operation unless
he is satisfied that there is a fair distribution of profits.”38  In fact, all social relations, for
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Brandeis, come down to the place of the individual in the fabric of experience.  In
February of 1914 he told the United States Chamber of Commerce,
Every man in the medical world glories in having given to the world something
which advances medical science.  Every man in the field of architecture glories
when he can give to the world something that advances architectural science.
You will find exactly the same thing in almost every department of engineering.
Why should it not be so in business?  Is there any lack of opportunity for
competition, honorable competition, in the field of engineering or of architecture
or of medicine?  They can play the game wherever a man can see it.  There need
be no secrets when it comes to the question of advancing the art to which man
devotes himself.  And the same is absolutely true of business and will be
recognized as true of business as soon as men come to recognize that business is
one of the noblest and most promising of all the professions.39
Brandeis concludes his speeches on industrial democracy by stressing the importance of
the individual because it is the individual who nurtures and advances personal, social,
and human health.  Society and the individual are bound together in a continual give and
take of the opportunity for betterment.  Society depends on the individual and the
individual depends on society.
     In Individualism Old and New, Dewey makes the point that America’s historical
understanding of individualism—the understanding of the isolated soul sustaining his or
herself in the face of natural dangers—is outmoded in industrial society.  This is how
Dewey frames the matter:
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[T]he problem is seen to be essentially that of creation of a new individualism as
significant for modern conditions as the old individualism at its best was for its
day and place. . . .  [T]he issue will define itself as utilization of the realities of a
corporate civilization to validate and embody the distinctive moral element in the
American version of individualism: Equality and freedom expressed not merely
externally and politically but through personal participation in the development
of a shared culture.40
Dewey says the individual faces the most damning problem of industrial society: the
mechanization of personhood.  In contemporary industrial society, the individual faces
the “quantification of life, with its attendant disregard of quality” (12).  When life
becomes mechanized and quantified, the potential for meaning slips away.  “The
spiritual factor of our tradition,” says Dewey, “equal opportunity and free association
and intercommunication, is obscured and crowded out” (9).  Not only are the industrial
giants to blame for allowing the potential for meaning to slip away, individuals must also
share the blame, for individuals have power over the way in which they conceive of
individuality.  Dewey calls on individuals to take responsibility for their own position in
contemporary society.  The “disintegration of individuality,” says Dewey, is largely “due
to failure to reconstruct the self so as to meet the realities of present social life” (33).
Because the pursuit of meaning is the point of individuality, the individual is the one
who must work with the possibilities of the present to satisfy the desire for meaning:
“The future is always unpredictable.  Ideals, including that of a new and effective
individuality, must themselves be framed out of the possibilities of existing conditions,
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even if these be the conditions that constitute a corporate industrial age.  The ideals take
shape and gain a content as they operate in remaking conditions” (82).
     Dewey shares with Brandeis the belief in the importance of individuality.  Moreover,
both share the belief that the importance of individuality must survive the onslaught of
industrialism.  Brandeis calls for a democratization of industrial relations; Dewey calls
for a reconceptualization of what individuality means.  But both believe it is largely the
individual’s responsibility to sustain individuality.  It is the individual’s responsibility to
fight and struggle for meaning in industrial America.  It is, in fact, that fighting and
struggling, that undergoing of experience, that will, in the end, make individuality even
more meaningful.
     The attitude common to both Dewey and Brandeis is meliorism—the belief that the
possibilities for personal and social betterment are present and available through human
undertakings.  Meliorism in industrial relations is the belief that, while industrialism is
here to stay, the possibilities for a better future are present in the fabric of experience.
Dewey summarizes the task this way: “It is a property of science to find its opportunities
in problems, in questions.  Since knowing is inquiring, perplexities and difficulties are
the meat on which it thrives.  The disparities and conflicts that give rise to problems are
not something to be dreaded, something to be endured with whatever hardihood one can
command; they are things to be grappled with” (78).  The project as Dewey sees it is to
“grapple” with industrial problems intellectually, attempting to solve the problems
practically, with the knowledge that problem-solving is the creation of meaning, a step
towards a better future.  The belief is not that the future will be without strife and
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suffering but that it will be better than the present.  “[I]f life continues and if in
continuing it expands,” Dewey writes, “there is an overcoming of factors of opposition
and conflict; there is a transformation of them into differentiated aspects of a higher
powered and more significant life.”41
     Brandeis expresses his melioristic attitude toward industrial democracy by aligning it
with the pursuit of social and political democracy in America: “[W]e cannot successfully
grapple with the problem of democracy if we confine our efforts to political democracy.
American development can come on the lines on which we seek it, and the ideals which
we have can be attained, only if side by side with political democracy comes industrial
democracy.”42  Notice that Brandeis uses “grapple” just as Dewey used “grapple” to
describe the project the individual faces.  It is a struggle, it is a laborious undertaking,
but it is worth it; indeed, meaning resides in the grappling.  “Nothing could be more
revolutionary than to close the door to social experimentation,” says Brandeis in defense
of a minimum-wage statute for women.  “The whole subject of woman’s entry into
industry is an experiment.  And surely the federal constitution—itself perhaps the
greatest of human experiments—does not prohibit such modest attempts as the woman’s
minimum-wage act to reconcile the existing industrial system with our striving for social
justice and the preservation of the race.”43  Brandeis believes the social experimentation
of women in industry holds promise for a better future.  As he says, it is a matter not
only of favor for women but for social justice and the preservation of humanity.  He
makes roughly the same point when he talks about the role of competition in
contemporary society.  “As long as we maintain conditions favorable to competition and
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the freedom of individual development—conditions which leave the individual’s effort
untrammeled by superior power,” Brandeis says, “so long may we safely allow men to
make what profit they can get from an expectant public, and to exercise the largest
degree of liberty in the marketing of their products.”44
     For Brandeis and Dewey, individualism, if the individual can learn to grapple
intelligently with the problems of an ever-changing society, represents the promise of
social and personal betterment.  It is social and personal betterment because, while
Brandeis and Dewey maintain faith in the individual’s powers, those powers are
inseparable from the society in which the individual is embedded.  The hope for
amelioration is always contextualized within society.  “[L]ife goes on in an environment;
not merely in it but because of it, through interaction with it,” Dewey says.  He
continues, “At every moment, the living creature is exposed to dangers from its
surroundings, and at every moment, it must draw upon something in its surroundings to
satisfy its needs.  The career and destiny of a living being are bound up with its
interchanges with its environment, not externally but in the most intimate way.”45  The
individual cannot sustain well-being without the help of his or her environment,
including his or her communal and social environment.  But it is also true that society
cannot sustain well-being without the help of the individual.  The relationship is
symbiotic.  Brandeis puts the point masterfully: “Equal opportunity for all people as for
all individuals—that is the essential of international as well as of national justice upon
which a peace which is to be permanent must rest.  Unless that fundamental right is
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recognized and granted universally, there will be discord and war in the future, as there
has been in the past.”46
     While the hope for peace is a projection of a future age, the prospects for striving for
that peace are in the present age.  Dewey says that “To the being fully alive, the future is
not ominous but a promise; it surrounds the present as a halo.  It consists of possibilities
that are felt as a possession of what is now and here.  In life that is truly life, everything
overlaps and merges.”47  To understand these possibilities, one must be able to
understanding what is happening in the fabric of experience.  One must listen to the
world and “read” reality.  In that way, one must be able to understand the consequences
of personal and social undertakings.  It is only through understanding consequences that
one can grasp the prospects for peace.  Brandeis understood consequences arguably
better than any other lawyer of his day.  In 1908, his understanding of consequences
turned into what later became known as the “Brandeis Brief”—a document so insightful
that it changed the course of American legal history.
Consequences and the Rhetorical Power of the Brandeis Brief
     Rhetorical analysis does not lend itself easily to study of the Brandeis Brief.  It is,
after all, two pages of legal argument, a fifteen page survey of existing laws limiting the
number of hours women can work in a single day, and over ninety pages of sociological
data.  There is scant eloquence in the Brief.  Where Brandeis does contribute sentences
of his own to connect the sociological data, he writes mechanically, without the zeal and
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fervor for which he is known.  Even though it is probably the most influential and well-
known text from his pre-Court days, it is rhetorically alien to his normal style.
     The problem is that the Brandeis Brief is not meant to be eloquent.  It is not an
oration before a labor union, it is not an impassioned speech before the court, it is not
full of his usual musings on Americanism, democracy and progress.  It is, rather, a mere
collection of “the facts.”  But therein lies its force.  For there is a deception operating
within the Brief: its rhetorical power stems from its rhetorical simplicity.  To understand
this, however, perhaps it is best to explain some of the history of the brief.
     Curt Muller, owner of a laundry in Portland, Oregon believed it was within his legal
right to contract with his laundresses as to how many hours they would work in a day.
The state of Oregon thought differently.  In 1903 they had passed a law limiting to ten
per day the number of hours women were allowed to work in factories and industrial
settings.  Thus, Muller violated Oregon’s statute when he contracted with his laundresses
to work over ten hours a day.  He was convicted of a misdemeanor under Oregon’s
statute and he appealed all the way to the Supreme Court.  The case was Muller v.
Oregon (1908).48  The National Consumer’s League acted to defend Oregon’s statute.
First they sought the help of Joseph Choate, a well-known New York attorney.  He heard
the circumstances of the case and said, “Big, strong Irish laundry women?  Why
shouldn’t they work longer?”49  The Consumer’s League then turned to Brandeis.
Believing this was a matter of public concern, Brandeis freely volunteered his services,
which he did often when he believed the outcome of a case would directly influence
public matters.50
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     But Brandeis faced an uphill battle.  Two years after the State of Oregon approved its
statute limiting the number of hours a woman could work, the Supreme Court heard
arguments in Lochner v. New York (1905).  The issue before the Court was the
constitutionality of a law limiting the number of hours bakers could work in a single day.
At issue, the court said, was “the right of the individual to labor for such time as he may
choose, or the right of the state to prevent the individual from laboring, or from entering
into any contract to labor, beyond a certain time prescribed by the state.”51  The Court
believed the “liberty” clause of the Fourteenth Amendment included “liberty of
contract,” whereby individuals could buy and sell labor without restriction, so long as
that buying and selling was of mutual consent.  There were exceptions to this, however.
In 1898, in Holden v. Hardy (1898),52 the Court affirmed the constitutionality of a Utah
statute that limited to eight the number of hours a miner could work in a day.  The
reasoning was that in the unique and dangerous circumstances of mining, the state had a
right to protect its citizens’s safety, health, and morals, along with the general welfare of
the public.  Because of this precedent, the central question before the Court in Lochner
was, “Is this a fair, reasonable, and appropriate exercise of the police power of the state,
or is it an arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty, or
to enter into those contracts in relation to labor which may seem to him appropriate or
necessary for the support of himself and his family?”53  Thus the Court left open the
possibility that under “reasonable and appropriate” circumstances a state could limit the
number of hours individuals could work.  Such a limitation was designed to protect the
“safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the public.”54
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     The Court’s ruling in Lochner was a 5-4 split decision.  The majority ruled against
New York’s statute limiting bakers’s hours, but they did acknowledge the possibility for
the state to limit the number of hours an individual could work in specific circumstances
so long as the state was able to prove that it was acting to protect both individual and
communal safety, health, and morality.  The majority put the matter rather bluntly: “The
question whether this act [of New York] is valid as a labor law, pure and simple, may be
dismissed in a few words.  There is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty
of person or the right of free contract [guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment], by
determining the hours of labor, in the occupation of a baker.”55  The majority continued,
“Clean and wholesome bread does not depend upon whether the baker works but ten
hours per day or only sixty hours a week.  The limitation of the hours of labor does not
come within the police power on that ground.”56  Thus, while the Court actually struck
down New York’s statute, it reaffirmed the holding in Holden.  New York had not
proven, the Court said, that limiting the number of hours a baker could work actually
protected the safety, health, and morals of individual workers and the public.  “The
purpose of a stature must be determined,” said the Court, “from the natural and legal
effect of the language employed; and whether it is or is not repugnant to the Constitution
of the United States must be determined from the natural effect of such statutes when put
into operation, and not from their proclaimed purpose.”57  A statute claiming to protect
safety, health and morals must actually do so; it must produce its intended consequences.
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     Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote one of his most famous dissents in Lochner.  Believing
the Court had overstepped the limits of its authority, Holmes produced one of his most
memorable legal polemics:
The case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country
does not entertain. . . .  The 14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer’s Social Statics. . . .  [A] Constitution is not intended to embody a
particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of
the citizen to the state or of laissez faire.  It is made for people of fundamentally
differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and
familiar, or novel, and even shocking, ought not to conclude our judgment upon
the question whether statues embodying them conflict with the Constitution of
the United States.58
Part of Holmes’s contribution to constitutional jurisprudence, says Samuel Konefsky,
was “to rescue it from the unreal world of absolute concepts.”59  But what erupted after
Lochner was an intellectual battle around the Court’s part in political decision-making, a
battle that left the public wondering about the Court’s competency.  “The spectacle of
the country’s highest tribunal losing all sense of reality about a vital human and social
problem,” writes Konefsky, “was bound to hurt the Court’s standing with the public.”60
But what the Lochner debate did do, notes Philippa Strum, was leave the door open for
Brandeis’s sociological jurisprudence: “The only hope of getting that majority [in
Lochner] to sustain a statute was to flood it with such an overwhelming mass of statistics
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that it would be hard pressed to conclude that the state had not met its burden of proof.”61
And that is exactly what Brandeis did.
     The irony is that Brandeis used the Court’s reasoning and language in Lochner to, in
effect, overturn Lochner.62  Brandeis’s entire brief actually rests on one syllogism, a
syllogism Brandeis formulated using Lochner’s terminology.  To paraphrase Brandeis’s
reasoning, the argument is as follows:
If there is “fair ground, reasonably in and of itself, to say that there is material
danger to the public health (or safety), or to the health (or safety) or employees
(or to the general welfare), if the hours of labor are not curtailed,” then the hours
of labor must be curtailed.
There is “reasonable ground for holding that to permit women in Oregon to
work in a ‘mechanical establishment, or factory, or laundry’ more than ten hours
in one day is dangerous to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare.”
     Therefore, the hours of labor must be curtailed.63
Thus Brandeis’s project, in the over ninety pages remaining in the Brief, was to supply
the Court with evidence of the syllogism’s minor premise.  Brandeis had to “flood” the
Court, to use Strum’s term, with concrete sociological data showing conclusively that
there was “reasonable ground” to uphold Oregon’s statute.
     Brandeis writes the Brief very mechanically.  The majority of the Brief is, after all,
pages upon pages of excerpts from sociological surveys and studies across the
industrialized world—from England and France to Switzerland, Austria, Holland, Italy,
and Germany.  Brandeis writes the Brief so as to display only “the facts.”  He reasons
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that “facts of common knowledge” establish conclusively that “there is reasonable
ground for holding that to permit women in Oregon to work in a ‘mechanical
establishment, or factory, or laundry’ more than ten hours in one day is dangerous to the
public health, safety, morals, or welfare” (10).  But while Brandeis writes passively—in
order to try and remove any human element from the data, any human interpretation that
may skew “the facts”—his sentences are actually charged with emotion, infused with the
“human element.”
     His project in “Part First” (his language) of the Brief is to establish the international
perspective on limiting the number of hours women can work.  His conclusion after
surveying existing laws from “leading countries in Europe” is that “In no country in
which the legal limitation upon the hours of labor of adult women was introduced has
the law been repealed.  Practically without exception every amendment of the law has
been in the line of strengthening the law or further reducing the working time” (11).  So
Brandeis quotes from the laws of seven “leading countries in Europe” and then offers a
page and a half of similar laws in the United States.  He writes, “Twenty States of the
Union, including nearly all of those in which women are largely employed in factory or
similar work, have found it necessary to take action for the protection of their health and
safety and the public welfare, and have enacted laws limiting the hours of labor for adult
women.”  More to the point, he says, “In no instance has any such law been repealed.
Nearly every amendment in any law has been in the line of strengthening the law or
further reducing working time” (16).  The subtext of this section is that if the United
States were to find unconstitutional laws limiting the number of hours women could
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work in a day, it would fall decades behind Europe’s progress (and who in America
wants to fall behind Europe?!).  The United States cannot afford, Brandeis reasons, to
fall out of sync with international progress.  To do so would, in short, be un-American.
     From page 18, immediately after his survey of international laws, through page 112,
the end of the book, save for a one-paragraph conclusion, Brandeis undertakes his survey
of sociological data.  Notice how Brandeis begins this section:
Long hours of labor are dangerous for women primarily because of their special
physical organization.  In structure and function women are differentiated from
men. . . .  [P]hysicians are agreed that women are fundamentally weaker than
men in all that makes for endurance: in muscular strength, in nervous energy, in
the powers of persistent attention and application.  Overwork, therefore, which
strains endurance to the utmost, is more disastrous to the health of women than of
men, and entails upon them more lasting injury (18).
Nowadays, Brandeis would be shunned for his description of women.  In short, the
Brandeis Brief, notes Strum, “could not be comforting to feminists, because it classified
women as weak, dependent, and subordinate.  Women were not merely different; they
were both different and ‘not upon a quality.’”64  While one could level such an argument
against Brandeis, it would miss the point of his rhetoric: Brandeis framed his argument
in a way the sitting Court Justices could easily accept.  It was the prevailing belief of the
time, the belief that all “physicians are agreed” upon, that women were built for different
tasks than men.  The truth of such a belief is irrelevant for the current purposes.
Brandeis had to frame his sociological survey in such a way that his conclusion—that
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limiting the number of hours women could work in a day was constitutional and
beneficial for women and society—was inescapable.  Therefore, he had to rely upon the
prevailing beliefs, not only of the Supreme Court Justices, but of the public at large.  The
“facts” were “to speak for themselves,” and bouncing those facts off of common
contemporary beliefs was surely a way to give the facts room to speak.
     The point that women are weaker than men is brought to the fore in modern industrial
society, Brandeis said: “women are affected to a far greater degree than men by the
growing strain of modern industry” (24).  In fact any observer could conclude, Brandeis
hinted, that modern industry threatens the physical endowments of individuals workers:
“Machinery is increasingly speeded up, the number of machines tended by individual
workers grows larger, processes become more and more complex as more operations are
performed simultaneously.  All these changes involve correspondingly greater physical
strain upon the worker” (24).  By “the worker” Brandeis means not only women, but
men as well.  It is just a “bare fact” of modern industrial life that the dangers to “the
worker” are increasing on a consistent basis.  “The worker,” of course, is also a term of
individualism.  The threat to the individual comes from the dreadful giant known as
industry.  The threat is of “the machines” dominating “the individual.”
     The threat of modern industry involves the individual first and foremost; but it also
involves society at large, for society and the individual are bound together.  “The evil
effect of overwork before as well as after marriage upon childbirth,” Brandeis writes, “is
marked and disastrous” (36).  This brief sentence, the only sentence Brandeis writes to
connect nine pages of sociological data with another six pages of data, is charged with
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emotion.  Industry is “evil”; it results in “overwork,” an obvious danger to the
individual; it is detrimental not only to the individual but to “marriage,” a sacred
institution, part of the bedrock of society, and to “childbirth”; industry threatens the
entire family, and the consequences are “marked and disastrous.”  The threat of industry
is a matter of public morality.  “The effect of overwork on morals,” he writes six pages
later, “is closely related to the injury to health.  Laxity of moral fibre follows physical
debility.  When the working day is so long that no time whatever is left for a minimum
of leisure or home-life, relief from the strain of work is sought in alcoholic stimulants
and other excesses” (44).  Brandeis supports that claim with two pages of data.  Industry
destroys the individual’s potential and, more extensively, the potential for familial,
moral and social well-being.  Indeed, he says two pages later, “the deterioration is
handed down to succeeding generations. . . .  The overwork of future mothers thus
directly attacks the welfare of the nation” (47).
     Having discussed the dangers to society, Brandeis proceeds to show the dangers of
overwork on the economy.  The protection of women and society “can be afforded only
through shortening the hours of labor” (56).  He continues: “To the individual and to
society alike, shorter hours have been a benefit wherever introduced. . . .  Wherever
sufficient time has elapsed since the establishment of the shorter working day, the
succeeding generation has shown extraordinary improvement in physique and morals”
(57).  The consequences of enacting a shorter workday are far-reaching and beneficial
for everyone, even the capitalists: “The universal testimony of manufacturing countries
tends to prove that the regulation of the working day acts favorably upon output.  With
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long hours, output declines; with short hours, it rises.  The heightened efficiency of the
workers, due to the shorter day, more than balances any loss of time.  Production is not
only increased, but improved in quality” (65).  Again, this is not Brandeis speaking, but
the “universal testimony” of “the facts.”  And the statement is wound with the God-
terms of capitalism—“output,” output “rises,” “efficiency of the workers,” “balances any
loss of time,” “increased” production, “improved” quality.  Brandeis adopts the terms of
his audience and weaves them through the interlude between data.  The capitalists are
worried about the effects of shorter workdays on the economy, and Brandeis co-opts
them through terms of economic reassurance.
     The final parts of the Brief show the “reasonableness” of universally applying the
shorter workday for women and of the prudence of making that day ten hours long.
“Factory inspectors, physicians, and working women are unanimous in advocating the
ten-hour day, wherever it has not yet been established” (92).  The subtext is that
Brandeis is not the advocate; he is merely legal counsel for Oregon.  The advocates,
those speaking through Brandeis, are the ones truly involved in labor—factory
inspectors, physicians and working women.  They are the ones directly affected by labor
conditions and they are the ones advocating.  In good conscience, the Court cannot
dismiss their testimony.
     There is one final section and a conclusion remaining in the Brief.  The final section
deals specifically with the place of working women in laundries—the specific context of
the Oregon statute and the case before the Court.  The conclusion is only a paragraph
long; it is, in fact, only one sentence:
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We submit that in view of the facts above set forth and of legislative action
extending over a period of more than sixty years in the leading countries in
Europe, and in twenty of our States, it cannot be said that the Legislature of
Oregon had no reasonable ground for believing that the public health, safety, or
welfare did not require a legal limitation on women’s work in manufacturing and
mechanical establishments and laundries to ten hours in one day (113).
Brandeis’s message is this: the history of the world’s industrial experience comes down
to the place of the individual woman working in a laundry in Oregon.  The entire history
of the world’s experience culminates in the specific problems of the present.  The Court
cannot rule other than to uphold Oregon’s statute.  The conclusion is inescapable.  All
experience points to the need to secure the individual in her work.  It is a matter of
personal, social, economic, historical, industrial, and moral well-being.
     The Court ruled unanimously in Muller v. Oregon to uphold Oregon’s statute.  In an
unconventional move, Justice Brewer, writing for the Court, even mentioned Brandeis
and his Brief by name.65  One columnist at the time said, “The story of the fight on
behalf of overworked women which was won before the United States Supreme Court
may put heart in those who believe that ultimately we shall make industry for the sake of
humanity and not regard humanity as existing for the sake of industry.”66  Over the next
eight ears, forty-one states passed new laws or improved existing laws limiting the
number of hours a woman could work in a day.67
     Brandeis’s rhetorical style in the Brandeis Brief seems, on the face of it, thoroughly
Aristotelian.  Brandeis begins with a syllogism and weaves together artistic and inartistic
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proofs to support his argument.  While there are definite traces of Aristotle in the Brief,
to label Brandeis’s rhetorical style thoroughly Aristotelian is misleading.  For the
evidence of upon which Brandeis relies hinges upon the God-term of James and
Dewey’s pragmatism: experience.
     Aristotle’s philosophy relies on words such as substance, essence, form, matter, state,
faculty, virtue, etc.  His language is the language of nature, of categories and logical
divisions.  James and Dewey leave much of Aristotle’s philosophy behind.  Their
philosophy is one of development, of progress, of setback, of yearning and fulfillment,
of danger and despair, of novelty and possibility, but no certainty.   For James, there is
indeed no bedrock of categories, of division, of essence, substance and nature: “In
radical empiricism there is no bedding; it is as if the pieces clung together by their edges,
the transactions experienced between them forming their cement.”68  James’s sentiment
is true of Dewey’s understanding of human freedom: “Human desire and ability
cooperates with this or that natural force according as this or that eventuality is judged
better.  We do not use the present to control the future.  We use the foresight of the
future to refine and expand present activity.”69
     James and Dewey leave behind Aristotelian terminology and implement terms of
doing, having, undergoing, progressing, expanding, desiring, fulfilling, savoring, living
and dying.  These are terms of experience.  James says that “Experience is remoulding
us every moment.”70  Dewey says that experience “reaches down into nature; it has
depth.  It also has breadth and to an indefinitely elastic extent.  It stretches.”71  For James
and Dewey, the point is not to construct a formal philosophical schema but to create a
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philosophy that speaks to the fabric of experience.  Experience is the God-term because
the way in which individuals have their experiences determines the way in which the
world is made.
     This was Brandeis’s concern in the Brief.  The subtitle of “Part Second” of the Brief
is “The World’s Experience Upon Which the Legislation Limiting the Hours of Labor
for Women is Based.”  His argument is that limiting the number of hours women are
allowed to work is necessary not because formal principles dictate such but because the
experience of the world says so.  The consequences of not limiting the number of hours
women are allowed to work are clear.  What determines what is morally good or bad is
not a formal logical judgment, as Aristotle says, but the consequences of personal and
social undertakings.  Consequences determine good and bad, not formal categories and
schemas.  The consequences of not limiting women’s hours are pain and degradation;
the consequences of limiting women’s hours are enrichment and progress—the
experience of the world makes that known.  The Brandeis Brief is about consequences; it
is about understanding experience.  Experience becomes the God-term for Brandeis just
as it was the God-term for James and Dewey.
The Language of Pragmatism as Individualism
     This chapter has analyzed Brandeis’s pre-Court rhetoric in conjunction with the vein
of pragmatism that affirms individualism as central to the meaning of life.  Perhaps
necessary before moving on to Brandeis’s rhetoric on the Court is to highlight some of
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what makes the pragmatic political style, Brandeis’s political style, significant for the
study of rhetoric.
     The rhetoric of pragmatism as individualism is organic.  Pragmatism as individualism
speaks of growth, of fullness, of cultivation, of nurturing.  It is the rhetoric of promise
and possibility in the presence of forces that seek to stunt the organism’s growth.
Dewey summarizes the point:  “Man himself is living in an aleatory world; his existence
involves, to put it baldly, a gamble.  The world is a scene of risk; it is uncertain,
unstable, uncannily unstable.”72  But the presence of risk and uncertainty does not mean
that despair is the only outcome, for what makes life meaningful is the ability to forge
through the risk and uncertainty.  Dewey writes,
The moral is to develop conscientiousness, ability to judge the significance of
what we are doing and to use that judgment in directing what we do, not by
means of direct cultivation of something called conscience, or reason, or a
faculty of moral knowledge, but by fostering those impulses and habits which
experience has shown to make us sensitive, generous, imaginative, impartial in
perceiving the tendency of our inchoate dawning activities.73
Dewey’s language is not one of “reason” or “faculty” or of “conscience”; his language is
of “develop[ing],” “directing,” and “fostering.”  These are terms of organic growth.
They point to the endless project of doing, having and undergoing that pragmatists
affirm.  Dewey puts the point eloquently:
Life itself consists of phases in which the organism falls out of step with the
march of surrounding things and then recovers unison with it—either through
76
effort or by some happy chance.  And, in a growing life, the recovery is never
mere return to a prior state, for it is enriched by the state of disparity and
resistance through which it has successfully passed.  If the gap between organism
and environment is too wide, the creature dies.  If its activity is not enhanced by
the temporary alienation, it merely subsists.  Life grows when a temporary falling
out is a transition to a more extensive balance of the energies of the organism
with those of the conditions under which it lives.74
     Pragmatism hinges on the rhetoric of the organism, the rhetoric of growth, of freight,
of pain, of fulfillment, of health, of sickness, of nourishment.  These are, moreover, the
terms of Brandeis’s rhetorical corpus.  He believes that “the present tendency towards
centralization must be arrested if we are to attain the American ideals, and that for it
must be substituted intense development of life through activities in several states and
localities.”75  He also says that “the real success in life is to be measured by one’s own
accomplishments in advancing the welfare of the community.”76  He also says that “As
democracy insists that the full development of each individual is not only right but a duty
to society, so the new nationalism proclaims the right and the duty of each race or people
to develop itself fully.”77  He also writes to a friend that “Success in any democratic
undertaking must proceed from the individual.  It is possible only where the process of
perfecting the individual is pursued.  His development is attained mainly in the processes
of common living.”78  He also believes that the “right to life” means the “right to live,” to
develop as an individual: “In order to live men must have the opportunity of developing
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their faculties; and they must live under conditions in which their faculties may develop
naturally and healthily.”79
     Brandeis feared unregulated industry, and all things “big,” because they threatened
the individual’s potential for growth.  Bigness in industry leads to “physical and moral
degeneracy—work, work, work, without recreating any possibility of relief save that
which dissipation brings.”80  The same problem holds for economic “bigness”: “It is
asserted that to persist in the disintegration of existing unlawful trusts is to pursue a
policy of destruction.  No statement could be more misleading.  Progress demands that
we remove the obstacles in the path of progress; and private monopoly is the most
serious obstacle.”81  “[People] have come to realize the effect of monopoly,” Brandeis
writes, “in arresting progress, arresting that advance in industry without which a great
industrial future is unattainable.”82  What is at stake in industrial society is the health and
well-being of individuals and of society itself: “The attempt to dismember existing
illegal trusts is not, therefore, and attempt to interfere in any way with the natural law of
business.  It is an endeavor to restore health by removing a cancer from the body
industrial.”83
     The pragmatic political style enacts the rhetoric of growth.  It emphasizes the
potential for, and the potential interference with, progress, development, enrichment, and
betterment.  And what is central to this potential is the place of the individual.  What is
central is the chance for growth in the particular organism.  Society’s project, as
Brandeis, James and Dewey all believed, is to liberate the individual to pursue
enrichment.  “A genuinely liberated social and political environment,” writes John
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McDermott, “is one which encourages the individual, who is, after all, not ready-made,
to experience the world in all of its potential intensity.”84  In a world ingrained with risk
and uncertainty, the social and political project of liberating the individual is no easy
task.  It is rather the deepest problem of the modern age.  The next chapter will deal with
Brandeis’s approach to solving that problem while he sat on the bench of the United
States Supreme Court.
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CHAPTER III
LEGAL PRAGMATISM AND SOCIETY:
LOUIS BRANDEIS’S SUPREME COURT RHETORIC
     Unlike other well-known Supreme Court Justices, such as Benjamin Cardozo,
Brandeis wrote no lengthy treatise on “the nature” of “the law.”  The closest he came to
delivering publicly such a treatise was his address before the Chicago Bar Association in
January of 1916, five months before he would become Supreme Court Justice Louis
Brandeis.
     His address was entitled “The Living Law.”1  His project in the address was to show
that the law must evolve and grow in cooperation with social changes.  He began, “[I]n
that short period [of America’s existence] the American ideal of government has been
greatly modified.  At first our ideal was expressed as, ‘A government of laws and not of
men.’  Then it became, ‘A government of the people, by the people, and for the people.’
Now it is, ‘Democracy and social justice.’”2  The basic fact the law must deal with, said
Brandeis, is that social conceptions of government and justice change, and because the
law is meant to serve society, the law must change as society changes.  Both the law and
society are in perpetual flux, in a process of always becoming.
     But Brandeis pointed out something else.  Along with the change in social
conceptions of the law, the public has had a “waning respect for law” (316).  He
questioned, “Has not the recent dissatisfaction with our law as administered been due, in
large measure, to the fact that it had not kept pace with the rapid development of our
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political, economic, and social ideals?  In other words, is not the challenge of legal
justice due to its failure to conform to contemporary conceptions of social justice?”
(318).  The inability of the law to develop along with social changes has led to “fury
against the courts.” (319).  But not all is lost.  Since 1912, Brandeis said, the American
public has seen in the courts a more organic appreciation of social needs.  This stems
from the law’s increasing recognition of local experimentation, experimentation in the
states, in industry and the economy.  In 1912, finally, the courts “realized that no law,
written or unwritten, can be understood without full knowledge of the facts out of which
it arises, and to which it is to be applied” (321-322).
     Through the perpetual flux of social evolution, the law must carve out its own organic
place in human progress:
What we need is not to displace the courts, but to make them efficient
instruments of justice, not to displace the lawyer, but to fit him for his official or
judicial task.  And, indeed, the task of fitting the lawyer and the judge to perform
adequately the functions of harmonizing law with life is a task far easier
accomplished than that of endowing men, who lack legal training, with the
necessary qualifications (323).
Here Brandeis calls on lawyers, judges, and America’s legal institution in general, to be
social instruments.  He calls on them to serve society.  In order to do so, he says, lawyers
and judges must be social thinkers, must be in tune with experiences beyond the narrow
confines of the courtroom.  “The pursuit of the legal profession,” Brandeis says,
“involves a happy combination of the intellectual with the practical life.  The intellectual
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tends to breadth of view; the practical to that realization of limitations which are
essential to the wise conduct of life” (324).
     Brandeis’s phrase “the wise conduct of life”—his infusion of the intellectual and the
practical—is essentially Dewey’s conception of “creative intelligence,” which John
McDermott summarizes as the method of achieving “optimum possibilities in the never-
ending moral struggle to harmonize the means-end relationship for the purpose of
enhancing human life and achieving growth.”3  Brandeis’s judicial vision is intertwined
with his social and personal vision: the purpose of human structures—the law,
government, the economy and industry—is to liberate the struggle for living.  This is the
task modern society faces:
We are powerless to restore the general practitioner and general participation in
public life.  Intense specialization must continue.  But we can correct its
distorting effects by broader education—by study undertaken preparatory to
practice—and continued by lawyer and judge throughout life: study of
economics and sociology and politics which embody the facts and present them
to the problems of today (325).
     Brandeis ends “The Living Law” with a parable.  Bogigish was a well-known law
professor who grew up in the ancient city of Ragusa, located only a few miles from
Montenegro.  When Montenegro was “admitted to the family of nations,” its prince
concluded that it needed a legal code, “like other civilized nations.”  The prince of
Montenegro turned to the Tsar of Russia for help, who employed Bogigish in the task of
developing the legal code.  So what did Bogigish do to develop the code?
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[I]nstead of utilizing his great knowledge of laws to draft a code, he proceeded to
Montenegro, and for two years literally made his home with the
people—studying everywhere their customs, their practices, their needs, their
beliefs, their points of view.  Then he embodied in law the life which the
Montenegrins lived.  They respected that law, because it expressed the will of the
people (326).
     The moral of the story is clear: the law must embody a particular form of life in order
to serve that life.  The right to life, after all, for Brandeis, is more than the right to have
life; it is the right to enjoy life—to pursue possibilities, to grow, to flourish, to evolve.
To be effective, political actors must understand the needs of individual and social
organisms and, through the method of creative intelligence, enable those forms of life to
grow.  Brandeis puts the point masterfully in his unpublished dissent4 in Stratton v. St.
Louis Southwestern Railway Company (1930):
Life implies growth.  Only change is abiding.  In order to reach sound
conclusions in such cases, we must strive ceaselessly to bring our opinions into
agreement with facts ascertaining.  We must never forget that the judgment of
men is fallible, being influenced inevitably by their views as to economic, social
and political policy.  Our effort to reach sound conclusions will be futile if we
substitute formulas for reasoning.  Formulas block the paths to truth and wisdom.
Stare decisis is always a desideratum, even in these constitutional cases.  But in
them, it is never a command.  For we may not close the mind to the lessons of
experience and abdicate the sway of reason.5
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Completely escaping one’s social, economic, and political sympathies is impossible,
Brandeis rightly admits.  But that does not mean that experience does not allow for
wisdom.  Wisdom is attained not by imposing legal formulas or mathematical reductions
on social circumstances but by understanding the consequences of personal and social
action and deciding a particular case given the best apprehension of the facts available.
     Brandeis believes that if lawyers and judges substitute reasoning for formulas, they
will be able to “read reality” and come to a decision that not only serves the needs of
society but also promotes individual liberty.  “His theory of democracy, centered on the
individual,” writes Strum, “encompassed both a recognition of the kinds of innovated
governmental action required by the industrial age and an awareness of the limitations
that had to be placed on business and on government if the individual was to be
emphasized, the economy was to work well, and efficiency and freedom were to be kept
in proper balance.”6  In short, for Brandeis, the law is a tool for serving the individual
and society in concert.
     Throughout this thesis I have been aligning Brandeis with pragmatism, and his
aforementioned understanding of the law is thoroughly pragmatic.  It should be clear,
however, that Brandeis’s pragmatism-as-law, an understanding completely consistent
with James and Dewey, is quite unlike certain contemporary understandings of
pragmatism-as-law.  Specifically, it is quite unlike Stanley Fish’s understanding.
     Fish is one of the most high-profile scholars grappling with the prospects of
pragmatism.  Whether one agrees with his views or not, he certainly stands at the fore of
the modern movement known as “neo-pragmatism,” a movement often ascribed to
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Richard Rorty’s influence.  Even though he is a visible member of the neo-pragmatist
movement, Fish’s understanding of pragmatism diverges completely from the
understanding of the pragmatic political style I have been advancing.  To make this
analysis of Brandeis’s Supreme Court rhetoric clear, therefore, it is perhaps necessary to
differentiate Brandeis’s pragmatic political style from the pragmatism Fish puts forth.
     Fish’s main problem in his book There’s No Such Thing as Free Speech . . . And It’s
a Good Thing Too is with the place of moral language in political discussions.  His
problem is with words and phrases such as “reason,” “fairness,” “neutrality,” “free
speech,” and “tolerance.”  He says, “when such words and phrases are invoked, it is
almost always as part of an effort to deprive moral and legal problems of their histories
so that merely formal calculations can then be performed on phenomena that have been
flattened out and no longer have their real-world shape.”7  Brandeis, to be sure, shared
the same concern.  Problems should be tied to the particular circumstances of their
historical, social, economic, and political place.  But Fish goes further than Brandeis
would like: “[W]hile notions like ‘merit’ and ‘fairness’ are always presented as if their
meanings were perspicuous to anyone no matter what his or her political affiliation,
educational experience, ethnic tradition, gender, class, institutional history, etc., in fact
‘merit’ and ‘fairness’ (and other related terms) will have different meanings in relation to
different assumptions and background conditions.”8  Brandeis was aware of the
difficulties of escaping one’s own predispositions, but unlike Fish, Brandeis never shied
away from words like “justice,” “fairness,” “equality,” “tolerance,” “freedom,” and
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“liberty” (neither did James and Dewey, for that matter).  Indeed, such words, for
Brandeis, were indispensable for forging a uniquely American moral identity.
     Brandeis had a theory of America—a theory of justice, of tolerance and equality, of
liberty and freedom.  In turn, these ideas of justice, tolerance, equality, liberty and
freedom became principles for Brandeis—ideals to work toward.  Theory and principles
created his vision of America, his vision of where America had been, where it is now,
and where it should be going.  Brandeis’s job—as an advocate, rhetor, and Supreme
Court Justice—was to promote that theory, that vision.  And that is exactly where
Brandeis diverges from Fish.  For Fish, theory and vision should have no part in
decision-making.  Without theory, Fish writes, individuals are left “without a ground of
justification more basic or higher than the grounds given us by our moral convictions
and determinations of fact.  There is no theory or principle or bright line that will allow
us to rise above or step to the side of the conclusions we have reached as situated
political agents.”9  Fish is against theory and principle because he says they do not aid
decision-making.  He says nothing follows from theory and principle.  Brandeis,
however, thought theory and principle, when created and enacted intelligently, were
instruments specifically designed to aid political decision-making.
     Fish tries to distance himself from this type of pragmatism by distinguishing between
a pragmatist account and a pragmatist program.  In a pragmatist account, he says, “the
law works not by identifying and then hewing to some overarching set of principles, or
logical calculus, or authoritative revelation, but by deploying a set of ramshackle and
heterogeneous resources in an effort to reach political resolutions of disputes that must
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be framed (and this is the law’s requirements and the public’s desire) in apolitical and
abstract terms (fairness, equality, what justice requires).”10  Conversely, a pragmatist
program “asks the question ‘what follows from the pragmatist account?’ and then gives
an answer, but by giving an answer pragmatism is unfaithful to its own first principle
(which is to have none) and turns unwittingly into the foundationalism and essentialism
it rejects.”11
     Brandeis’s entire rhetorical corpus is the attempt to articulate a pragmatist program
on top of a pragmatist account.  Brandeis’s entire career is the attempt to answer the
question, “Given that consequences matter, given that the purpose of life is growth,
given that the most significant thing about an individual is his or her vision, given that
the world is forever changing and the individual and society are left forever trying to
cope, forever trying to forge a meaningful life, how should I speak (as a rhetor), how
should I decide (as a judge), how should I believe (as a Zionist)?”  Brandeis’s pragmatic
political style is the attempt to fuse the pragmatic project with the pragmatic
understanding of life and to promote that fusion as the best way to make decisions.
     Fish would thus say that Brandeis makes pragmatism null and void.  By trying to
promote the pragmatist method, Brandeis’s “pragmatism” has become self-defeating,
trying to provide answers where none are possible.  Fish believes pragmatism can only
be descriptive—only an account of life—whereas a normative project—a project that
articulates what one should do—is self-contradictory and unpragmatic.  Brandeis (and
James and Dewey, for that matter) would say pragmatism must be both descriptive and
normative.  What Fish does not understand is that pragmatism is specifically about
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seeing what difference a given theory or practice makes and then advocating that theory
or practice because it is desirable—because it is balanced, because it does promote
growth, because it does liberate, because it is beneficial for the individual and society.
Larry Hickman writes, “[T]he pragmatic account of inquiry is invariably situated with
respect to specific circumstances.  It arises from felt needs, employs both abstract and
concrete tools, tests proposals in the laboratory of experience, and terminates in the
resolution of the difficulties which occasioned that particular sequence of inquiry.”12  By
offering a “resolution of the difficulties,” pragmatism does, contra Fish, have something
to offer politics; it does have a normative appeal to make.  Hickman says this
“resolution” is the fundamental difference between the normative account pragmatists
offer and the type of descriptive account Fish offers:
[T]here is a significant difference between James’s proposal for a working
method that privileges no particular result, and the proposal issued by Jean-
François Lyotard and other postmodernists that no particular narrative or
standpoint can or should be privileged.  James’s proposal possesses the virtues of
what has been termed “the scientific method” of inquiry (on which it is based):
when it is properly applied, it does present a privileged method with respect to
knowledge-getting, since it is experimental and therefore produces practical
effects that are objective.  It is self-correcting.  Lyotard’s postmodern proposal,
on the other hand, appears to be self-defeating on its face: it must privilege its
own announced narrative, namely, that no narrative is privileged.13
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     Fish completely misunderstands pragmatism by believing it has nothing concrete and
specific to offer.  The pragmatic method is itself a concrete and specific tool.  The
pragmatic method is a concrete and specific tool for practically steering personal and
social undertakings toward the better life.  The pragmatic method effectively allows the
individual to pursue his or her vision of the good life.  Pragmatism thus works with
theories, principles and ideals, not against them, as Fish believes.  Of course, these
theories, principles and ideals will never represent Platonic Forms, Truths or Absolutes;
there will never be perfect Harmony.  But that is exactly why one cannot forget one’s
ideals—the meaning of life is in the striving for those ideals through human limitations
and danger and risk; the meaning is in the forging of a moral identity, in cutting one’s
path through life.  And the pragmatic method allows the individual to cut such a path.
     What separates Fish’s understanding of pragmatism from the pragmatism of
Brandeis, James and Dewey is vision.  Brandeis, James and Dewey have a vision of life
that relies on the pursuit of meaning, that relies on the health of the organism.  Fish
seems to have no such vision.  In his schema, there is no hint that betterment, either
personal or social, is possible.  Fish explicitly denies the chances for liberty, equality,
freedom, tolerance, and a balanced life, a good life.  He even denies that one should have
such a vision of the good life.  One should not have theories, principles or ideals, Fish
declares.  Yet for Brandeis, James and Dewey, it all comes down to the integration of
theories, principles and ideals into the process of living, into the way in which one has
one’s experiences.  It all comes down to vision and the possibilities for betterment.
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     Because it all comes down to vision and the possibilities for betterment, the law must
allow individuals and society to pursue those possibilities.  The law must serve vision,
must try to meet the personal and social needs, must try to promote liberty, freedom,
equality, tolerance, health and growth.  The law must act as an instrument of
amelioration.  And pragmatists believe they have the best way for allowing the law to do
that.
     My argument in the remainder of this chapter extends from my critique of Fish.  The
pragmatic political style, Brandeis’s style, involves approaching political
disputes—judicial, social, economic, etc.—normatively, under the guise of one’s vision
of personal and social betterment.  Essentially, Brandeis’s approach to judicial decision-
making is a normative extension of his beliefs regarding the place of the individual in
society.  His approach is a normative extension of the characteristics of pragmatism:
namely, that the pragmatic method seizes truth through consequences; that the pragmatic
method strives to cope with a world unfinished, in-the-making, and malleable to the
human touch; that the pragmatic method rejects close-systems of thinking and meaning
and instead pursues novelty and possibility with every undertaking; that the pragmatic
method replaces the quest for certainty with the quest for meaning; and that the
pragmatic method chooses meliorism in the face of uncertainty.  In the next section I
will bring out these themes through an analysis of Brandeis’s Supreme Court opinions
regarding the First Amendment and liberty.  Then I will analyze his opinions concerning
the structure of government and society.  I will conclude by highlighting the rhetoric of
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Brandeis’s understanding of the relationship between the individual, society, the law and
government.
Eloquence, Dissent, and the Prospects of Liberty
     Brandeis wrote most eloquently in his dissents.  Strum calls his dissents “lessons for
the public or at least that part of it that reads Supreme Court opinions.  It is therefore in
Brandeis’s dissents that one finds not only the meticulous workmanship that is a
hallmark of his opinions but, in addition, clear statements of political thought.”14  In
dissents judges are less constrained by creating law—less bound by the need for legal
clarity and straightforward decision-making—and better able to experiment stylistically.
As Don Le Duc points out, “No competent judge would draft a narrow statement of
controlling law in the flamboyant style of a dissent because of the realization that
lawyers might easily misinterpret its implications.”15  Walter Ulrich also points out that
In a majority opinion, a desire to insure that the opinion is clear to members of
the legal progression and the need to tone down a position to gain the adherence
of other judges constrain a judge.  Since a dissenting or concurring judge does
not face these limitations, a dissenting or concurring opinion can be “an outlet for
individual, independence, idiosyncrasy—a divergence from accepted, official or
conventional wisdom.”  Freed from many of the constraints of judicial norms,
justices can transcend the immediate case to express their broader views.16
     While it is no surprise that Brandeis’s rhetorical best emerges in his dissents, it is also
no surprise that Brandeis’s dissents are normative appeals.  Every justice who writes a
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dissenting opinion is expressing his or her opinion on what the court should have found
or should do in the future.  C. Evans Hughes states, “A dissent in a court of last resort is
an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day, when a
later decision may possibly correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes the
court to have betrayed.”17  But what should also be clear about Brandeis’s dissents is the
extent of the impact of his normative appeals.  “More than any other Justice on the
Court,” writes Bradley Bobertz, “Brandeis understood the need to shape free speech
doctrine in a way that would respond to the long range needs of American democracy.”18
Later he says, “Brandeis provides functional justifications for free speech that stand to
this day as the dominant theoretical underpinnings of the Court’s free speech
jurisprudence.”19  Essentially, throughout the twentieth century, the rhetoric of
Brandeis’s dissents became the prevailing rhetoric of First Amendment jurisprudence.
     The point of this rhetorical analysis of Brandeis’s influential dissents is the way in
which those appeals emerged.  The point is Brandeis’s method, his judicial style.
Mason, Brandeis’s first biographer, says he used the dissenting opinion “as an
educational device to explore and illumine not only the law but also the relations which
law governs . . . in a persuasive demonstration of what the law ought to be in terms of
social justice.”20  What is important for the present understanding of the pragmatic
political style is the way in which Brandeis processed the circumstances of the case and
arrived at his normative appeal.
     An exhaustive analysis of his dissents is well beyond the scope of this project, but it
is important to understand common rhetorical strategies running throughout his most
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influential opinions.  Perhaps the best place to start is with his very first dissenting
opinion; the case was New York Central Railroad Company v. Winfield (1917).21
     The circumstances of the case were as follows: James Winfield lost an eye while
working as an interstate “common carrier” for the New York Central Railroad Company.
Justice Van Devanter, writing for the majority, said Winfield’s injury “was not due to
any fault or negligence of the carrier, or of any of its officers, agents, or employees, but
arose out of one of the ordinary risks of the work in which Winfield was engaged.”22
Winfield, however, collected damages under the Workmen’s Compensation Law of the
state.  The Supreme Court reversed the award, concluding that liability for damages was
not covered by state statutes but by the Federal Employers’ Liability Act of Congress,
which, the Court said, does not award damages in the absence of negligence.
Establishing liability under the act of Congress sent a clear message: “the controlling law
should be uniform and not change at every state line.”23  Thus, because Congress in the
Employers’ Liability Act held that damages must be awarded only where there was
negligence on the part of the employer, the states could not require compensation where
the act withheld it.  “[T]he Federal act,” the majority concluded, “governs to the
exclusion of the state law.”24
     The states must, the majority believed, remain subject to Federal dictates: “Only by
disturbing the uniformity which the act is designed to secure and by departing from the
principle which it is intended to enforce can the several states require such carriers to
compensate their employees for injuries in interstate commerce occurring without
negligence.  But no state is at liberty thus to interfere with the operation of a law of
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Congress.”25  The source of the majority’s belief was this: Federal law governs
nationally, state law is bound by Federal law, and the individual worker is therefore also
bound by Federal law.  The majority looked first to the structure of Federal law, then to
the necessary compliance of the states, then to the place of the individual worker within
that legal system.  According to the majority, the individual’s place in society was a
function of legal prescriptions.
     Brandeis’s dissenting opinion is a complete reversal of the majority’s understanding.
Brandeis begins by asking, did Congress actually mean to subject the states to Federal
dictates?  “[W]e endeavor to determine,” he writes, “whether Congress, in enacting the
Employers’ Liability Act, intended to prevent states from entering the specific field of
compensation for injuries to employees arising without fault on the railroad’s part, for
which Congress made no provision.”26  How does Brandeis attempt to determine the
intent of Congress?  By contextualizing the act within the larger scope of social,
political, economic, and industrial circumstances.  He writes,
Congress must be presumed to have intended the necessary consequences of its
action.  And if we find that its will is not expressed, or is not clearly expressed,
either in words or by specific action, we should look at the circumstances under
which the Employers’ Liability Act was passed; look on the one had, at its origin,
scope, and purpose; and, on the other, at the nature, methods, and means of state
Workmen’s Compensation Laws.  If the will is not clearly expressed in words,
we must consider all these in order to determine what Congress intended.27
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     Brandeis believes that the actual words of the act contain nothing “expressing a will
by Congress to cover the whole field of compensation or relief for injuries received by or
for death of such employees while engaged in interstate commerce; or the whole field of
carriers’ obligations in relation thereto.”28  Thus, it is necessary to look to the larger
social context of Congress’s actions.  So he undertakes a survey of the historical
circumstances of the Employers’ Liability Act.  Why did Congress seek to write the act
in the first place?  Congress, he says, believed it necessary to supplement the worker’s
ability to receive compensation from job-related injuries.  Because of industrialization,
Brandeis says, workers no longer had adequate job-related protections; the legal projects
became, because of industrialization, “seriously impaired in practice.  The protection it
provided employees seemed to wane as the need for it grew.”29  The “bigness” of
corporations in the industrial age made it necessary, Brandeis concludes, for Congress to
create new protections for individual workers.  He says that pre-industrial protections,
“When applied to huge organizations and hazardous occupations, as in railroading, they
practically abolished the liability of employers to employees; and in so doing they
worked great hardship and apparent injustice.  The wrongs suffered were flagrant; the
demand for redress insistent; and the efforts to secure remedial legislation widespread.”30
Thus, as industrial accidents became all the more frequent, Congress “used its power
over interstate commerce to afford relief.”31  The purpose of the act was not to displace
the power of the states to regulate commerce; the purpose was, rather, to serve as
“emergency legislation” aimed at helping workers thrive in the industrial age.  Because
an entity as large as the Federal government can never account for the endless contextual
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contingencies, “the great diversity of conditions,” Brandeis says, Congress left room for
the states to experiment in creating justice in industrial relations.32  The government
cannot cut the states out of the regulatory loop, for the states have better control of the
idiosyncrasies of their own, local circumstances.  Brandeis believes the purpose of
Congress’s action was clear:
to end the denial of the right to damages for injuries due to the railroad’s
negligence,—a right denied under judicial decisions through the interposition of
the defenses of fellow servant, assumption of risk, and contributory negligence.
It was not the purpose of the act to deny to the states the power to grant the
wholly new right to protection or relief in the case of injuries suffered otherwise
than through fault of the railroads.33
     The majority believes Congress’s action binds the states and the individual under
legal dictates; Brandeis believes the opposite.  Authority is due first and foremost to the
individual worker, then to the right of the states to protect their citizens, then to the
action of Congress to create “emergency legislation” to protect the nation.  Based on
“the world’s experience in dealing with individual accidents,”34 the duty is clear:
“Attention should be directed, not to the employer’s fault, but to the employee’s
misfortune.  Compensation should be general, not sporadic; certain, not conjectural;
speedy, not delayed; definite as to amount and time of payment; and so distributed over
long periods as to insure actual protection against lost or lessened earning capacity.”35
The law must first look to the needs of the individual, then to prospects for growth in
state and local experimentation, and then to the demands of the industrial age on the
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nation.  It is wrong, Brandeis says, to assume that Congress gave the states no power to
protect their citizens:
It is the state which is both primarily and ultimately concerned with the care of
the injured and of those dependent upon him, even though the accident may
occur while the employee is engaged directly in interstate commerce. . . .  Upon
the state also rests, under our dual system of government, the duty owed to the
individual, to avert misery and promote happiness so far as possible surely we
may not impute to Congress the will to deny to the states the power to perform
either this duty to humanity or their fundamental duty of self-preservation.36
 This is the normative appeal Brandeis makes: the law must serve the needs of the
citizen, promote his or her happiness and sustain his or her striving for self-fulfillment.
The law’s duty is to serve humanity, not to conform to abstract legal dictates.  What the
majority should have held in Winfield, Brandeis concludes, is that the individual
deserves protection from industrial dangers on all levels of social existence—all local,
state and federal levels.
     Winfield does not deal directly with a First Amendment question, but it shares with
Brandeis’s First Amendment dissents a distinct concern for the place of liberty in
society.  Like his First Amendment dissents, he believes in Winfield that the need is to
promote liberty and nurture growth at all levels of society.  So Brandeis begins by
contextualizing the case.  In the spirit of the Brandeis Brief, the circumstances of the
case are not narrowly confined to judicial precedent; the circumstances involve
historical, social, economic, scientific, political, and cultural elements well beyond
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precedent.  Analyzing those elements helps Brandeis understand what is at stake in a
given decision—what difference it will make if a case is decided one way or another,
what consequences will emerge from steering the law this way or that.  After
contextualizing the case in the larger socio-political context, and after centrally locating
the individual within that same socio-political context, Brandeis emerges with a
normative appeal.  He declares what the Court should do given all the relevant data.  But
he only arrives at that belief through a careful consideration for the broader factors at
stake.  He deliberates extensively, but his decision is not deduced from formal legal
principles; it is approached through an intimate understanding of personal and social
needs.  The individual is not a cog in the judicial machine and the states and Congress
are not bound to transcendent legal principles.
     In “Logical Method and Law,”37 Dewey articulates a philosophical undergirding for
Brandeis’s legal style.  Richard Posner, however, believes Dewey’s attempt to formulate
such an undergirding is unwarranted.  “[P]ragmatic adjudication,” writes Posner, “cannot
be derived from pragmatism as a philosophical stance.”38  To further complicate matters,
he agrees with Fish that “A pragmatic judge thus need not be recognizable by a
distinctive style of judging.”39  Posner believes that trying to tie judges, such as
Brandeis, and even Oliver Wendell Holmes, whom Dewey repeatedly cites in his essay
as a judicial authority, to pragmatism is a misdirected attempt to understand the
relationship between philosophical pragmatism and the law.  In fact, Posner believes
there should be no relationship between philosophical pragmatism and the law: “The
intellectual kinship between Dewey and Holmes that is displayed in Dewey’s essay is
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worth remarking.  It undermines two canards about pragmatism: that pragmatism has no
form or character . . . and that pragmatism has a definite political cast.”40
     One theme throughout this thesis has been that the James-Dewey variety of classical
American pragmatism and the Brandeis legacy in political and judicial rhetoric is largely
the same; both operate with the same vision, both approach matters through the same
method, and both enact a distinct political style.  This does not mean that the pragmatic
style necessarily leads to a particular set of political sympathies (like liberalism or
conservatism) or that there is a static “form” of the pragmatic style.  But it does mean
that pragmatism offers a particular method, a particular attitude, a particular approach to
problem-solving that bridges the gap between what “philosophers” do and what
“politicians” and “judges” do.  Because the pragmatic political style is operative in an
endless number of contexts—philosophical, political, or otherwise—it is valuable to
understand what James, Dewey and Brandeis claim and how their claims intersect.
     “Logic” in the title of Dewey’s essay does not mean formal logic—logic as deduction
from formal principles.  Logic is not, Dewey says, “formal consistency, consistency of
concepts with one another irrespective of the consequences of their application to
concrete matters-of-fact” (68-69).  Dewey’s understanding of logic is based in
experience, a God-term of classic American pragmatism.  Like experience, logic is
experimental: “general principles emerge as statements of generic ways in which it has
been found helpful to treat concrete cases. . . .  It is an indication of a unified way of
treating cases for certain purposes or consequences in spite of their diversity.  Hence its
meaning and worth are subject to inquiry and revision in light of what happens, what the
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consequences are, when it is used as a method of treatment” (71).  What does this entail
for a method of legal problem-solving?  It entails, first of all, that precedent is not the
end-all; stare decisis does not dictate solutions to legal problems.  “[P]rinciples of
interpretation do not signify rules so rigid that they can be stated once for all and then be
literally and mechanically adhered to.”  Dewey continues, “for the situations to which
they are to be applied do not literally repeat on another in all details” (74).  Instead of
being reflections of a transcendent legal structure, legal principles are tools for living:
logic must be “relative to consequences rather than to antecedents, a logic of prediction
of probabilities rather than one of deduction of certainties. . . .  [G]eneral principles can
only be tools justified by the work they do. . . .  Like other tools they must be modified
when they are applied to new conditions and new results have to be achieved” (75;
emphasis in original).  Where, then, is one to look for these general principles?  Where is
the judge to find these principles?  The point is that these principles are not to be found;
these principles are to be derived from experience, from experimentation, from trial and
error, from the consequences of personal and social undertaking.  The judge is supposed
to understand the context of the case at bar and through creative intelligence offer a
working solution based on previous experience.  “[A]ttention will go to the facts of
social life,” says Dewey, “and the rules will not be allowed to engross attention and
become absolute truths to be maintained intact at all costs. . . .  [L]ogic is really a theory
about empirical phenomena, subject to growth and improvement like any other empirical
discipline” (76).  Logic and the law must, Dewey says at the close of his essay, serve
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social needs; that is what the changing nature of society demands: “[I]nfiltration into law
of a more experimental and flexible logic is a social as well as an intellectual need” (77).
     Brandeis could have written Dewey’s essay word for word.  Like Dewey, Brandeis
believes the law must be contextualized, must respect consequences, and must serve
social needs, which include the needs of the individual.  Brandeis differs from the
majority of the Court in his day by always contextualizing the case at bar in more than
legal precedent.  He does deal with precedent, it is true, but weaving his argument
through precedent is only the beginning.  More than any other justice of his day,
Brandeis deals in “facts”—in historical, sociological, economic and political realities,
the realities of consequences.
     In International News Service v. Associated Press (1918),41 for example, the majority
held that the case before the Court involved only the fairness of competition in business,
a matter that had little to do with the public in general: “The question here is not so
much the rights of either party as against the public but [the businesses’s] rights as
between themselves.”42  The case, said the majority, involved the legally protected
property of business, which was not of much concern to the public.  Brandeis saw the
matter completely differently.  Brandeis believed the case, which involved a dispute over
the legal status of news information after it had been communicated willfully and
publicly, was thoroughly a matter of public concern.  After all, it involved the public’s
right to know: “The general rule of law is, that the noblest of human
productions—knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas—became, after
voluntary communication to others, free as the air to common use.”43  The case involved
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not “business pure and simple,” as the majority believed, but the needs of society in the
presence of endlessly changing circumstances.44  Brandeis located the case in more than
just the legal precedents dealing with “property” rights; he located the case in the
organic need to balance the public and the private.  The case was more than a matter of
free-market competition, said Brandeis; it was a social, a public, a private, an economic
and a political matter; and not to contextualize it so missed the gravity of the situation.
     Contextualization in a broad, thorough, intimate understanding of the personal social
issues at stake in a given case became part of Brandeis’s judicial trademark.  As
Baskerville puts it, “Law [for Brandeis], it seems, had now to be conscious of social
phenomena beyond the direct experience of judges and lawyers; restrained in its
application of rigid formulas; mindful of other forces at work within the national
polity.”45  Brandeis made this clear in a number of cases stemming from enforcement of
the Espionage Act.  By the late-1910s the Court had declared the Espionage Act
constitutional,46 but challenges to various convictions under the Act continued
throughout the 1920s.  One such case, Schaefer v. U.S. (1920),47 dealt with German-
language newspapers in the United States printing what the government deemed false
statements meant to subvert America’s war efforts.48  The majority deemed the German-
language papers “powerful” and “effective instruments of evil.”49  The majority said the
Court acted through “no other scrutiny or submission than to the sedate and guiding
principles of criminal justice.”50  “Sedate” meant the legal system was largely settled, a
fixed system; “guiding principles” meant that to decide a case the Court needed only to
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bounce the facts of the case off the fixed system of law.  The majority’s method was a
matter of deduction from formal legal principles.
     The majority’s method was the same in Pierce v. U.S. (1920).51  Like Schaefer,
Pierce dealt with the “clear and present” danger of communication during wartime.  The
majority found that the communication under question—a Socialist Party pamphlet
called “The Price We Pay”—violated the Espionage Act by trying to subvert the draft.
The majority believed that to afford “The Price We Pay” protection under the first
amendment would corrupt the power of the entire United States government: “In effect,
it would allow the professed advocate of disloyalty to escape responsibility for
statements however audaciously false. . . .”52  It was well within the government’s
power, the majority held, to curtail the spread of disloyal beliefs.
     Brandeis’s method in Schaefer and Pierce was completely the opposite of the
Court’s.  In Schaefer, he situated the case with respect to the very complex process of
communication: “The nature and possible effect of a writing cannot be properly
determined by culling here and there a sentence and presenting it separated from the
context.  In making such a determination, it should be read as a whole. . . .  The writings
here in question must speak for themselves.”53 In Pierce, Brandeis said “The Price We
Pay” was political communication pure and simple, and therefore entirely protected
under the First Amendment.  Brandeis believed the majority read the pamphlet out of
context; so as not to do the same, Brandeis reprinted the entire pamphlet in his dissenting
opinion.54  His reading revealed a much different undertaking than the subversion of the
United States government; it revealed political expressions “like the statements of many
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so-called historical facts.”55  The pamphlet was a judgment regarding the justness of war,
not an attempt to impede the draft.  As a judgment regarding the justness of war, it was
fully protected, said Brandeis, as a part of the public dialog concerning the war.56  Even
the most seemingly reprehensible judgments must been given room to participate in the
public exchange:
The fundamental right of free men to strive for better conditions through new
legislation and new institutions will not be preserved, if efforts to secure it by
argument to fellow citizens may be construed as criminal incitement to disobey
the existing law—merely because the argument presented seems to those
exercising judicial power to be unfair in its portrayal of existing evils, mistaken
in its assumptions, unsound in reasoning or intemperate in language.57
     First Amendment jurisprudence must deal first and foremost, Brandeis thought, with
the place of the individual in society; the bedrock of First Amendment jurisprudence
must be an intimate understanding of liberty.  In Gilbert v. State of Minnesota (1920),58
Brandeis made his belief clear:
The right to speak freely concerning functions of the federal government is a
privilege or immunity of every citizen of the United States which, even before
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state was powerless to curtail. . . .
The right of a citizen of the United States to take part, for his own or the
country’s benefit, in the making of federal laws and in the conduct of the
government, necessarily includes the right to speak or write about them; to
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endeavor to make his own opinion concerning laws existing or contemplated
prevail; and, to this end, to teach the truth as he sees it.59
Gilbert dealt with the effect of a Minnesota law making it illegal for anyone to “interfere
with or discourage” entrance into the armed forces.  But Brandeis believed Minnesota’s
law had consequences far beyond the borders of Minnesota: “[T]he matter is not one
merely of state concern.  The state law affects directly the functions of the federal
government.  It affects the rights, privileges, and immunities of one who is a citizen of
the United States; and it deprives him of an important part of his liberty.”60  Minnesota’s
law harms the entire country because it harms the individual, for it is the individual in
association with other individuals who constitute the entire nation.
     Brandeis believed the consequences of Pierce, which convicted individuals for
distributing “The Price We Pay,” extended well beyond the government’s ability to
recruit citizens for the armed forces: “The defendants, humble members of the Socialist
party, performed as distributors of the leaflet what would ordinarily be deemed merely a
menial service.  To hold them guilty under the third count is to convict not them alone,
but, in effect, their party, or at least its responsible leaders, of treason, as that word is
commonly understood.  I cannot believe that there is any basis in our law for such a
condemnation on this record.”61  Likewise, in Schaefer the consequences were just as
far-reaching: “The jury which found men guilty for publishing news items or editorials
like those here in question must have supposed it to be within their province to condemn
men, not merely for disloyal acts, but for a disloyal heart. . . .  To prosecute men for such
publications reminds of the days when men were hanged for constructive treason.”62
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     Just like Dewey in “Logical Method and Law,” Brandeis wants to know what
consequences follow from decision-making.  Brandeis understands the consequences of
the majority’s decision by placing the case at bar in a broad social context and
positioning the individual as a central part of that context.  In Schaefer, to find
individuals guilty for a “disloyal heart” leads to a chilling effect on free speech.  The
majority’s decision, says Brandeis, “will doubtless discourage criticism of the policies of
the government. . . .  [A]n intolerant majority [of the public], swayed by passion or by
fear, may be prone in the future, as it has often been in the past to stamp as disloyal
opinions which it disagrees.  Convictions such as these, besides abridging freedom of
speech, threaten freedom of thought and of belief.”63  Pierce involves the same issue:
“To hold that a jury may make punishable statements of conclusions or of opinions, like
those here involved, by declaring them to be statements of facts and to be false would
practically deny members of small political parties freedom of criticism and of
discussion in times when feelings run high and the questions involved are deemed
fundamental.”64  Gilbert is likewise: “Like the course of the heavenly bodies, harmony in
national life is a resultant of the struggle between contending forces.  In frank expression
of conflicting opinion lies the greatest promise of wisdom in governmental action; and in
suppression lies ordinarily the greatest peril.”65
     It should be clear that, unlike Fish, Brandeis believes “liberty” is a powerful concept
and term because it has incredible purchase in social exchange.  Liberty becomes a
guiding principle for Brandeis’s adjudication because experience has proven promotions
of liberty to be fruitful.  And for pragmatists, where action produces fruits, such action
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becomes morally good and that good must be nurtured.  Liberty must be nurtured
because it is fruitful.  Brandeis argues in Gilbert that the Court should extend its
understanding of liberty to include more than just liberty of property:
I have difficulty in believing that the liberty guaranteed by the Constitution,
which has been held to protect against state denial the right of an employer to
discriminate against a workman because he is a member of a trade union . . . the
right of a business man to conduct a private employment agency . . . or to
contract outside the state for insurance of his property . . . although the
Legislature deems it inimical to the public welfare, does not include liberty to
teach, either in the privacy of the home or publicly, the doctrine of pacifism. . . .
I cannot believe that the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
includes only liberty to acquire and to enjoy property.66
The normative appeal is, individual liberty in all its fruitful manifestations should be the
guiding light of the Court’s undertaking.  In Pierce, the normative appeal is the same:
the government must protect the individual’s right to maintain whatever beliefs he or she
sees fit, because beliefs are central to the fruitful evolution of personhood: “We may be
convinced that the decision to enter the great war was wholly free from . . . base
influences, but we may not, because such is our belief, permit a jury to find, in the
absence, that it was proved beyond a reasonable doubt that these defendants knew that a
statement in this leaflet to the contrary was false.”67  In Schaefer, the normative appeal
is, the Court should never allow the desire to curb “dangerous” speech from destroying
the balance of freedoms necessary for a health society: “[The clear and present danger
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standard] is a rule of reason.  Correctly applied, it will preserve the right of free speech
both from suppression by tyrannous, well-meaning majority, and from abuse by
irresponsible, fanatical minorities.”68
     Justice Learned Hand, speaking at Brandeis’s funeral, got it right: what Brandeis
hated most was “the mechanization of life.”69  Brandeis thought promoting liberty was
the best way to fight the mechanization of life.  The courts had to focus on liberty first
and foremost, thought Brandeis, so as to stave off life becoming mechanized.  Moreover,
the courts had to focus on individual liberty so as to discourage themselves from
becoming mechanized instruments of formalism.  A mechanized court encourages
mechanized forms of life, wherein the individual’s liberty is subordinate to formal
structures of law.  Such, at least, was Brandeis’s concern in his most famous free speech
opinion, Whitney v. People of the State of California (1927).70
     In Whitney, Brandeis, rather than dissenting in his usual style, concurred with
majority.  But his “concurrence” should not be seen as a break from his earlier free
speech dissents, such as Gilbert, Pierce, and Schaefer.  As Philippa Strum points out,
“The ‘concurrence’ might well have been a dissent, however, as it not only showed that
Whitney did not belong behind bars but also demolished the line of reasoning followed
by the Court so completely that California’s governor cited it in pardoning her.”71  Like
Gilbert, Pierce, and Schaefer, Whitney directly addressed the issue of promoting liberty
in the face of an onslaught of mechanization.
     Anita Whitney, daughter of a California state senator and niece of Supreme Court
Justice Stephen Field, was a member of the Communist Labor Party of California.  The
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stated purpose of the organization was to disseminate propaganda, organize the
Proletariat class and overthrow capitalist rule.72  As a member the organization and as an
outspoken critic of the War,73 Whitney was arrested for violating California’s Criminal
Syndicalism Act, which held that any person who “organizes or assists in organizing, or
is or knowingly becomes a member of, any organization, society, group or assemblage
of persons organized or assembled to advocate, teach or aid and abet criminal
syndicalism . . . [is] guilty of a felony and punishable by imprisonment.”74  Whitney
appealed her conviction to the Supreme Court, claiming that California’s act deprived
her of liberty without due process and was therefore unconstitutional.  The Supreme
Court rejected her argument.  Writing for the majority, Justice Stanford said, “[A] State
in the exercise of its police power may punish those who abuse this freedom by
utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to incite to crime, disturb the public
peace, or endanger the foundations of organized government and threaten its overthrow
by unlawful means, is not open to question.”75  Essentially, Whitney did not prove that
the statute was enacted unreasonably or arbitrarily, nor did she prove that the statute
infringed upon “any right of free speech, assembly or association, or that those persons
are protected from punishment by the due process clause who abuse such rights by
joining and furthering an organization thus menacing the peace and welfare of the
State.”76
     Brandeis concurred with the majority because he agreed that the statute was not
unconstitutional and that Whitney made the wrong argument; “she did not claim that it
was void because there was no clear and present danger of serious evil.”77  But
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Brandeis’s agreement with the majority ended there.  While California’s syndicalism act
was not unconstitutional, it was, Brandeis believed, rather ridiculous:
The mere act of assisting in forming a society for teaching syndicalism, of
becoming a member of it, or assembling with others for that purpose is given the
dynamic quality of crime. . . .  Thus the accused is to be punished, not for
attempt, incitement or conspiracy, but for a step in preparation. . . .  The novelty
in the prohibition introduced is that the statute aims, not at the practice of
criminal syndicalism, nor even directly at the preaching of it, but at association
with those who propose to preach it.78
Brandeis was not claiming that the state did not have the right to curb speech and
assembly when a tangible threat existed.  But he was claiming that the experience of
history has proven that the danger the state seeks to prevent in curbing free speech must
be proven imminent beyond a doubt.79
     The mastery of Brandeis’s Whitney concurrence lies in his ability to weave a number
of diverse strands together into a coherent textual whole.  To begin weaving this textual
whole, he reflects on the American founders: “Those who won our independence
believed that the final end of the state was to make men free to develop their faculties,
and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary.”80
Laws and governments are not ends in themselves; they are, rather, instruments for
promoting individual liberty—the right of the individual to pursue personhood on his or
her own terms.  “Those who won our independence” is a statement about the founders
and America’s founding period, but notice that Brandeis does not use the term
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“founders.”  “Those who won our independence” means those who struggled and died
for the promotion of liberty, those who fought the onslaught of mechanization from a
foreign government in order to free people to “develop their faculties.”  As a result of
struggle, the promotion of liberty becomes the hallmark of the American experience.
Brandeis writes, “They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They believed
liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty.”81  As a result
of struggle, the promotion of liberty is not only an end, it is a means, an ongoing
struggle; it is a matter of courage.
     Thus, promoting liberty is never over and done with.  Liberty as “an end and as a
means” reveals that liberty is both valuable and instrumental.  Instrumental for what?
Brandeis answers,
They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without
free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion
affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious
doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public
discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of
the American government.82
As he did in his pre-Court rhetoric, Brandeis highlights the means-ends relationship
through enacting organic rhetoric; it is a matter of thinking, speaking, discovering, and
spreading.  Without such an organic view, assembling and discussing become futile;
with such a view, assembling and discussing become tools able to combat “noxious
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doctrine,” or mechanized thinking, speaking and writing.  Promoting liberty is a means
to combat the dire consequences of mechanized relationships.  Since mechanization
leads to an “inert people,” combating mechanization becomes a public duty, a duty that
the American government must always promote.  And Brandeis is quite willing to use
this understanding of experience as a “fundamental principle.”  Such a principle
becomes a guide for meeting the needs of individuals and society and striving for
betterment.
     Brandeis continually highlights the role of the founders—“those who won our
independence”—so as to stress the ongoing project of American democracy.  That is,
Brandeis sees particular continuity between the role of liberty in society during the time
of the founders and during the present.  He says,
They recognized the risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they
knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its
infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that
fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable
government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely
supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil
counsels is good ones.83
While specific social circumstances are always changing, experience has shown an
ongoing relationship between “human institutions” and the individual.  The goal is to
balance those.  The goal is not to enforce order, or secure it merely through “fear of
punishment.”  A healthy balance between institutions and subjects can be forged through
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promoting liberty, through enabling individuals to discuss matters freely and propose
remedies and to combat “evils counsels” with “good ones.”  Promoting liberty is a
matter of continually creating and enacting intelligence in social relations.  As Brandeis
says, “Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they
eschewed silence coerced by law-the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing
the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that
free speech and assembly should be guaranteed.”84
      Brandeis goes on to reiterate the importance of liberty, concluding that “It is the
function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears.”85  But he also
reiterates that promoting liberty is an ongoing struggle:
Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards.  They did not
fear political change.  They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty.  To
courageous, selfreliant men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless
reasoning applied through the processes of popular government, no danger
flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the
evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for
full discussion.  If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and
fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied
is more speech, not enforced silence.86
     According to Vincent Blasi, this passage represents the heart of Brandeis’s belief in
“civic courage.”87  According to Bobertz, this passage is one of “the most frequently
cited passages ever written by a Supreme Court Justice.”88  In this excerpt Brandeis
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formulates his now famous approach to First Amendment jurisprudence: the cure for
“bad speech” is “more speech, not enforced silence.”  It is best to allow differing
opinions to clash in public dialog, says Brandeis, rather than suppress opinions that seem
“dangerous.”  Brandeis knows there are no easy answers for America.  He knows there
are only answers won through struggle, answers that are not end-all solutions to human
problems, but that are more or less able to serve human purposes.  Change is inevitable,
so the evolution of speaking and believing is also inevitable.  But what one can
understand is that shutting down the opportunities for speaking and
believing—mechanizing life and glossing over life’s novelties and possibilities—leads to
disastrous consequences.
     Pragmatic First Amendment jurisprudence holds that meaning emerges from struggle.
In fact, meaning is bound in struggle; it is part of the undertaking, of the process of
pursuing betterment.  As Dewey makes clear, “Because the actual world, that in which
we live, is a combination of movement and culmination, of breaks and re-unions, the
experience of a living creature is capable of esthetic quality. . . .  The moment of passage
from disturbance into harmony is that of intensest life.”89  “Intensest life” is a moment of
growth, of moving from disturbance into harmony, or, as Brandeis might say, of
hatching out differences and creating a solution that avoids mechanization by promoting
liberty.
     The experience of American history reveals, if nothing else, the need to promote
liberty.  In a society undergoing constant change—social, economic, industrial, political
and cultural change—the need to promote liberty becomes all the more important, lest
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life becomes mechanized and shuts down.  Ulrich says that “Brandeis creates an image
of the founders that emphasizes their willingness to take risks to protect freedom of
speech.  Whether they actually said these things is largely irrelevant; Brandeis asks the
audience to understand the spirit of the founders as he understands it and to abide by that
spirit.”90  Ulrich is right, but the point is not limited to the founders.  Brandeis’s point is
about the spirit of the entire American experience.  It is about his understanding of
history, consequences, the individual, liberty, the balance of power, the relationship of
government to society and the individual, and the full meaning of life coming to fruition
in struggle and expression.  Whitney contains the essence of Brandeis’s beliefs and
rhetorical style.  James’s point that a man’s vision is the great fact about him speaks
directly to Brandeis’s entire undertaking in Whitney.  His concurrence is a summation of
his vision; it is an expression of spirit, of Brandeis feeling the total push and pull of the
cosmos.  One finds in Brandeis’s Whitney concurrence the full thrust of his assessment
of the deep and profound meaning of life.
The Organic Structure of the Law and Society
     While Brandeis’s individualism was primary, it was in no way absolute.  That is to
say, the individual could not be given free range to do whatever he or she pleased.  The
individual depends, believed Brandeis, directly on society and society depends directly
on the individual.  Essentially, what Brandeis sought was balance.  He sought to balance
the needs of the individual with the needs of society and the structure of government.
The difficulty, as Brandeis saw it, is that the needs of the individual, society, and the
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structure of government are always changing.  Advances in technology and industry
affect society, which affects the place of the individual in society, which affects the role
the government must play in dealing with the needs of the individual and society.  As the
individual’s needs change, so do society’s needs, and so do the duties of law and
government.
     Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead v. U.S. (1928)91 is a masterful example of this point.
The case concerned the government’s use of wiretapping to convict persons violating the
National Prohibition Act.  By tapping the phone lines of a number of different suspected
bootleggers, federal agents collected over 750 pages of typed transcripts, which the
government then used as the primary evidence to convict the bootleggers.  The
defendants appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that wiretapping violated their
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights, essentially claiming that wiretapping amounted to
illegal search and seizure.  Justice Taft delivered the majority opinion, which upheld the
use of wiretapping and the defendants’s convictions, concluding that the bootleggers
“cannot justify enlargement of the language [of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments] . . .
beyond the possible practical meaning of houses, persons, papers, and effects, or so to
apply the words search and seizure as to forbid hearing or sight.”92  He continued: “The
reasonable view is that one who installs in his house a telephone instrument with
connecting wires intends to project his voice to those quite outside, and that the wires
beyond his house, and messages while passing over them, are not within the protection
of the Fourth Amendment.”93  Additionally, the majority held that whether evidence was
gathered legally or illegal, the evidence in Olmstead was admissible nonetheless.94  Taft
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argued that the Court must follow common-law precedent: “Our general experience
shows that much evidence has always been receivable, although not obtained by
conformity to the highest ethics. . . .  A standard which would forbid the reception of
evidence, if obtained by other than nice ethical conduct by government officials, would
make society suffer and give criminals greater immunity than has been known
heretofore.”95  As the majority saw it, the issue in Olmstead concerned helping society,
and the government, by convicting “criminals” by whatever means available; it was an
either or decision: either wiretapping is permitted and used to convict “criminals” or
wiretapping is forbidden and criminals go free and society crumbles.  According to
James Boyd White, Taft was essentially saying, “‘My job is to decide this case in light
of the Constitution.  Here are the facts.  They are as plain as can be.  Here is the text.  It
is as plain as can be.  It speaks of searches and seizures and here there is neither.’”
White concludes, “The function of the court as Taft enacts it is thus not to reason, not to
argue, not to explain, but to declare the meaning of an authoritative text.”96
     Brandeis cannot accept the majority’s position.  There are more parties concerned in
the case, believes Brandeis, than just “society” and “criminals.”  First, Brandeis argues
in his dissent that even though the framers of the Constitution did not explicitly forbid
the use of wiretapping, wiretapping does not thereby become constitutional:
When the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were adopted, ‘the form that evil had
theretofore taken’ had been necessarily simple.  Force and violence were then the
only means known to man by which a government could directly effect self-
incrimination. . . .  Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have
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become available to the government.  Discovery and invention have made it
possible for the government, by means far more effective than stretching upon
the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet.97
Brandeis’s argument is that the law must evolve with society and technology.  Because
tapping a citizen’s telephone is a particularly invasive form of governmental espionage,98
the Court must sustain the individual’s right to be left alone, to be secure in his or her
personal sanctuary.  As White characterizes Brandeis’s position, “[The founders] must
have meant [the Constitution] to be read in a way that would permit it to be relocated in
a new, and in principle to them unknowable, context, that is, ‘non-literally.’  What is
required in interpreting the Constitution, therefore, is something like translation, a
bringing into the present a text of the past.”99  Reading the Constitution in light of the
invention of wiretapping, it is clear, thought Brandeis, that the courts cannot allow the
government’s prosecutorial powers to grow out of hand, for if they do, the balance
between individual liberty, social organization and regulatory power will be destroyed.
In language almost directly from “The Right to Privacy,” Brandeis infuses Olmstead
with eloquence rivaling his Whitney dissent:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the
pursuit of happiness.  They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature,
of his feelings and of his intellect.  They knew that only a part of the pain, please
and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things.  They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.
They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone—the most
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comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.  To protect
that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the
individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.100
     The upshot of this passage is balance.  The Court must understand the consequences
of social, technological and industrial evolution and enable the law to grow accordingly.
There is no neglecting constitutional principles, says Brandeis; there is only the realistic
acknowledgment that the law must deal with social strife, not in abstract form, but as it
currently exists, as the needs of society and the individual change: “Experience should
teach us to be on our guard to protect liberty when the government’s purposes are
beneficent.  Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by
evil-minded rulers.  The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by
men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”101  “Understanding” is of greater
importance than whatever “well-meaning” intentions one may have.  For democracy to
work, for the government to function properly and at the same time serve and promote
social and individual undertakings, the judiciary must, says Brandeis, maintain
balance.102
     Not only does his dissent in Olmstead follow the rhetorical movement of his opinions
concerning liberty and the First Amendment—that is, by contextualizing the case in a
broad social context, with an intimate understanding of the place of the individual in that
context and of the potential consequences of the decision, and emerging with a
normative proclamation—Olmstead also conveys the rhetorical upshot of his opinions
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concerning the structure of society: the need for an organic, dynamic balance between
social relations.  He continued this point in his opinions concerning the place of labor in
the industrial age.
     The two most important of such opinions were Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering
(1921)103 and Truax v. Corrigan (1921).104  Duplex dealt with a labor union’s attempt to
“injure” and “destroy” the “good will,” in the majority’s language, of a Michigan
company who manufactured and installed printing presses.  Under the terms of the
Sherman Act, the printing press company sought an injunction against the labor union’s
actions.  The majority held,
There is nothing here to justify defendants or the organizations they represent in
using either threats or persuasion to bring about strikes or a cessation of work on
the part of employees of complainant’s customers or prospective customers, or of
the trucking company employed by the customers, with the object of compelling
such customers to withdraw or refrain from commercial relations with
complainant, and of thereby constraining complainant to yield the matter in
dispute.  To instigate a sympathetic strike in aid of a secondary boycott cannot be
deemed ‘peaceful and lawful’ persuasion.105
Truax dealt with similar circumstances.  Ex-employees of a restaurant in Arizona and
their fellow union members, claiming unfair treatment and deplorable working
conditions, staged a protest in front of the restaurant.  The State of Arizona, however,
had a law prohibiting the state from granting injunctions over non-violent labor disputes
concerning the terms of employment.  Because the ex-employees continued their protest
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in front of the restaurant and cost their ex-employer considerable business, the restaurant
owner claimed that Arizona’s law deprived him of liberty and property without due
process of law.  The majority held that the restaurant owner’s business was indeed a
property right and therefore afforded protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.  The
protesters’s non-violent campaign, the majority concluded, constituted an “unlawful
annoyance” and a “hurtful nuisance. . . .  It was not lawful persuasion or inducing.”106
The protesters’s persuasive tactics, their forms of speech, essentially, while not violent
outright were on par with a violent demonstration: “Violence could not have been more
effective.  It was moral coercion by illegal annoyance and obstruction, and it thus was
plainly a conspiracy.”107  Consequently, the Court declared Arizona’s “no injunction”
law invalid because it disregarded “fundamental rights of liberty and property and to
deprive the person suffering the loss of due process of law.”108  Felix Frankfurter
remarked that the majority’s decision in Truax was “fraught with more evil than any
which it has rendered in a generation.”109
     Not surprisingly, Brandeis dissented in both Duplex and Truax.  In Duplex, Brandeis
said the question was, “May not all with a common interest join in refusing to expend
their labor upon articles whose very production constitutes an attack upon their standard
of living and the institution which they are convinced supports it?”110  He answered
“yes,” believing that the common self-interest of the strikers constituted a justification
for their action.  Brandeis supported his belief through judicial precedent, through
Congressional Acts, including close readings of the Clayton and Sherman Acts, and
through an historical survey of the social evolution of various labor disputes.  The
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central issue at stake in Duplex, said Brandeis, was the right of industry and laborers, of
employers and employees, of the monetarily powerful business owners and the
numerically powerful labor unions, to struggle through industrial conflict and negotiate a
fair settlement.  And the Court should have no part in this non-violent “combat”:
Because I have come to the conclusion that both the common law of a state and a
statute of the United States declare the right of industrial combatants to push their
struggle to the limits of the justification of self-interest, I do not wish to be
understood as attaching any constitutional or moral sanction to that right.  All
rights are derived from the purposes of the society in which they exist; above all
rights raise duty to the community.  The conditions developed in industry may be
such that those engaged in it cannot continue their struggle without danger to the
community.  But it is not for judges to determine whether such conditions exist,
nor is it their function to set the limits of permissible contest and to declare the
duties which the new situation demands.  This is the function of the legislature
which, while limiting individual and group rights of aggression and defense, may
substitute processes of justice for the more primitive method of trial by
combat.111
     Brandeis’s rhetorical strategy and conclusion were similar in Truax.  He included a
lengthy survey of the historical conditions of labor disputes and, because of the changing
conditions of industrial relations, believed it best for industrial combatants to struggle
through their own problems without governmental interference.112  The only part
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government should play in industrial relations, Brandeis said, was to facilitate social
experimentation:
Whether a law enacted in the exercise of the police power is justly subject to the
charge of being unreasonable or arbitrary can ordinarily be determined only by a
consideration of the contemporary conditions, social, industrial, and political, of
the community to be affected thereby. . . .  Nearly all legislation involves a
weighing of public needs as against private desires, and likewise a weighting of
relative social values.  Since government is not an exact science, prevailing
public opinion concerning the evils and the remedy is among the important facts
deriving consideration particularly when the public conviction is both deep-
seated and widespread and has been reached after deliberation.113
     The majority in both these cases believed Brandeis was seeking to curb individual
liberty—the liberty of business owners to conduct their businesses without governmental
regulation or interference from labor.  Given Brandeis’s undying belief in the promotion
of individual liberty, his dissents in Duplex and Truax seem—prima facie—opposed to
individual liberty.  Yet, Brandeis believed, these opinions had more to do with sustaining
balance in society than with economic liberty.  When the uninhibited expression of
individual liberty comes at the expense of public welfare—as often seemed to be the
case in the industrial age—individual liberty can and should be restricted.  “Practically
every change in the law governing the relation of employer and employee,” he writes in
Truax, “must abridge, in some respect, the liberty or property of one of the parties—if
liberty and property be measured by the standard of the law therefore prevailing.”114
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Furthermore, the continually changing conditions of society make the government’s
judicial duties even more difficult.  But the American public is not looking for an easy
answer, said Brandeis; it is looking for alleviation, for working solutions to particular
problems: “Few laws are of universal application.  It is of the nature of our law that it
has dealt, not with man in general, but with him in relationships.”115  Because particular
problems are constantly changing, the law must strive for an organic, dynamic balance in
social relations.  Such was Dewey’s belief as well: the public should aim at “more or less
intelligent improvisation aiming at palliating conditions by means of patchwork
policies.”116
     In The Public and Its Problems, Dewey’s concern is with the dynamic character of
social relations.  Political fixes are temporary at best, says Dewey.  Yet such fixes are
wrongly kept in place as though they were permanent, end-all solutions.117  The public
must pursue social amelioration by breaking through “existing political forms.  This is
hard to do because these forms are themselves the regular means of instituting change.
The public which generated political forms is passing away, but the power and lust of
possession remains in the hands of the officers and agencies which the dying public
instituted.”118  Just as Brandeis placed his hope for amelioration in social
experimentation, Dewey believes the public and the state must be continually reborn to
deal with the changing nature of social relations:
The formation of states must be an experimental process.  The trial process may
go on with diverse degrees of blindness and accident, and at the cost of
unregulated procedures of cut and try, of fumbling and propping, without insight
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into what men are after or clear knowledge of a good state even when it is
achieved.  Or it may proceed more intelligently, because guided by knowledge of
the conditions which must be fulfilled.  But it is still experimental.  And since
conditions of action and of inquiry and knowledge are always changing, the
experiment must always be retried; the State must always be rediscovered.119
Amelioration of social problems comes through the creative implementation of balance.
     For both Dewey and Brandeis, balance is nothing formal, static, or prescribed; it is
dynamically renegotiated always, reborn under the belief that meaning arises through
personal and social growth.  While the key to growth is creative and intelligent
experimentation, such experimentation is not unbound.  Sometimes restricting social
relations in certain circumstances is necessary to promote growth in the long run.
     Presumably, such was Brandeis’s understanding in supporting prohibition.120  But
such surely was his understanding in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann (1932).121
Oklahoma law required those wishing to manufacture, sell, or distribute ice to obtain a
permit from the state.  New State Ice Co. had such a permit; Liebmann did not, but he
went into the ice business nevertheless, thus becoming a competitor with New State Ice.
The case went to the Supreme Court.  The majority held that states could not arbitrarily
and unreasonably regulate private businesses; states could only regulate—and regulate in
very limited ways—businesses that acted as public utilities, of which there were very
few.  Justice Sutherland, writing for the majority, made clear that New State Ice dealt
with a matter of private economic pursuit: “Plainly, a regulation which has the effect of
denying or unreasonably curtailing the common right to engage in a lawful private
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business, such as that under review, cannot be upheld consistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment.”122  Thus, Oklahoma’s state law requiring ice companies to obtain a permit
for doing business was unconstitutional.  Furthermore, such a law was in direct
opposition to free market principles: “The control here asserted does not protect against
monopoly, but tends to foster it.  The aim is not to encourage competition, but to prevent
it; not to regulate the business, but to preclude persons from engaging in it.”123
Sutherland even saved until the end of the majority opinion a special rhetorical jab for
Brandeis: “And it is plain that unreasonable or arbitrary interference or restrictions
cannot be saved from the condemnation of that amendment merely by calling them
experimental. . . .  The principle is imbedded in our constitutional system that there are
certain essentials of liberty with which the state is not entitled to dispense in the interest
of experiments.”124
     The majority opinion is written in the rhetoric of free market individualism.  It speaks
of the liberty of engaging in business freely, of industrial competition, of conducting
one’s business apart from governmental interference.  But Brandeis dissents on the basis
that the free market individualism in New State Ice is individualism over against the
public; thus state regulation becomes desirable, even necessary: “[T]he conception of a
public utility is not static.  The welfare of the community may require that the business
of supplying ice be made a public utility, as well as the business of supplying water or
any other necessary commodity or service.  If the business is, or can be made, a public
utility, it must be possible to make the issue of a certificate a prerequisite to engaging in
it.”125
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     Monopoly is almost always a dreaded word in Brandeis’s vocabulary.  But as a
pragmatist, Brandeis is against closed-systems of meaning, which means that monopoly
does not necessarily equal evil.  Sometimes, as is the case with New State Ice, a
monopoly can serve a larger good, the public good:
[W]hile ordinarily free competition in the common callings has been encouraged,
the public welfare may at other times demand that monopolies be created. . . .
The certificate of public convenience and invention is a device—a recent social-
economic invention—through which the monopoly is kept under effective
control by vesting in a commission the power to terminate it whenever that
course is required in the public interest.126
His appeal to monopoly is his appeal to balance.  While the majority makes the
argument that New State Ice is about individual liberty in the free market, Brandeis
makes the opposite point; it is about restricting individual liberty for the public good: “If
states are denied the power to prevent the harmful entry of a few individuals into a
business, they may thus, in effect, close it altogether to private enterprise.”127
     At the end of New State Ice, Brandeis’s normative appeal calls on the Court to allow
states and industry to fight out for themselves the meanings of “public” and “private”
enterprise:
The economic and social sciences are largely uncharted seas.  We have been
none too successful in the modest essays in economic control already entered
upon. . . .  Man is weak and his judgment is at best fallible.
127
Yet the advances in the exact sciences and the achievements in invention
remind us that the seemingly impossible sometimes happens. . . .  The
discoveries in physical science, the triumphs in invention, attest the value of the
process of trial and error.  In large measure, these advances have been due to
experimentation.  In those fields experimentation has, for two centuries, been not
only free but encouraged.  Some people assert that our present plight is due, in
part, to the limitations set by courts upon experimentation in the fields of social
and economic science; and to the discouragement to which proposals for
betterment there have been subjected otherwise.  There must be power in the
states and the nation to remould, through experimentation, our economic
practices and institutions to meet changing social and economic needs. . . .
     To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave
responsibility.  Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious
consequences to the nation.  It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courage state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.
. . .  If we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold.128
This passage not only displays Brandeis’s eloquence so magnificently, but it also
contains the essence of Brandeis’s views on social relations.  Because the world is
forever in-the-making, the way in which America experiences industrial change is
constitutive of America’s future.  If America experiences industrial relations as
destructive, as over against personal and social well-being, then America’s future will be
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one of industrial devastation.  However, if America experiences industrial relations as
healthy, functional and in concert with personal and social needs, then America’s future
will be one of industrial democracy.  Striving for balance in the present is part of
creating balance in the future.  Thus Brandeis calls on the courts to back off, to restrain
themselves, to accommodate social experimentation.
     Brandeis was one of the most vocal proponents of judicial self-restraint at a time
when judicial self-restraint was not popular among judges.129  Nowhere did he make his
support of judicial self-restraint more clear than in his majority opinion for Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins (1938).130
     In Erie Brandeis used a case concerning a railroad’s liability to a pedestrian, arguably
a “trespasser,” to overturn the almost one-hundred-year-old doctrine of “general
common law,” a doctrine Brandeis believed was destroying social experimentation
within the states.  A lower court awarded Tompkins damages after he was struck by an
open-door of a moving train.  Tompkins was on the railroad’s private property, but a
federal appeals court ruled that, even though no state law established liability for such an
accident, the railroad was liable to Tompkins under general common law—that is,
common law made by federal judges in absence of specific state legislation or precedent.
The idea of general common law emerged from Swift v. Tyson (1842), which held that
“upon questions of general law the federal courts are free, in absence of a local statute,
to exercise their independent judgment as to what the law is.”131  Swift “held that federal
courts exercising jurisdiction on the ground of diversity of citizenship need not, in
matters of general jurisprudence, apply the unwritten law of the state as declared by its
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highest court; that they are free to exercise an independent judgment as to what the
common law of the state is—or should be.”132  Essentially, Erie presented Brandeis the
chance to disapprove Swift.
     His main grievance was that Swift proved harmful; it was a matter of consequences.
Through Swift, Brandeis said, “The federal courts assumed, in the broad field of ‘general
law,’ the power to declare rules of decision which Congress was confessedly without
power to enact as statutes.”133  Swift thus gave the federal judiciary undue power in
creating federal law, power that Congress was without.  Swift created an imbalance in
the power relationships among governmental constructs.  But more pressing, perhaps,
for Brandeis, were the needs of the public.  Swift was creating social unrest by spoiling
relationships among individuals, local governments, businesses, and local statutes.
“Experience in applying the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson,” he wrote, “had revealed its
defects, political and social; and the benefits expected to flow from the rule did not
accrue.”134  Legislatures create laws to serve public and private needs.  But what has
been the experience of general common law?  Defects, both political and social.  Swift
does not do what it is supposed to do, said Brandeis, and it must, therefore, be
disapproved.  The goodness or badness of a law—morality, in a nutshell—emerges from
the resulting consequences: “[T]he mischievous results of the doctrine had become
apparent.  Diversity of citizenship jurisdictions was conferred in order to prevent
apprehended discrimination in state courts against those not citizens of the state.  Swift v.
Tyson introduced grave discrimination by noncitizens against citizens.”135
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     Brandeis’s language in Erie rhetorically reflects the purpose with which he undertook
the majority opinion.  For example, he says, “If only a question of statutory construction
were involved, we should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied
throughout nearly a century.  But the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now
been made clear, and compels us to do so.”136  The courts should assess issues of
constitutionality by “the course pursued.”  Laws, therefore, need not be prima facie
unconstitutional; that is, to decide the constitutionality of a statute, the courts need not
merely compare the language of the law formally with the language of the Constitution.
Unconstitutionality can emerge in a law’s operation, in the way in which it interacts with
social relations and in the way in which judges apply it.  Constitutional issues should be
judged on processes, not on formal principles.  His language “of the course pursued” is a
matter of the pragmatic upshot—what difference will it make if this world-formula or
that world-formula be true?  Swift’s world-formula was disastrous, and by becoming
disastrous, it also became unconstitutional.
     In deciding Erie, Brandeis also relied upon the philosophical wisdom of an old friend.
He quoted Holmes’s take on Swift by writing,
The doctrine rests upon the assumption that there is “a transcendental body of
law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and until
changed by statute,” that federal courts have the power to use their judgment as
to what the rules of common law are; and that in the federal courts “the parties
are entitled to an independent judgment on matter of general law.”
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“But law in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist without
some definite authority behind it.  The common law so far as it is enforced in a
State, whether called common law or not, is not the common law generally but
the law of that State existing by the authority of that State without regard to what
it may have been in England or anywhere else. . . .
“The authority and only authority is the State, and if that be so, the voice
adopted by the State as its own (whether it be of its Legislature or of its Supreme
Court) should utter the last word.”137
The law, Brandeis said through Holmes, is progressive, organic, experimental, and in the
law there is no room for closed-systems of meaning; there is only room for building and
maintaining social relations.  Swift should be disapproved because of the imbalance it
creates.  “Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable
in a state whether they be local in their nature of ‘general,’ be they commercial law or a
part of the law of torts.”  He continued, “And no clause in the Constitution purports to
confer such a power upon the federal courts.”138    It is not up to the federal courts,
Brandeis believed, to dictate unwritten law to the states.  It is up to the states to negotiate
the particular social relations of their local reality.
     According to Edward Purcell, Erie was “gnostic and pragmatic, focused on the social
function and consequences of procedural rules.  It was, in fact, characteristically
Brandeisian: epistemologically confident, theoretically principled, institutionally rooted,
and morally committed.”139  Erie was also characteristically Brandeisian in that, as a
counterpart to his many opinions on individual liberty and the First Amendment, it
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shows that in the pursuit of growth individuals and society must act in concert.  Put next
to Pierce, Schaefer, and Gilbert, not to mention Whitney and Olmstead, Erie reveals
Brandeis’s commitment to nurture both society and individuality.  Neither society nor
individuality can be absolute, of course.  For Brandeis, there was no room for absolutism
of any kind, especially on the bench.
     For his eightieth birthday celebration, Dewey once wrote, “Democracy is a way of
personal life controlled not merely by faith in human nature in general but by faith in the
capacity of human beings for intelligent judgment and action if proper conditions are
furnished.”140  Brandeis saw his role on the Court as furnishing the “proper conditions”
for life.  The task was not to dictate the structure of life, but to enable individuals to
create the structure of their own lives.  The judiciary, thought Brandeis, should only go
so far, should only act to facilitate the release of powers—social and individual powers.
It was up to the individuals who comprise society to make the great society become a
great community, in Dewey’s famous words.  It was up to the Court to furnish
individuals with the opportunities for doing that.
The Language of the Law and Social Relations
     In releasing their powers so as to make the great society become the great
community, individuals face a particular obstacle, writes James: “Woe to him whose
beliefs play fast and loose with the order which realities follow in his experience; they
will lead him nowhere or else make false connections.”141  Play is nothing James forbids;
indeed, playing and experimenting within the fabric of experience can be sources of
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liberation.142  But experimentation is more or less successful, more or less liberating, to
the degree that it follows the order of the reality of one’s experiences.  The point, to be
sure, is one of degree.  Play can be both liberating and constraining—liberating if it
leads one down paths of enrichment, constraining if it leads one down paths of
deterioration.  Because James bases his philosophy in experience, and because
experience is an endless undergoing, an endless process, good and bad experiences are
matters of degree.  Experiences can be more or less enriching, more or less liberating,
more or less destructive, more or less painful, more or less promising, more or less
sources of health.  Thus James says, “[M]ust not the guiding principle for ethical
philosophy (since all demands conjointly cannot be satisfied in this poor world) be
simply to satisfy at all times as many demands as we can?  That act must be the best act,
accordingly, which makes for the best whole, in the sense of awakening the least sum of
dissatisfactions.”143  The ethical pursuit is towards a life that satisfies needs and leaves
behind dissatisfactions.  The ethical and moral life is a process; it is a matter of
proximity, because, of course, not all needs can be met.  James is speaking here of a
good life that comes in degrees, never through formal calculations or abstract maxims.
     This, however, is the point Stanley Fish fails to understand.  Principles are
misleading, Fish says, because people expect them to “drop from the sky.”144  Because
they do not drop from the sky, it is politics all the way down, and principles are thus
rather insignificant and mostly misleading:
[M]y point . . . is that adhoccery will be what is going on despite the fact that the
issues will be framed as if they were matters of principle and were available to a
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principled resolution.  As we have seen, there are principles aplenty—autonomy,
respect, toleration, equality—but when they are put into play by sophisticated
intelligences, the result is not resolution but a sharpened sense of the blind alleys
into which they lead us.145
This is how Fish views decision-makers with principles: as individuals duped into
believing they possess Truths, Absolutes, and Essences.  Decision-makers are duped,
says Fish, into thinking liberty, equality, and freedom are static states representing
Timeless Forms.  But, Fish retorts, principles never work out that way in actual political
exchanges.  So decision-makers should drop talk of principles altogether or admit they
are ad hoc rhetorical decorations with no real value.
     Is there another way to view principles?  Is there a way to view principles without
thinking they are Timeless Forms, Logical reflections of Reality, and without thinking,
as Fish does, that they have no real value?  Yes, there is another way of viewing
principles, the pragmatic way.  For the pragmatist, principles are not objects had, not
static states to be possessed, nor are they worthless, ad hoc constructs.  Rather, for the
pragmatist, principles function as ideals one should work toward, goals one should strive
for.  Principles are part of the pragmatic project of forging a moral identity.  In that way,
principles become matters of degree.  They are matters of an experimental process, of
living in a certain direction, toward a certain goal, with a certain hope.  Dewey says,
“What the live creature retains from the past and what it expects from the future operate
as directions in the present.”146  Experience carries with it lessons of history, lessons that
help the individual avoid the bad and pursue the good.  Morality, for the pragmatist, is a
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matter of doing, a matter of process and degree.  James argues that “there is no such
thing possible as an ethical philosophy dogmatically made up in advance.”147  But in
James’s philosophy there is a rejoinder: “Wherever a process of life communicates an
eagerness to him who lives it, there the life becomes genuinely significant.”148  Fish
concedes that there is no such thing as an ethical philosophy dogmatically made up in
advance, but he does not see that a life of liberty, equality, and freedom is possible
nonetheless—possible, namely, because that life is a matter of degree, a matter of
organic interactions in an endless process of negotiation.  Principles are never had as
Forms, but they are had as significant elements of the way in which one has one’s
experiences and creates the future.
     For Brandeis, the process of American life, the undergoing of American experience,
is one of the most profound, significant and meaningful ways of experiencing life.  The
American experience is living toward liberty, toward freedom, toward equality, toward
an embodiment of American ideals.  Articulating this American experience becomes, in
Brandeis’s vocabulary, a rhetoric of degree.  In his unpublished opinion for Stratton v.
St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co. (1929), Brandeis echoes James’s understanding of
pursuing the good life by moving life away from destructive relationships:
[T]hroughout the greater part of our history, the States guarded jealously their
control over grants of the corporate privilege; and they have made it a source of
revenue.  Severe restrictions originated in fear.  First, there was the fear of
monopoly.  Then, the fear of a domination more general.  Fear of encroachment
upon the liberties and opportunities of the individual.  Fear of the subjection of
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labor to capital.  Fear that the absorption of capital by corporations and their
perpetual life, might bring evils similar to those which attended mortmain.  There
was a sense of some insidious menace inherent in large aggregations of capital.
Incorporation for business purposes was long denied after it had been freely
granted for religious, educational and charitable purposes.  And when finally
granted for business purposes, fees graduate according to the capital stock were
commonly exacted as compensation for the privilege.149
Liberty, novelty, possibility, and the good life are gained in degrees as one turns away
from the elements that harm liberty, novelty, possibility, and the good life.  Such a
statement may sound obvious, but the point is easy to miss.  Brandeis describes the
turning away from harmful social elements as a process.  Certain fears of bigness lead to
other fears, which lead to measures to curb bigness, which lead to opportunities to
promote liberty and the good life where they had been threatened.
     What is common to Brandeis, James and Dewey—a commonality Fish fails to
understand—is the spirit of hope in which the good life is pursued.  Pragmatists share
the language of hope because they believe the opportunities for a meaningful, significant
life are present in the fabric of experience.  Brandeis’s second dissent, coming in Adams
v. Tanner (1917),150 dealt with Washington State’s attempt to solve “the chronic problem
of unemployment” by forbidding employment agencies from collecting fees for finding
work for unemployed laborers.  He saw Washington’s social experiment as an attempt to
create meaningful relationships among workers, the state, and industry: “There is reason
to believe that the people of Washington not only considered the collection by the
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private employment offices of fees from employees a social injustice, but that they
considered the elimination of the practice a necessary preliminary to the establishment of
a constructive policy for dealing with the subject of unemployment.”151  At stake in
Adams was the public’s attempt to infuse the community with social justice; and it was a
pursuit, it was a process, a process of moving away from the evils of unemployment and
toward a future of economic opportunity for all.  Success in such circumstances is gained
in degrees, in more or less alleviating the pain of social injustice.
     Like Brandeis, James believed meaning is gained step-by-step, in an endless process,
in striving for betterment: “[H]ere we are, a countless multitude of vessels of life, each
of us pent in to peculiar difficulties, with which we must severally struggle by using
whatever of fortitude and goodness we can summon up.  The exercise of the courage,
patience, and kindness must be the significant portion of the whole business.”152  Dewey
shared the same hope in deriving meaning from struggle: “Contrast of lack and fullness,
of struggle and achievement, of adjustment after consummated irregularity, form the
drama in which, action, feeling, and meaning are one.”153
     It is hard to imagine Fish writing with the same passion as James, Dewey and
Brandeis.  But that is exactly where Fish’s understanding of pragmatism misses the point
of the pragmatic project, indeed, the pragmatic political style: meaning is found in the
struggle for betterment, which means that meaning is possible and the pursuit of
meaning becomes a moral principle.  And this is why pragmatists have to advocate
specific political procedures; pragmatists have to help steer society toward a better life
by advocating the paths that more or less lead to fulfillment and enrichment and away
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from deterioration and pain.  In so advocating, pragmatists speak not in terms of states,
essences, absolutes, substances and forms, but in terms of degree, in the rhetoric of
degree.
     In the following chapter, I will show how for pragmatists the pursuit of meaning
becomes all-encompassing, how it comprises the threads of the entire fabric of
experience.  The pursuit of meaning becomes the spiritual undergirding of the way in
which one has one’s experiences.  Such is the upshot of James’s understanding of life:
Life is in the transitions as much as in the terms connected; often, indeed, it
seems to be there more emphatically, as if your spurts and sallies forward were
the real firing-line of the battle, were like the thin line of flame advancing across
the dry autumnal field which the farmer proceeds to burn.  In this line we live
prospectively as well as retrospectively.  It is ‘of’ the future and so far as the
future, when it comes, will have continued it.154
For a full life, the pursuit of meaning is the beginning and the end.  The pursuit of
meaning helps Brandeis move with belief in the utmost importance of individualism,
through the need to sustain balance in social relations, to the promises of Zionism.  The
subject of the next chapter is Brandeis’s rhetoric on Zionism.
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CHAPTER IV
PRAGMATISM AS RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE:
LOUIS BRANDEIS’S ZIONIST RHETORIC
     Pragmatism is often charged with being anti-religious or, at the very least, a-religious.
As Stuart Rosenbaum points out, “many intellectuals continue to see the American
pragmatic tradition as mired in unproductive commitments to relativism, skepticism,
scientism, or extreme individualism.”1  This common perception often causes the
“representatives of traditional religious perspectives all [to] reject the American
pragmatic tradition.”2  Richard J. Bernstein calls this common perception the “aggressive
atheism” view of pragmatism.3
     From an historical perspective, James and Dewey would cringe at the suggestion that
they were “aggressive atheists,” that their pragmatism committed them to relativism,
skepticism, scientism, or extreme individualism.  After all, William James said in 1907,
three years before his death, “I firmly disbelieve, myself, that our human experience is
the highest form of experience extant in the universe.  I believe rather that we stand in
much the same relation to the whole of the universe as our canine and feline pets do to
the whole of human life.”4  Even John Dewey, much more of a secular humanist than
James, wrote A Common Faith in 1934, in the later half of his career.  In that book
Dewey argued for an increased awareness of the religious experiences of life, which
would “have its natural place in every aspect of human experience that is concerned with
estimate of possibilities, with emotional stir by possibilities as yet unrealized, and with
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all action in behalf of their realization.  All that is significant in human experience falls
within this frame.”5
     Throughout this thesis I have been aligning Brandeis with pragmatism, specifically
with what I call the pragmatic political style.  But Brandeis was also a Jew, and
throughout his life he became increasingly committed to a personal and public
expression of the Jewish religion.  In 1910, Brandeis’s Judaism became an integral part
of his public speaking when he became a Zionist.   As Strum notes, Zionism quickly
became the “dominating theme of his life.”6  Even more impressively, throughout his
tenure as Supreme Court Justice, Zionism was the one public cause in which Brandeis
participated outside of his Court duties.   Zionism was the only public form of social
advocacy that followed him through his term on the bench until his death in 1941.
     If pragmatism is anti-religious, if it is “aggressive atheism,” or meaningless secular
humanism, as traditional religious advocates argue, then Brandeis cannot be a
pragmatist.  Brandeis’s style cannot be pragmatic because Zionism was an integral part
of his public and private life; indeed, it was probably the most meaningful part of his
public and private life.  If in pragmatism there is no room for religion, then the preceding
chapters have been for naught.
     The present chapter is an attempt to show how pragmatism is in no way anti-
religious.  Furthermore, it is the attempt to show how Brandeis’s Zionism in no way
separates him from the pragmatic style; rather, his Zionism, I will argue, shows the
pragmatic style come to fruition, the pragmatic style in its most meaningful form.
Brandeis’s Zionist rhetoric is more than just Brandeis dealing with a problem—the
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Jewish problem, as he calls it—in a pragmatic manner; it is Brandeis embodying the
pragmatic style in the most enriching way possible, as a part of the quest for meaning.  I
will first examine more extensively James and Dewey’s takes on pragmatism and
religion, focusing on James’s “Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results” and his
“Pragmatism and Religion,” and Dewey’s A Common Faith.  I will then proceed with a
rhetorical analysis of Brandeis’s addresses on Zionism and the Jewish tradition, showing
not only how his Zionism is congruent with James and Dewey’s beliefs on pragmatism
and religion, but how there is a particular rhetorical strategy for dealing pragmatically
with religious and spiritual issues.  I will conclude by highlighting the linguistic
emphasis running throughout Brandeis’s Zionist rhetoric, a linguistic emphasis fully a
part of James and Dewey’s understanding of the intersection between pragmatism and
religion.
Religious Roots in American Pragmatism
     Perhaps James is best known as a religious thinker for his The Varieties of Religious
Experience.  This is a remarkable and important work, to be sure.  But I want to
approach James’s sentiments on religion through the lens of his pragmatism, and there
are, it seems, two more direct ways to do so than through the Varieties.
     Raised a Protestant, James remained religious, more or less so, throughout his entire
life, and as he became the popular prophet of pragmatism, the issue of religion was an
explicit part of his focus.  In 1898, James addressed philosophers at the University of
California, Berkeley, presenting a paper entitled “Philosophical Conceptions and
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Practical Results.”  While the paper was first and foremost an attempt to bring “the
principle of practicalism,” or pragmatism, into common philosophical parlance, James
approached the matter through an analysis of belief in God.  It seems no accident, then,
that when James resurrected the word “pragmatism” from C. S. Pierce he did so, in large
part, by applying it to religious disputes.
     James’s thesis in that address is a straightforward proclamation of the pragmatic
method: “[T]o develop a thought’s meaning we need only determine what conduct it is
fitted to produce; that conduct is for us its sole significance.”7  He claims that the
purpose of philosophy is “to find out what definite difference it will make to you and
me, at definite instants of our life, if this world-formula or that world-formula be the one
which is true” (349).  To show the worth of the pragmatic method, James needs to show
its applicability to problems and the way in which it can help solve problems—concrete
problems.  And there is, James believes, one problem that has plagued philosophers for
millennia: the debate between materialism and theism.
     James approaches the debate by asking, What concrete difference will it make if God
exists or not?  He answers, if it makes no concrete difference, then the existence of God
is a non-issue.  If it makes a concrete difference, then it is a live issue and quite a
significant part of life, to be sure.  If existence is viewed retrospectively—that is, with an
orientation toward the past and the past alone—then, James says, the existence of God
makes no difference in concrete fact: “When a play is once over, and the curtain down,
you really make it no better by claiming an illustrious genius for its author, just as you
make it no worse by calling him a common hack” (351).  But if existence is viewed
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prospectively—that is, with an orientation toward the future as an extension of the
present—then, James says, the existence of God becomes something completely
different: “Theism and materialism, so indifferent when taken retrospectively, point
when we take them prospectively to wholly different practical consequences, to opposite
outlooks of experience” (353).  What are those opposite outlooks of experience?
Materialism, viewed prospectively, blocks the individual’s experiences from his or her
“more ideal interests” and cannot act as a “fulfiller of our remotest hopes” (354).  But
theism, viewed prospectively, “however inferior it may be in clearness to those
mathematical notions so current in mechanical philosophy, has at least this practical
superiority over them, that it guarantees an ideal order that shall be permanently
preserved” (354).
     For James, the point is not that a specific ideal order is True or False, that one’s
beliefs have been cosmically pre-ordained, but that the presence of certain beliefs and
ideals dramatically affects the way in which the individual has his or her experiences.
When belief in God is viewed prospectively, experience becomes not mechanically
philosophical but infused with promise: “Materialism means simply the denial that the
moral order is eternal, and the cutting off of ultimate hopes; theism means the
affirmation of an eternal moral order and the letting loose of hope” (354).  James thus
calls religion “a living practical affair” (356).  It is a live option.  And more than that, it
opens up a new range of possible experiences.  James says,
If you ask what these experiences are, they are conversations with the unseen,
voices and visions, responses to prayer, changes of heart, deliverances form fear,
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inflowings of help, assurances of support, whenever certain persons set their own
internal attitude in certain appropriate ways.  The power comes and goes and is
lost, and can be found only in a certain definite direction, just as if it were a
concrete material thing (357).
Religious experiences thus become not things aloof, not unembodied abstractions, but
things concrete, particular and meaningful.  Religious experiences become specific ways
of having experiences.  They become meaningful because they intimately connect the
individual to the relational manifold, as authentic sources of meaning, completely
opposed to superficiality and second-handedness.
     James’s analysis of this intersection between pragmatism and religion continues in
“Pragmatism and Religion,” the final chapter, the capstone, of Pragmatism: A New
Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking.  In this chapter, James masterfully articulates the
attitude of meliorism, which he infuses will religious language: “Some conditions of the
world’s salvation are actually extant, and [the pragmatist] can not possibly close her eyes
to this fact: and should the residual conditions come, salvation would become an
accomplished reality.”8  As the belief that the world can become better, meliorism steers
between both optimism and pessimism, and also rationalism and empiricism.  As James
says,
I find myself willing to take the universe to be really dangerous and adventurous,
without therefore backing out and crying ‘no play’. . . .  I am willing that there
should be real losses and real losers, and no total preservation of all that is.  I can
believe in the ideal as an ultimate, not as an origin, and as an extract, not the
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whole.  When the cup is poured off, the dregs are left behind for ever, but the
possibility of what is poured off is sweet enough to accept (470).
Notice that James places danger and possibility together in the same breath.  While the
present is teeming with novelty and possibility, danger, risk and the inevitability of lose
are just as real.  But the religious attitude plunges forward nevertheless.  The religious
attitude pushes through danger and risk and lose in pursuit of consequences that are
“sweet enough” to accept.
     For James, the religious life is not opposed to pragmatism but a very integral part of
it.  This does not mean, however, that pragmatism accepts any religion whatsoever.  For
some religions are indeed antithetical to the prospects of pragmatism.  As James puts it,
“You see that pragmatism can be called religious, if you allow that religion can be
pluralistic or merely melioristic in type. . . .  Pragmatism has to postpone dogmatic
answer, for we do not yet know certainly which type of religion is going to work best in
the long run” (472).  Pragmatism is against closed-systems of meaning of any type, and
close-systems of religious meaning are no exception.  James’s main point is that
pragmatism is not opposed to religion, because religion, or more rightly, religious
experiences, can signify profound sources of fruitfulness.  The main task is to find which
religions or religious experiences are better, more fruitful, more meaningful, than those
that stunt life’s growth and encourage spiritual stalemates.
     In A Common Faith, Dewey introduces a distinction that is necessary for
understanding the pragmatic religious attitude—the distinction between religion and
religious.  Religion, says Dewey, is a noun that denotes substance; religious is an
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adjective that denotes quality of experience.  And the division between the two must be
made clear.  Religion refers to “a special body of beliefs and practices having some kind
of institutional organization, loose or tight.  In contrast, the adjective ‘religious’ . . .
denotes attitudes that may be taken toward every object and every proposed end or
ideal.”9  Dewey’s interest in thus dividing the terms is a pragmatic move to emphasize
process and leave behind substance.
     Moreover, Dewey makes the same point as James that the intersection between
pragmatism and religion is experientially about ratios, proportions, fitness, etc.: “The
actual religious quality in the experience described is the effect produced, the better
adjustment in life and its conditions, not the manner and cause of its production” (14).
Also like James, Dewey here asserts that the religious quality is valuable prospectively,
not retrospectively.  The religious experience is the process of moving ahead in the flow
of experience with the hope of gaining a more functional and meaningful understanding
of life.  As Dewey writes, “The self is always directed toward something beyond itself
and so its own unification depends upon the idea of the integration of the shifting scenes
of the world into that imaginative totality we call the Universe” (19).  Oriented toward
the future, the religious experience thereby becomes not correspondence to an
antecedent substance or pre-established belief structure, but the grasp of possibilities:
“For all endeavor for the better is moved by faith in what is possible, not by adherence to
the actual” (23).
     The religious experience for Dewey signifies an experience of a particular quality.
That quality is so important because it fuses the conditions of the present with hope, a
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process Dewey calls “a working union of the ideal and actual” (52).  As a fusion of
ideals and possibilities, the religious experience also becomes socially significant.
Because life’s possibilities are found in the relational manifold, of which the individual
is a constitutive part, pursuing those possibilities through creative intelligence has social
consequences:
It is possible to trace to some extent these [social] evils to their causes, and to
causes that are something very different from abstract moral forces.  It is possible
to work out and work upon remedies for some of the sore spots.  The outcome
will not be a gospel of salvation but it will be in line with that pursued, for
example, in matters of disease and health.  The method if used would not only
accomplish something toward social health but it would accomplish a great thing;
it would forward the development of social intelligence so that it could act with
great hardihood and on a larger scale (77).
Dewey’s point is that the quality of religious experience becomes functional and
operative because it opens up the possibilities of the present into hope for the future.
Religious experiences become particularly enriching forms of experience because they
are unifying, because they tie the individual and society to human evolution in general.
Dewey concludes A Common Faith by saying,
We who now live are parts of a humanity that extends into the remote past, a
humanity that has interacted with nature.  The things in civilization we most
prize are not of ourselves.  They exist by grace of the doings and sufferings of the
continuous human community in which we are a link.  Ours is the responsibility
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of conserving, transmitting, rectifying and expanding the heritage of values we
have received that those who come after us may receive it more solid and secure,
more widely accessible and more generously shared than we have received it.
Here are all the elements for a religious faith that shall not be confined to sect,
class, or race.  Such a faith has always been implicitly the common faith of
mankind.  It remains to make it explicit and militant (87).
     As liberty is such an important concept for pragmatists, religious experiences become
significant as experiences of a broad scope, a liberal, expanding scope.  By infusing the
ideal with the actual, religious experiences open up the present into the future.  Both
James and Dewey agree on this point.  James says the quality of the creative temper,
which comes to fruition in religious experiences, is invaluable because it “immediately
suggests an infinitely larger number of the details of the future experience to our mind.
It sets definite activities in us at work.”10  Dewey says the religious experience entails
creating imaginative possibilities in the “ceaseless flux”: “The whole self is an ideal, an
imaginative projection.  Hence the idea of a thoroughgoing and deep-seated harmonizing
of the self with the Universe (as a name for the totality of conditions with which the self
is connected) operates only through imagination.”11
     The focus of the intersection between pragmatism and religion is on betterment, on
amelioration.  Religious experiences thus embody the melioristic attitude.  Religious
experiences grab on to the leads of the present and push forward in the tissue of
experience, striving to make the future better.  James says that “Excitements, ideas, and
efforts, in a word, are what carry us over the dam.”12  The religious experience is what
149
describes the excitements, ideas, and efforts of the individual in the present, pushing that
person into the future.  Religious experiences act as particularly meaningful threads
connecting the present to the future because they are organic compositions of ideals and
possibilities.  For pragmatists, religious experiences entail creatively applying one’s
hope for future betterment to the tangible, concrete leads of the present.  There is, of
course, no assurance that the future will inevitably become better, only that the creative
powers of human beings are the best tools available for making the future better.  Just as
it is with meliorism, “salvation” in the future is neither inevitable nor impossible; it
simply becomes more probable through the human touch.
     Because it describes a particularly meaningful way of working in the present, the
religious experience, far from being absent in pragmatism, becomes pervasive in it.
Steven Rockefeller describes it as a moral outlook holding that “the universe of which
we are a part has not made up its mind where it is going; the struggle between good and
evil is real; and human choice and decision can make a critical difference in the direction
of events.”13  Stuart Rosenbaum describes it as the “concrete and experiential” idea that
“our values are our ‘imagination guides,’ the ‘inner’ representations who live with us
and help us through our daily rounds.”14  These guides become the moral focus of one’s
life, joining the ideal and the practical and pursued with hope.  And Douglas Anderson
calls this the “religious attitude,” the perspective that “when lived through one’s
character and career, [the religious attitude] makes an important difference in the world
of experience and nature that we both inhabit and confront.  The attitude, when
pervasive in a life, enables free and constitutive action on our part.”15
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     What makes pragmatic religious experiences so interesting is not their absence in
daily life but their abundance.  Pragmatism is bubbling over with religious experiences,
the infusion of one’s ideals—one’s understanding of “the good life,” of what is
meaningful—with the very real possibilities for amelioration.  In the next section I show
how this understanding of pragmatic religious experiences becomes the thrust of
Brandeis’s Zionist rhetoric.
American Pragmatism, American Zionism
     The tale of Brandeis becoming a Zionist is long, and the telling of that tale is best left
to his biographers.16  But a few words on his Zionist evolution seem appropriate for
understanding his rhetorical project.
     While his family was Jewish, Brandeis grew up in a largely a-religious home.
Brandeis’s parents came to the United States in what was called the “second wave” of
Jewish immigrants (usually German immigrants, which Brandeis’s parents were).  These
immigrants, notes Joe Stork and Sharon Rose, “were poor, but they prospered rapidly,
joining the middle and upper middle class merchants and professionals. . . .”17  Dedicated
to the American dream of economic and social prosperity, Brandeis’s parents, along with
a number of close relatives, established a produce store and acquired various mills and
factories.18  Yet as the Brandeis family became well-established socially and
economically, their Jewish heritage became less and less distinct.  But this was
characteristic, notes Gerald Sorin, of the German Jewry of which Brandeis’s family was
a part: “By the 1880s, German Jews had become significantly acculturated.  This was
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reflected in their rapid economic and social mobility, their institutionalization of Reform
Judaism, and the intensification of their collective identity as Americans and Jews.”19
     Brandeis grew up in a religious context marked by a number of different influences:
Reform Judaism, German liberalism, and dedicated Americanism.  The influence of
German liberalism and dedicated Americanism led many Reform Jews to express their
Judaism in secular form.20  So in the context of American Jewry as a whole, this secular
Reform Judaism was largely at odds with Orthodox Judaism and the Socialist Judaism
movement, both of which were struggling to attract incoming waves of Jewish
immigrants from all over Europe.  As a result, Zionism’s entrance into the American
Jewish community was marked by the same “cultural, religious, and political divisions”
of Judaism at large, says Sorin, along with increasing decentralization and pluralism.21
Some Reform Jews saw Zionism as a threat to the Americanization they had achieved in
the previous decades; Orthodox Jews saw Zionism as patronizing and ideologically
weak.22  To say the least, Zionism, and as a result, Brandeis’s rhetorical project, faced an
uphill battle.
     While there were a number of factors contributing to Brandeis’s commitment to
Zionism, including the influence of his uncle Lewis Dembitz, the figure to whom
Brandeis’s looked up all his life, and Jacob De Haas, editor of the Boston Jewish
Advocate, Brandeis’s mentor in Zionism,23 his commitment did not emerge until after he
was a passionate proponent of American democracy.  Scholars who study Brandeis seem
to agree, rightly, that Brandeis’s Zionism was a counterpart of his Americanism.  Indeed,
Brandeis saw the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine as an extension of the prospects
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of American democracy.  Brandeis’s belief, writes Baskerville, was that “progressive
American values and Zionist goals were ultimately identical.”24  And Strum says,
“Zionism meant not only the goal of a Jewish state but the revitalization in the United
States of Jewish culture and values.”25  Michael A. Meyer says, “American Zionism, as
Justice Louis Brandeis formulated it, was more philanthropic than ideological, mostly an
extension of the colonization idea.”26  Brandeis himself put the matter forthright: “My
approach to Zionism was through Americanism.  Practical experience and observation
convinced me that to be good Americans, we must be better Jews, and to be better Jews
we must be Zionists.”27
     Brandeis’s appeal to Zionism through Americanism of course did not please every
Jew; in fact, Brandeis’s approach to Zionism eventually created a number of divisions in
the American Jewish Community.28  Nevertheless, from 1910 until the early 1920s,
Brandeis used his rhetorical skill to become the leader of American Zionism.  And
despite the opposition, his rhetorical strategy was to affirm Judaism, Americanism, and
Zionism in the same breath.  As Sorin puts it,
Although Zionism never implied for American Jews a personal imperative to
settle in Palestine, the movement provided a vehicle for steering a course
between assimilation and Jewish survival in the United States. . . .  Zionism, with
its emphasis on common tradition, history, and fate, offered a spiritual
communalism that buttressed a sense of Jewish peoplehood.29
Brandeis used Zionism to appeal to a number of competing factions and to try to
overcome the divisions within the American Jewish community.  For Brandeis, Zionism
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was so appealing because it combined the best of American democracy, communal
solidarity, and Jewish traditions.  Zionism was a matter of cultural pluralism, as Sorin
makes clear:
Brandeis not only supplied an epigrammatic refutation of the charge of dual
loyalty so often leveled at Zionists; his formulations, emphasizing Zionism’s
benefit to America and the world, also allowed Jewish nationalists, both religious
and secular, to make the case for cultural pluralism and the congruity of Jewish
ethics and American ideals.  Zionism or Jewish nationalism, like American
nationalism, it was argued, gained at least part of its value in its universal
mission—its emphasis on democracy and self-determination.30
Zionism, instead of separating Jews from either Americanism or their Jewish
heritage—religious or secular heritage—“encouraged and helped American Jews to
remain Jewish.”31  As Brandeis construed it, Zionism was an extension of both American
democracy and the Jewish tradition.
     Brandeis’s Zionism and Americanism cannot be separated.  In fact, as I will show,
both are dynamic partners in his pragmatic political style.  This analysis of Brandeis’s
Zionist rhetoric seeks to explicate the method by which he called for the creation of a
Jewish state.  My argument is that his Zionism, instead of distancing him from the
pragmatic style, exemplifies the pragmatic style come to fruition, the pragmatic style in
its most meaningful form.
     Perhaps it will be best to begin by outlining Brandeis’s general attitudes toward
Zionism, which Brandeis himself provided in somewhat comprehensive form.  In June
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of 1915, Brandeis spoke to the Conference of Eastern Council of Reform Rabbis.  His
address was entitle “The Jewish Problem, How to Solve it,” and the address became, as
Solomon Goldman says, “his most comprehensive statement on Zionism.”32  Brandeis
began with a juxtaposition between the past and the present: “The suffering of the Jews
due to injustices continuing throughout nearly twenty centuries is the greatest tragedy in
history. . . .  Yet the present is pre-eminently a time for hopefulness.  The current of
world thought is at last preparing the way for our attaining justice.”33  Specifically,
Brandeis saw the War giving Jews a chance to remake their position in world history.
And when Brandeis said “Jews,” he meant not only the Jew as an individual person but
Jewish people in aggregate: “For us the Jewish Problem means this: How can we secure
for Jews, wherever they may live, the same rights and opportunities enjoyed by non-
Jews?  How can we secure for the world the full contribution which Jews can make, if
unhampered by artificial limitations?  The problem has two aspects: That of the
individual Jew, and that of Jews collectively” (13).  The Jewish Problem was individual
in that the Jew needed to be secure, like any other individual, in his or her pursuit of
personhood.  The Jewish Problem was social in that Jews as a race of people needed to
be recognized for their significant contributions to humanity in general.
     Since the Jewish Problem was both individual and social, it seemed clear that the
Jewish Solution needed to be both individual and social.  And for Brandeis, the
individual and social solution meant the creation of balance for the common good.
In the past it has been generally assumed that the full development of one people
necessarily involved its domination over others. . . .  [However] In establishing
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the equal right of every person to development, it became clear that equal
opportunity for all involves this necessary limitation: Each man may develop
himself so far, but only so far, as his doing so will not interfere with the exercise
of a like right by all others.  Thus liberty came to mean the right to enjoy life, to
acquire property, to pursue happiness in such manner and to such extent as the
exercise of the right in each is consistent with the exercise of a like right by every
other of our fellow-citizens (18-19).
This form of liberty had a clear home in the twentieth century, said Brandeis: American
democracy.  “Democracy rejected the proposal of the superman who should rise through
sacrifice of the many.  It insists that the full development of each individual is not only a
right, but a duty to society; and that our best hope for civilization lies not in uniformity,
but in wide differentiation” (19).  American democracy represented the culmination of
humanity’s lessons, lessons about the best form of government, about the maximization
of liberty, about balancing personal and social needs in a way that affirmed both the
individual and society without preference to either.
     American democracy was not only the fullest incarnation of the lessons of the past, it
also represented the most real hope for the future.  More specifically, it represented the
most real Jewish hope for the future.  But in order to be significant parts of the potential
future, Jews had to be seen as valuable parts of the present, which Brandeis, of course,
believed they were:
The Jews gave to the world its three greatest religions, reverence for law, and the
highest conceptions of morality.  Never before has the value of our contribution
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been so generally recognized.  Our teaching of brotherhood and righteousness
has, under the name of democracy and social justice, become the twentieth
century striving of America and of western Europe.  Our conception of law is
embodied in the American constitution which proclaims this to be a “government
of law and not of men.”  And for the triumph of our other great teaching, the
doctrine of peace, this cruel war is paving the way (22-23).
Because Jews were valuable parts of the present, Brandeis said the future should
represent hope, not despair.  “Let us make clear to the world that we too are a nationality
striving for equal rights to life and to self-expression” (23).  The responsibility for
making known to the world the value of Jewish life rested with Jews themselves.  In
Brandeis’s Zionism, this was the very distinct call for personal responsibility.
     However, in order for Jews to succeed in articulating their place in the world, the first
step was to define terms appropriately; the world must, said Brandeis, understand what
Zionism is and is not.  “It is not a movement to remove all the Jews of the world
compulsorily to Palestine” (24).  Furthermore, “it is not a movement to compel anyone
to go to Palestine” (24).  So what is it?
It is essentially a movement to give the Jew more, not less freedom; it aims to
enable the Jews to exercise the same right now exercised by practically every
other people in the world: To live at their option either in the land of their fathers
or in some other country. . . .
     Zionism seeks to establish in Palestine, for such Jews as choose to go and
remain there, and for their descendants, a legally secured home, where they may
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live together and lead a Jewish life, where they may expect ultimately to
constitute a majority of the population, and may look forward to what we should
call home rule (24).
     Brandeis believed there was something quite significant about the Jewish form of life.
It was significant because of the Jewish spirit, which was particularly congenial to the
American spirit: “There is no inconsistency between loyalty to America and loyalty to
Jewry.  The Jewish spirit, the product of our religion and experiences, is essentially
modern and essentially American” (29).  This meant there was a subsequent
responsibility for Jews.  Because Judaism embodied American principles and ideals,
Jews had a special part to play in furthering the project of American democracy:
Indeed, loyalty to America demands rather that each American Jew become a
Zionist.  For only through the ennobling effect of its striving can we develop the
best that is in us and give to this country the full benefit of our great inheritance.
The Jewish spirit, so long preserved, the character developed by so many
centuries of sacrifice, should be preserved and developed further, so that in
America as elsewhere the sons of the race may in the future live lives and do
deeds worthy of their ancestors (29-30).
Thus Jews had to be active participants in Americanism and Zionism.
     However, in an age ravaged by war, anti-Semitism, and social and economic
hardships, Brandeis feared that active participation in Zionism was rare among
American Jews:
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We must protect America and ourselves from demoralization, which has to some
extent already set in among American Jews. . . .  The sole bulwark against
demoralization is to develop in each new generation of Jews in America the
sense of noblesse oblige.  That spirit can be developed in those who regard their
people as destined to live and to live with a bright future.  That spirit can best be
developed by actively participating in some way in furthering the ideals of the
Jewish renaissance; and this can be done effectively only through furthering the
Zionist movement (30).
Brandeis reminded his audience that the opportunities of the present could only become
realities through human action, participation and intervention.  It was thus up to the
Jews, and particularly the Jews of America, who were socially, politically, and
economically well-equipped to contribute to Zionism, to grab hold of present
possibilities and strive for betterment.  “The whole world longs for the solution of the
Jewish Problem.  We have but to lead the way, and we may be sure of ample cooperation
from non-Jews. . . .  Organize, Organize, Organize, until every Jew in America must
stand up and be counted, counted with us, or prove himself, wittingly or unwittingly, of
the few who are against their own people” (35).  Make the possibilities of the present
become the realities of the future, Brandeis told the audience, which can only happen
through a concert of action—individual action, to be sure, but action of groups, Jews and
non-Jews alike, American and non-Americans alike, cooperating to create a better
future.  Through participation in the present, the future can become better; the
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possibilities of salvation become more and more probable through intelligent human
undertaking.
     The spirit and rhetorical style of Brandeis’s address is quintessentially pragmatic, a
reiteration of James and Dewey’s understanding of the intersection between pragmatism
and religion.  Possibilities are present in the relational manifold; there are “leads” in the
present.  Just like James and Dewey, Brandeis thinks these “leads” can quite readily be
found in American democracy.  But Brandeis also offers the spirit of the Jewish people
as a counterpart to the promises of American democracy.  Both American democracy
and the Jewish spirit represent hope for a better future.  But Brandeis, James, and Dewey
all admit that along with the “leads,” one must take thorough account of the dangers and
risks of the present.  For Brandeis and the other Zionists, one of the great dangers is the
War, another is anti-Semitism, and another is the place of the term “Jew” in the world’s
vocabulary.34  However, hope infused with creative intelligence can push through the
dangers of the present.  Humans can actually become stronger, living with more
significance and meaning, through the struggle to overcome danger and risk.  As
Brandeis says,
The Zionists seek to establish this home in Palestine because they are convinced
that the undying longing of Jews for Palestine is a fact of deepest significance;
that it is a manifestation in the struggle for existence by an ancient people which
has established its right to live, a people whose three thousand years of
civilization has produced a faith, culture and individuality which enable it to
contribute largely in the future, as it has in the past, and to the advance of
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civilization; and that it is not a right merely but a duty of the Jewish nationality to
survive and develop.  They believe that only in Palestine can Jewish life be fully
protected from the forces of disintegration; that there alone can the Jewish spirit
reach its full and natural development, and that by securing for those Jews who
wish to settle there the opportunity to do so, not only those Jews, but all other
Jews will be benefited, and that the long perplexing Jewish Problem will, at last,
find solution (24-25).
The Jew, with both personal and social needs, can look to Zionism for help.  Meeting
those needs, however, is a struggle; but meeting needs and fulfilling desires despite risk
and danger is a mark of the Jewish spirit continuing to develop and grow.
     Expressing his hope for Zionism is also Brandeis sticking his neck out.  His Zionism
represents his assessment of the dynamic nature of the present and his attempt to infuse
the future with more meaning.  Thus, it seems, Brandeis embodies James’s argument in
“The Will to Believe.”  Because it is such an influential text dealing with the intersection
between pragmatism and religion, perhaps it is best to pause here and engage James’s
famous essay.
     James’s first move in “The Will to Believe” is to distinguish between a live and a
dead hypothesis.  The former, he says, “is one which appeals as a real possibility to him
to whom it is proposed.”35  The upshot of this definition is that a vast number of
hypotheses can be regarded as live, because an hypothesis’s being real depends on the
individual “to whom it is proposed.”  A dead hypothesis, conversely, is one that “refuses
to scintillate with any credibility at all” (2).  James seems to be aiming for ineffectual
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definitions, for his essay is about faith and belief and not verification.  James introduces
“reality” or “lack of credibility” as loose ways of differentiating hypotheses specifically
because belief is an expression of individual will, and such an expression has little to do
with absolute certainty and divine clarity.  “This shows,” he writes, “that deadness and
liveness in an hypothesis are not intrinsic properties, but relations to the individual
thinker.  They are measured by his willingness to act” (2-3).  Essentially, the will to
believe is an expression of the desire for growth:
We want to have a truth; we want to believe that our experiments and studies and
discussions must put us in a continually better and better position towards it; and
on this line we agree to fight out our thinking lives.  But if a pyrrhonistic skeptic
asks us how we know all this, can our logic find a reply?  No! certainly it cannot.
It is just one volition against another,—we willing to go in for life upon a trust or
assumption which he, for his part, does not care to make (9-10).
     James introduces a juxtaposition here, a juxtaposition common to both James and
Dewey’s thought.  The juxtaposition is between the very dry, logical, misleading quest
for certainty, and the very live, organic, fruitful quest for meaning.  And James
celebrates this division, believing philosophers of all kinds, and individuals of all kinds,
cannot afford to neglect the “illogical” passions of the pursuit for meaning.  His thesis in
the “Will to Believe,” after all, is,
Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between
propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided
on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstances, “Do not decide,
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but leave the question open,” is itself a passional decision,—just like deciding
yes or no,—and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth (11; emphasis in
original).
James is celebrating that which philosophers for millennia have seen as base,
unimportant, and spiritually misleading.  Meaning in life, for James, is not a matter of
correspondence to a logical structure of Truth; it is forged in accordance with the very
intimate desire to lead a significant life, despite all the doubt, uncertainty, and pain
associated with life.
     James does, however, save a word of warning for those who pursue a meaningful life
by playing fast and loose with the reality of experience: “I live, to be sure, by the
practical faith that we must go on experiencing and thinking over our experience, for
only thus can our options grow more true; but to hold any one of them—I absolutely do
not care which—as if it never could be reinterpretable or corrigible, I believe to be a
tremendously mistaken attitude, and I think that the whole history of philosophy will
bear me out” (14).  Believing always in the revisability of one’s beliefs is what James
calls giving up the doctrine of “objective certitude.”  But that is not the same, he
underscores, as giving up “the quest or hope of truth itself.  We still pin our faith on its
existence, and still believe that we gain an ever better position towards it by
systematically continuing to roll up experiences and think” (17).  This is James speaking
in the pragmatic rhetoric of degree.  Belief is a matter of better or worse, not True or
False.  Belief and truth are pursed hand-over-fist, in the struggle for living, in the rolling
up of experience.  Such a project, of course, is never done, for it is identical with life
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itself.  So James reminds us emphatically that “Humans passions . . . are stronger than
technical rules” (21).  To live by such passions is good.  Living by passions over
technical certainty is a matter of courage, a matter of sticking one’s neck out and
pouncing forward into the flow of experience with the hope for betterment: “Moral
scepticism can no more be refuted or proved by logic than intellectual scepticism can.
When we stick to it that there is truth (be it of either kind), we do so with our whole
nature, and resolve to stand or fall by the results” (23).
     James turns to religion as a way of bringing his point home.  For James, the mere
possibility of religious belief is one of the most pregnant matters in all of life.  Religion,
he says,
offers itself as a momentous option.  We are supposed to gain, even now, by our
belief, and to lose by our non-belief, a certain vital good.  Religion is a forced
option, so far as that good goes.  We cannot escape the issue by remaining
skeptical and waiting for more light, because, although we do avoid error in that
way if religion be untrue, we lose the good, if it be true, just as certainly as if we
positively chose to disbelieve (26).
James is oriented prospectively toward possibilities and not retrospectively toward
objectivity.  What religion does, says James, is open up the future—open it up to a new
range of possibilities, possibilities that are closed off if one chooses explicitly to
disbelieve.  Religious experiences are a matter of building the future: “The more perfect
and more eternal aspect of the universe is represented in our religions as having personal
form.  The universe is no longer a mere It to us, but a Thou, if we are religious; and any
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relation that may be possible from person to person might be possible here” (27-28).
Religious experiences open up a unique chance to build solidarity.  They are a specific
way of seeking out the leads of the present and plunging forward, with others who feel
the same passion, into the relational manifold.
     James is not advocating a specific set of prescribed doctrines.  Religion is not about
specific content; it is about specific possibility.  Whatever one chooses to do regarding
the pregnant religious question, James says the consequences are the same: “Indeed we
may wait if we will [for empirically verifiable data corroborating religious belief],—but
if we do so, we do so at our peril as much as if we believed.  In either case we act, taking
our life in our hands” (30).  There is a public side to this proposition, however, for James
says that willing to believe is, indeed, an activity with social responsibility.  “We ought .
. .” writes James, “delicately and profoundly to respect one another’s mental freedom:
then only shall we bring about the intellectual republic: then on shall we have that spirit
of inner tolerance without which all our outer tolerance is soulless, and which is
empiricism’s glory; then only shall we live and let live, in speculative as well as in
practical things” (30).
     As a Zionist rhetor, Brandeis was trying to bring about James’s notion of the
“intellectual republic.”  Zionism was Brandeis’s expression of the will to believe.  In
1929, he told a group of fellow Jews,
To take risks is the very essence of Jewish life, that is, to take necessary risks.
The wise man seeks not to avoid but to minimize risks.  He minimizes them by
using judgment and by knowledge and by thinking.  These are, fortunately,
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preeminently Jewish attributes.  Let us take counsel of our hopes, not of our
fears.  Let us inspire confidence in others by showing that we ourselves have
courage to act.  Confidence begets confidence, and achievement follows.36
Belief and religion for Brandeis, and for James, were never about specific doctrines or
religious content.  Belief and religion, for both James and Brandeis, were not closed-
systems; that is, they were not prescribed.  They were about openness, about novelty and
possibility, about tolerance and respect, about moving toward a public culture wherein
religion was dynamic and helpful, not rigid and inoperative.  Belief and religion for
James and Brandeis were about the pursuit for meaning and not about preordained ends.
     The same themes form the overall style of Brandeis’s Zionist rhetoric.  The first
rhetorical step, for the pragmatist concerned with the religious question, is to sort
through the present—to find the “leads” of the present and push through the dangers and
risks intermingling with those leads.  For Brandeis, the leads of the present are most
explicitly found in the history and prospects of American democracy, for American
democracy represents the culmination of the lessons of history and hope for the future.
What is “peculiarly American,” Brandeis says, is “inclusive brotherhood,” that is, the
dynamic integration of love of liberty, the pursuit of social justice, and the practice of
democracy.37  In that way, democracy involves “two pillars: one, the principle that all
men are equally entitled to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; and the other, the
conviction that such equal opportunity will most advance civilization.”38  American
democracy thus best locates the leads of the present because it represents the best hope
for both individuals and civilization in general.
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     Americanism, just like Judaism, “rests upon the essential trust in the moral instincts
of the people; potent to create their own well-being; to perfect it; and to maintain it, if an
opportunity is given.”39  But there is a social upshot of this individualism, for
individualism
imposes duties upon us in respect to our own conduct as individuals; it imposes
no less important duties upon us as part of the Jewish community or people.
Self-respect demands that each of us lead individually a life worthy of our great
inheritance and of the glorious traditions of the people.  But this is demanded
also by respect for the rights of others. . . .  Large as this country is, no Jew can
behave badly without injuring each of us in the end.40
This fusion of the individual and society represents, for the Jew, hope for the future.
“[T]hough the Jew make his individual life the loftiest, that alone will not fulfill the
obligations of his trust.  We are bound not only to use worthily our great inheritance, but
to preserve, and if possible, augment it; and then transmit it to coming generations.”41
     Brandeis fuses Americanism and Judaism together to stress the promises of the
individual and society acting together in concert.  That is not to say, however, that
dangers in the present do not threaten growth.  Anti-Semitism is always one of the
dangers of the present, and Brandeis recognizes that.  But as a pragmatist, Brandeis
holds that the most important place to start to overcome the dangers of the present is
with the responsibility of the individual:
I fell more than ever, that the opportunities are very great, greater than at any
time in eighteen centuries.  The world is with us, that is, the non-Jewish world.
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Whether the Jewish world will be with us will depend very largely upon the
Zionists themselves.  But the responsibility for success or failure will rest, not
upon anti-Zionists or non-Zionists.  It will rest upon ourselves.  The loyalty, the
wisdom, the virtues of the relatively few who have declared their conviction of
the truth of Zionism will determine whether the future shall bring success or
failure.42
There are undoubtedly dangers and risks associated with any undertaking, Brandeis says.
But that only means that getting better is possible; it means that amelioration is a very
live option.  It also means that amelioration is pursued through human involvement,
through individual participation in making the world better.
     Recognizing the leads and dangers of the present, however, is only the first step of
the religious experience.  The next step, after seeing that amelioration is a very live
option, is to will to believe, to stick one’s neck out, to pounce forward into the fabric of
experience and pursue such amelioration.  Brandeis sticks his neck out by placing his
hope in Jewish spirituality, which represents the best chance for turning the present into
a better future.  He says, “I find Jews possessed of those very qualities which we of the
twentieth century seek to develop in our struggle for justice and democracy; a deep
moral feeling which makes them capable of noble acts; a deep sense of the brotherhood
of man; and a high intelligence, the fruit of three thousand years of civilization.”43
Meaning is to be found in the Jewish people because they have forged meaning, have
struggled through many a danger and risk, and have emerged as healthier individuals.
Thus Brandeis sees a chance in “the persistence of the individual Jew; his willingness to
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exert himself; to forego pleasure and to undergo pain, to brave dangers, and submit to
sacrifice, that wins his individual successes.”44  Brandeis is placing his hope in the Jew’s
will to believe, in the Jew’s time-tested ability to undergo experiences and forge
meaning.  As a Jew himself, this means Brandeis is rallying other Jews to join in the
quest for meaning that he sees in the creation of a Jewish state.  Brandeis rhetorically
grabs hold of the present through the Jewish spirit, and with that spirit he presses on.
“Though the burden is heavy,” says Brandeis, “it will be joyously borne.  For we shall be
buoyed up by the spiritual appeal and the irresistible beauty of Palestine.”45
     There is yet a third step to this pragmatic spirituality.  While intelligently pursuing a
meaningful life is the source of hope for amelioration, such a pursuit cannot be sought
without a particular understanding—the understanding that the future represents only
possibilities, not salvation.  Thus, the creation of a Jewish state, for Brandeis and the
Zionists, will always be a struggle.  “There are no miracles,” Brandeis said.  “Things
happen in the world of Zionism as they happen in you own businesses and in your own
households.  Things come from working.  Men accomplish because they work, because
they work with the necessary material and instruments.  That means effort and it means
money.”46  The point is that the future will contain dangers and risks and novelty and
possibility just like the present.  Nevertheless, Brandeis believes the creation of a Jewish
state is a step toward an ameliorated future.  “[In Palestine] there will of course be
Jewish sorrow as well as Jewish joy,” he told an audience in 1929.47  But pursued
intelligently, the future can become better than the present; the future can represent a
step in the right direction.
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     This is the basic point of pragmatic spirituality: meaning does not reside in
preordained ends; meaning becomes embodied in experiences, in undergoing, in the
pursuit of meaning.  The point is quite circular, but that is just fine for pragmatists.  If
meaning is derived from the pursuit of meaning, then meaning is organic, always able to
evolve and never settled.  This is why Dewey says,
[T]his idea of God, or of the divine, is also connected with all the natural forces
and conditions—including man and human association—that promote the growth
of the ideal and that further its realization.  We are in the presence neither of
ideals completely embodied in existence nor yet of ideals that are mere rootless
ideals, fantasies, utopias.  For there are forces in nature and society that generate
and support the ideals.  They are further unified by the action that gives them
coherence and solidarity.48
The world is thus bubbling over with possibilities, but the undergoing must be continual.
It must an active striving to realize those possibilities.  “Now is the time for action, for
service, and for sacrifice,” says Brandeis, “service and sacrifice directed by
understanding.  In that service and sacrifice every Jew must be made to bear his part.
Let us proceed, for the time is urgent.”49  Grab hold of the possibilities of the present, the
pragmatist commands, but by grabbing hold, recognize that such grabbing is taking
one’s life into one’s hands.  The grabbing of the present is part of the creation of the
future.  So grab meaningfully, grab intelligently and with passion, but realize the project
is never done.  The real hope is only for amelioration.  The point is that individuals must,
whatever they believe, face the world, face the dangers and possibilities always.  But that
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is why meaning is possible without certainty.  Meaning is the grabbing hold of the very
real possibilities of the present in spite of danger and risk.  The point, as James puts it, is
that “there is really no scientific or other method by which men can steer safely between
the opposite dangers of believing too little or of believing too much.  To face such
dangers is apparently our duty, and to hit the right channel between them is the measure
of our wisdom as men. . . .  What should be preached is courage weighted with
responsibility.”50
     Brandeis’s Zionist rhetoric shows that James was right.  Brandeis shows not only that
pragmatism and religion are emphatically compatible, but also that, if the point of life is
growth, and if—as James, Dewey and Brandeis all believed—growth is best achieved in
those particular experiences known as religious experiences, then pragmatism actually
comes to fruition in spiritual experience.  As a Zionist rhetor, Brandeis embodies this
point.  Brandeis shows that his pragmatic political style is not complete until he enacts
his beliefs, until he grabs hold of the leads of the present and presses on.  As James says,
“The most interesting and valuable things about a man are his ideals and over-beliefs.”51
So when those ideals and over-beliefs become infused in practical action, the spiritual
experience begins, and begins to form meaning in one’s life in the most pregnant way
possible.  When Brandeis, in addition to his legal career and tenure on the bench, puts
his time into Zionism, when he steps to the podium and becomes the most influential
Zionist rhetor of his generation, then Brandeis embodies pragmatic spirituality.
Despite danger and uncertainty, Brandeis pursues meaning in Zionism and he creates
meaning in Zionism, and in that way lives pragmatically to the fullest.
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The Language of Pragmatism as Religious
     Religious experiences represent hope in its most pregnant form.  They represent the
hope that the prospects for a meaningful life are very real and very much a part of the
present and that the future can become better.  When the pragmatist speaks on religious
experiences, the result is the rhetoric of hope.  Hope is the point of Brandeis’s November
29, 1939 letter to his friend Henry Hurwitz: “The significant thing [about Zionism] is not
the extraordinary material success under most adverse circumstances; but the fact that
success has been possible because of the spiritual elevation of the masses of common
young men and women.”52
     The rhetoric of hope permeated all of Brandeis’s Zionist rhetoric.  In 1913 he said,
“The great quality of the Jews is that they have been able to dream through all the long
and dreary centuries; and mankind has credited them with another quality, the power to
realize their dreams.  The task ahead of them is to make this Zionist ideal a living fact.”53
In 1915 he said, “Our Jewish trust comprises also that which makes the living worthy
and success of value.  It brings us that body of moral and intellectual perceptions, the
point of view and the ideals, which are expressed in the term Jewish spirit; and therein
lies our richest inheritance.”54  In 1920 he said, “Zionism has given a new significance to
the traditional Jewish duties of truth and knowledge as the basis of faith and practice.”55
In 1923 he said, “[Palestine] is an inspiration to effort.  It is an inspiration not only
because of its past and its associations; but because the present urges one on to make it
bloom again, bloom not only physically, but spiritually.”56  In 1929 he said,
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Palestine has developed Jewish character.  The sufferings to which Jews have
been subjected during all those centuries has bred a people who could easily
regain all that Palestine has lost.  Jewish suffering not only taught Jews to think;
it gave them the will, courage, pertinacity to succeed under all circumstances and
amidst all difficulties. . . .  To make Palestine Jewish is only a question of our
will, intelligently directed.57
And in 1939, urging international cooperation for creating a Jewish homeland, he said,
“On the basis of legal right, which Great Britain with the sanction of the world
established, and of the pressing human needs, Jews will continue to enter Palestine
assured of the confident support of the Jewish people to all its inhabitants.”58
     From 1913, if not before, until the end of his life, Brandeis’s Zionism was based on
hope.  No matter what the dangers of the present—war, anti-Semitism, legal restrictions,
economic turbulence, an inert will of the people—Brandeis saw hope.  This was no blind
faith, for the struggle would be there forever, but the chance for amelioration was very
real.  In that way, it seems Brandeis was trying to leave Zionists, and all individuals in
general, with the same words that James left the Harvard Young Men’s Christian
Association in 1895:
Be not afraid of life.  Believe that life is worth living, and your belief will help
create the fact.  The ‘scientific proof’ that you are right may not be clear before
the day of judgment (or some stage of being which that expression may serve to
symbolize) is reached.  But the faithful fighters of this hour, or the beings that
then and there will represent them, may then turn to the faint-hearted, who here
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decline to go on, with words like those with which Henry IV. greeted the tardy
Crillon after a great victory had been gained: “Hang yourself, brave Crillon! we
fought at Arques, and you were not there.”59
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
     A number of themes recur throughout Brandeis’s rhetoric—from his pre-Court days,
through his days on the bench, into his Zionism.  Two such themes are facts and
consequences.
     Brandeis thought uncovering the facts of the issue at hand was an integral part of
intelligent decision-making.  He also thought that consequences were of primary
importance.  One had to understand the consequences of one’s undertakings—personal
and social undertakings—in order to grasp the full moral status of one’s actions.  Put
together, facts and consequences established, for Brandeis, solid ground for solving
problems.
     Richard Posner thinks much of the same thing.  In Overcoming Law he writes,
“Emphasizing the practical, the forward-looking, and the consequential, the pragmatist,
or at least my kind of pragmatist . . . is empirical.  The pragmatist is interested in ‘the
facts,’ and thus wants to be well informed about the operation, properties, and probable
effects of alternative courses of action.”1  In The Problems of Jurisprudence, he echoes
the point:
Pragmatism in the sense that I find congenial means looking at problems
concretely, experimentally, without illusions, with full awareness of the
limitations of human reason, with a sense of the “localness” of human
knowledge, the difficulty of transitions between cultures, the unattainability of
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“truth,” the consequent importance of keeping diverse paths of inquiry open, the
dependence of inquiry on culture and social institutions, and above all the
insistence that social thought and action be evaluated as instruments to valued
human goals rather than as ends in themselves.2
     Posner’s points seem like points with which Brandeis could easily agree; and at least
to a degree, Brandeis probably would agree with Posner’s argument.  Posner, after all, is
a self-described pragmatist of a “scientific” sort, and throughout this thesis I have been
calling Brandeis a pragmatist of the “scientific” sort (at least in Dewey’s sense of the
term).  Even more strikingly, Posner approaches the law through economics, and
Brandeis considered himself first and foremost a “student of economics.”3  However,
while one cannot totally discount the few similarities between Posner and Brandeis, one
also cannot overlook the ocean that separates the two.
     Throughout his work, Posner takes a number of turns away from the pragmatism
Brandeis exemplified.  For example, Posner concludes the above passage by saying,
“These dispositions, which are more characteristic of scientists than of lawyers (and in
an important sense pragmatism is the ethics of scientific inquiry) have no political
valence.”4  Posner also says, “[T]he pragmatist shares the logical positivist’s suspicion of
propositions that cannot be tested by observation, propositions that run the gamut from
the maxims of common sense to the claims of metaphysics and theology.”5  He also
says, “Pragmatism engages the clutch that disconnects the whirring machinery of
philosophical abstraction from the practical business of governing our lives and our
societies.  It seeks to free us from preconceptions based on ‘philosophical’ thinking.”6
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He also says that “Pragmatism will not tell us what is best; but, provided there is a fair
degree of value consensus among judges, as I think there is, it can help judges seek the
best results unhampered by philosophical doubts.”7  He also writes, “What no one needs
is a normative moral philosophy, or the kind of legal theory that is built on or runs
parallel to normative moral theory, or postmodern antitheory.  We can avoid these dead
ends and keep on the path that leads to a true and healthy professionalization of law if
we steer by the light of pragmatism.”8  He also says, “The pragmatic mood induces a
willingness to delegate political rule to a specialist class of ambitious, rivalrous
politicians, leaving a reduced but essential checking role to the people.”9
     Brandeis would never agree with these statements.  Brandeis would never say that the
characteristics of pragmatism have no political valence, specifically because the
pragmatic style is a way of producing guidance for political decision-making.  The
pragmatic method is a means of creating concrete political beliefs in specific contexts.
Brandeis would never say that people should be suspicious of propositions that cannot be
tested by observation (his whole participation in Zionism, after all, was about sticking
his neck out for a belief that no one could “verify” through scientific rigor).  Beliefs are
about progressively pursuing the good life, not about retrospective correspondence.
Brandeis would never completely sever philosophical reflection from practical activity,
because philosophy and decision-making can be fruitful partners if they work in concert.
Like James and Dewey, Brandeis did not want to banish philosophy but make it more
congenial to the pursuits of meaning in everyday life.  Brandeis would also never say
that pragmatism can never propose what is best for decision-making, because Brandeis’s
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method was specifically about producing normative proclamations.  Pragmatism is
about providing the best working solutions to specific conflicts because the pragmatic
method enables the individual to contextualize the problem in actual human needs and
the hope for amelioration.  Brandeis would also never say that people do not need a
normative moral philosophy; he would just say it should be a relevant and an organic
normative moral philosophy.  Moral philosophy should be an extension of the pragmatic
method, a dynamic part of the pragmatic style.  And Brandeis would surely never say
that political decision-making should be left in the hands of an elite, specialized class.
For Brandeis, political decision-making has to be a local, fully embodied democratic
undertaking.  Political decision-making has to be available to everyone in society, not
just the courts, not just the economists or the sociologists or the congress or the
president.  Political decision-making has to be part of one’s very existence as an
American.  It is one’s American duty, thought Brandeis, to be politically active.
     Reading Brandeis—from his pre-Court rhetoric, to his Supreme Court and Zionist
rhetoric—one gets a very poignant message: living a meaningful life is possible.  In fact,
life is all about the creation of meaning.  The same message comes from James and
Dewey.  Creating a meaningful life, having meaningful experiences, is the purpose of
any undertaking.  While society and government must enable and facilitate the creation
of meaningful experiences, the value of such experiences emerges from the individual’s
having those experiences.
     Reading Posner (and Fish, I might add), it is difficult to understand that a meaningful
life is possible.  Political decisions can be made, says Posner, government can be
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structured for efficiency, the law can be just.  But Posner’s dry, no-nonsense empiricism
steers him far away from James, Dewey, and Brandeis’s fundamental
conclusion—namely, that the entire project of society, government, and inquiry itself, is
to enable the individual to live a meaningful life; life is fundamentally about the creation
of meaning through experiences.  Such an insight is absent from Posner’s pragmatism.
For Posner neglects the spirit in which pragmatism was originally born, the spirit that
radiates from James, Dewey, and Brandeis’s pragmatism.
     Pragmatism, in whatever form it takes, can never afford to forget or neglect the spirit
in which it was born.  If nothing else, Brandeis’s influence throughout the twentieth
century—his revered status as an advocate for labor, civil rights, liberty, and justice, his
standing as Zionism’s great America hero, his place as a rhetor of incomparable skill and
eloquence—shows that the pragmatic style, conceived in the spirit of James and
Dewey’s pragmatism, can be politically fruitful.  If pragmatism is about what works, and
if pragmatism’s fruitfulness has to do with the spirit in which it was originally born, then
to be fruitful pragmatism must embrace the spirit of its tradition, the pragmatic spirit of
William James, John Dewey, and Louis Brandeis.
     The claim of this thesis has been that specific political attitudes do follow from
pragmatism.  But this claim needs a bit of clarification.  For James and Dewey and
Brandeis, no general political orientations follow from the pragmatic style.  For
example, there would be no point in declaring that pragmatists are necessarily liberals or
conservatives, pro-life or pro-choice, Democrats or Republicans, committed absolutely
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to this or that.  No general political orientations follow from pragmatism because
pragmatism is all about contextual judgment.  The pragmatist may be a liberal or a
conservative, depending on the circumstances in which he or she finds his or herself; the
pragmatist may even find some hazy, middle-ground, working-solution that seems to fall
nowhere on the political spectrum.  But even if no general political content follows from
the pragmatic style, the pragmatist is very content to say that specific political beliefs
follow from specific circumstances.  For example, when faced with ever-expanding
industrial “bigness,” a bigness that threatened the individual’s chances for growth,
Brandeis had no problem saying that such bigness was an evil.  When bigness threatens
the individual’s pursuit of personhood, Brandeis believed, then the pragmatist must
conclude that bigness is an evil.  The consequences of industry threatening the individual
are clear, and the pragmatist must pay attention to those consequences.  That is why
“bigness” was such a “curse” for Brandeis: it proved itself to be a curse; bigness derived
its moral status from the consequences that followed from it.  Brandeis’s fellow
pragmatist William James thought the same thing: “I am against bigness and greatness in
all their forms. . . .  I am against all big organizations as such, national ones first and
foremost; against all big successes and big results; and in favor of the eternal forces of
truth which always work in the individual and immediately unsuccessful way, under-
dogs always, till history comes, after they are long dead, and puts them on the top.”10
Experience has shown bigness to be detrimental to the individual and society.  And thus
the pragmatist turns against bigness.  Being against bigness, for the pragmatist, is
specific political content because of the context in which bigness developed, the world’s
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experience in dealing with bigness, and the personal and social consequences that follow
from bigness.
     Through Brandeis’s rhetoric, this thesis shows that pragmatism provides a unique
method for producing specific political content.  Pragmatists have a particular method
for experiencing the world, formulating beliefs, and producing normative proclamations.
Of course, one cannot know the force of those specific beliefs and proclamations without
having a specific political context in which to work.  But the method is there, and the
method, the pragmatist believes, is the best option available.
     This thesis has tried to show how Brandeis operated in specific political contexts and
how that operation was an extension of James and Dewey’s pragmatism.  This thesis has
tried to provide an outline of the pragmatic political style, an outline of the method with
which pragmatists undertake problem-solving.  Through Brandeis’s rhetoric, this thesis
has offered a window into the style with which pragmatists very meaningfully approach
concrete problems in life.  And this thesis has also offered an understanding of
pragmatism that is—contra those who believe pragmatism has nothing to offer
politics—a unique way of participating in political decision-making.  What follows from
pragmatism?  The pragmatic political style.
     To make this thesis’s conclusions a bit clearer, one question seems to remain: As a
political style, does the pragmatic style have a specific attitude toward the role of
language, communication, and rhetoric in political exchanges?
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     In the introduction, I briefly touched on the attitudes of the realistic and republican
styles toward the role of language in political exchange.  In the realist style, texts get in
the way of informed political decision-making.11  In the republican style, political leaders
relish texts and use eloquence to guide the citizenry.12  Hariman’s two other political
styles—the courtly and bureaucratic—also adopt attitudes toward the role of texts in
political decision-making.  In the courtly style, texts, discourse, communication, and
rhetorical decorum create a hierarchy of power and subordination, of ruler and subject,
of control.  As Hariman writes, “Courtly tropes facilitate communication around and
about focal individuals, they both define and enhance personal authority, and they
distribute power within a social order oriented toward an individual’s display of political
authority and aesthetic distinction.”13  The bureaucratic style also entails an attitude
toward discourse.  In the bureaucratic style, texts create an all-encompassing technical
system of signs and symbols.  As Hariman writes, “This bureaucratic style culminates in
the symbolic drama of assimilation into the social structure of modernity, where all
individuals assume a composite identity which denominates them as both persons and
functionaries, residents of local cultures and participants in totalizing systems of
communication and control.”14
     For the purposes of this thesis, the question is, Does the pragmatic style adopt a
specific attitude toward texts in the role of political decision-making?  The answer is yes.
Simply put, for the pragmatic political style, language is a tool for satisfying the
demands and meeting the needs of political decisions.  Individuals are left trying to cope
with and create meaning in a world constantly changing, constantly shifting the terms of
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the debate.  Language, for the pragmatist, becomes a means of grabbing onto the flow of
experience and directing it toward more congenial personal and social ends.  This
pragmatic position—the position that views language as a tool—is nothing new, of
course.15  But the metaphor can quickly get out of hand,16 so I will use the remainder of
this conclusion to draw out the implications of language-as-tool for political problem-
solving.
     Individuals are embedded in a constant undergoing.  James called this the stream of
consciousness.17  Experiences run concurrently and continuously, with no definite breaks
in the flow of experience.18  But individuals do employ “concepts”—linguistic marks
and noises—to seize certain elements of the stream of thought and drive those elements
toward practical or aesthetic ends.19  Dewey says that “The story of language is the story
of the use made of these occurrences; a use that is eventual, as well as eventful.”20  The
individual receives, creates, and implements marks and noises to handle the perceptual
stream.  Language, as a result, becomes the tool by which individuals select, reflect, and
deflect from the stream of experience, the tool by which individuals seize experiences,
emphasize and formulate practical and aesthetic possibilities, and drive experience better
toward personal and social ends.  Language harnesses reality, more or less effectively,
and pushes it forward in the tissue of experience.  “Concepts not only guide us over the
map of life,” James writes, “but we revalue life by their use. . . .  The mere possession of
such vast and simple pictures is an inspiring good: they arouse new feelings of sublimity,
power, and admiration, new interests and motivations.”21
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     But this puts language, and the pragmatist, in a very precarious position.  To order the
flow of experience linguistically is to chop the flow of experience into more or less
manageable segments.  But once that is done, the flow of experience continues; it
continues to evolve, change, undergo, and reweave the fabric of life.  The language of
the conceptual order can therefore lose its grasp on life.  Language quickly becomes
outmoded and ineffective as the marks and noises of the conceptual order prove in need
of reconstitution.
     In political exchanges, the task is to seize the flow of events in such a way that the
terms of the conceptual order effectively engage the needs and desires of those involved
in the political reality.  In some cases, language proves to be not enough for
accomplishing the tasks at hand; that is to say, realistically, that proper discursive moves
cannot solve all of life’s problems.  But in many cases, language can work effectively,
opening up the possibilities of the present and pushing into an ameliorated future.  As
Dewey puts it, “When events have communicable meaning, they have marks, notations,
and are capable of con-notation and de-notation.  They are more than mere occurrences;
they have implications.  Hence inference and reasoning are possible; these operations are
reading the message of things, which things utter because they are involved in human
associations.”22
     When political disputes arise, the marks and noises of the pragmatic style—the
language of pragmatism, in short—become tools for approaching and working through
those disputes.  The language of the pragmatic style, while nothing like a silver bullet, a
sure-fire way to reach an ideal solution, represents the chance to work through problems
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with an intimate understanding of the dynamic nature of reality, the need for personal
and social growth, and the hope for achieving a working solution.  Political realities are
only manageable to a degree; but being manageable to a degree is often enough for
establishing operative relations in the manifold of experience.  Language helps bind
individuals together.  The hope, as Dewey expresses it, is to build a sense of political
unity out of political disaster: “The problem of creation of genuine democracy cannot be
successfully dealt with in theory or in practice save as we create intellectual and moral
integration out of present disordered conditions.”23
     The preceding reiterates the conclusions of this thesis’s chapters.  The pragmatic
political style speaks an organic rhetoric to stress the place of language in the flow of
experience.  Language must be organic because speech is embedded in an endless
experiential undergoing.  Organic rhetoric attempts to move with the flow of experience,
constantly evolving and progressing within the fabric of life—emphasizing certain
points, neglecting others, building conceptual masses, allowing other conceptual
apparatuses to fall away.  As James puts it (a point which Kenneth Burke would echo),
consciousness, and consequently, language, “is interested in some parts of these objects
to the exclusion of others, and welcomes or rejects—chooses from among them, in a
word—all the while.”24  And he reiterates, “Out of what is in itself an undistinguishable,
swarming continuum, devoid of distinction or emphasis, our senses make for us, by
attending to this motion and ignoring that, a world full of contrasts, of sharp accents, of
abrupt changes, of picturesque light and shade.”25  Organic rhetoric stresses the nature of
change, of the dynamic quality of life, of movement in the flow of experience.
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Movement in the flow is a qualitative experience; it is better or worse, more or less
embodied, more or less enriching, more or less fulfilling.  Organic rhetoric conveys the
need to allow the individual room to grow in more or less enriching ways, by pursuing
novelty and possibility at every turn.  James puts the point eloquently: “Every bit of us at
every moment is part and parcel of a wider self, it quivers along various radii like the
wind-rose on a compass, and the actual in it is continuously one with possibles not yet in
our present sight.”26  Dewey echoes James by saying, “Between the poles of aimlessness
and mechanical efficiency, there lie those courses of action in which through successive
deeds there runs a sense of growing meaning conserved and accumulating toward an end
that is felt as accomplishment of a process.”27  Organic rhetoric focuses on the
interrelated course of the individual and society, growing and developing and deriving
meaning from the flow of experience.
     In addition to organic rhetoric, the rhetoric of degree underscores the precariousness
of language.  Language is forced to choose and reject, to emphasize and ignore, in order
to try and handle the blooming, buzzing confusion that is the world.  Pragmatic orators
speak in the rhetoric of degree to emphasize the gradations of conceptual and perceptual
streams.  Language is more or less effective, better or worse in certain circumstances.
Pragmatists speak not in terms of substance but in terms of processes, in terms of better
and worse, of more or less.  For example, the term “liberty” in the pragmatist’s
vocabulary does not refer to a Platonic Form or to a substance that is either absolutely
had or not had, either on or off.  Liberty instead refers to the process of gaining more
freedom—both positive and negative freedom—of moving toward ends that promote
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liberty in the individual’s life.  The rhetoric of degree is the rhetoric of process and
movement, not of substance, essence, states, faculties, and being.  It is the rhetoric of
understanding the better and worse at stake in all choices and possibilities.  That is why
James uses the rhetoric of degree in outlining pragmatism’s conception of truth: “Our
account of truth is an account of truths in the plural, of processes of leading, realized in
rebus, and having only this quality in common, that they pay.  They pay by guiding us
into or towards some part of a system that dips at numerous points into sense-percepts. . .
.  Truth is made, just as health, wealth and strength are made, in the course of
experience.”28  Dewey applies the same rhetoric of degree to American democracy:
Our first defense is to realize that democracy can be served only by the slow day
by day adoption and contagious diffusion in every phase of our common life of
methods that are identical with the ends to be reached and that the recourse to
monistic, wholesale, absolutist procedures is a betrayal of human freedom no
matter in what guise it presents itself.  An American democracy can serve the
world only as it demonstrates in the conduct of its own life the efficacy of plural,
partial, and experimental methods in securing and maintaining an ever-increasing
release of the powers of human nature, in service of a freedom which is
cooperative and a cooperation which is voluntary.29
Pragmatists of course do not have an end-all answer to life’s problems.  But by paying
close attention to consequences and the hope for a meaningful life, they do know how to
direct the flow of experience toward ends that seem more or less congenial to human
happiness.
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     Directing the flow of experience toward more or less congenial ends entails, for
pragmatists, speaking a rhetoric of hope.  Given that individuals and their speech are
embedded in an endless flux, and given that language is more or less effective relative to
specific contexts, there is the very live chance that an intelligently enacted vocabulary
will help create an ameliorated future.  Language properly used can expand the present
into the future.  The rhetoric of hope gives orators a set of tools for grabbing hold of the
leads of the present and pushing through the fabric of experience into a better tomorrow.
“Communication is consummatory as well as instrumental,” says Dewey.  “It is a means
of establishing cooperation, domination and order.  Shared experience is the greatest of
human goods.  In communication, such conjunction and contract as is characteristic of
animals become endearments capable of infinite idealization; they become symbols of
the very culmination of nature.”30  The rhetoric of hope grabs hold of the leads of the
present and strives for an ameliorated future.  While danger and risk exist—and will
exist forever—humans have the power to forge through that danger and risk and create a
better future.  Brandeis’s Zionist rhetoric, for example, looks to a future wherein a
Jewish homeland exists to enable the Jewish people to pursue meaning in their own
unique way.  Brandeis thus uses the rhetoric of hope to infuse the possibilities of the
present with vision.  The rhetoric of hope works by opening up the present into the
future.  This is how James expresses that hope: “We can and we may, as it were, jump
with both feet off the ground into or towards a world of which we trust the other parts to
meet our jump—and only so can the making of a perfected world of the pluralistic
pattern ever take place.  Only through our precursive trust in it can it come into being.”31
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This idea of making the world harmonious is the same idea Dewey applies to “the good”:
“In quality, the good is never twice alike.  It never copies itself.  It is new every
morning, fresh every evening.  It is unique in its every presentation.  For it marks the
resolution of a distinctive complication of competing habits and impulses which can
never repeat itself.”32  The hope for the good is the hope that human powers can remake
the present into a better future.
     None of these rhetorics—organic rhetoric, the rhetoric of degree, the rhetoric of
hope—by themselves are entirely unique to pragmatism.  Rather, my purpose in brining
them to the fore is to begin to paint a picture of the rhetorical threads running through
the pragmatic tradition.  Moreover, in the pragmatic style, these rhetorics do not stand
alone, distinct from one another.  These rhetorics move through one another and work
together, simultaneously, to give the pragmatic method a mode of operation in political
exchanges.
     Chapter two of this thesis analyzed Brandeis’s rhetoric prior to his appointment to the
Supreme Court.  That chapter argued that individualism became a rhetorical device for
Brandeis.  Not only was he undyingly concerned with the place of the individual in
society, he also used individualism as the channel for his message.   That is to say,
whatever the specific point of his address, Brandeis ran that point through the meaning
of the importance of individualism.  Through the use of that rhetorical device, Brandeis
spoke in organic terms, in an organic rhetoric.  Brandeis focused on individualism
because he believed in the potential of and need for growth, in the individual’s abilities
to become a more intelligent person and live fruitfully.
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     Chapter three of the thesis dealt with Brandeis’s Supreme Court rhetoric.  That
chapter extended Brandeis’s understanding of the importance of individualism into
disputes concerning liberty.  It also highlighted the interrelated structure of the
individual and society, showing how creating balance between individual and social
needs becomes the pragmatist’s ongoing project.  That chapter showed that a large part
of the pragmatic style is the creation of normative proclamations, the creation of shoulds
in life.  That chapter argued that normativity is an integral part of pragmatism because
pragmatists believe they have a method that produces the best options with which
individuals and society can function and grow in the tissue of experience.  In that way,
pragmatists must make normative proclamations to solve the problems that individuals
and society face.  Pragmatists must say what individuals and society should do because
pragmatists believe the pragmatic method produces the most fruitful way of
understanding and solving problems.
     Chapter four of this thesis dealt with Brandeis’s Zionist rhetoric.  That chapter
focused on the intersection of pragmatism and religion that James and Dewey fleshed
out and that Brandeis carried forward.  While pragmatism is too often seen as anti-
religious, that chapter showed that the pragmatic style bubbles over with an
understanding of religious experiences.  In fact, that chapter showed that undergoing
religious experiences represents the pragmatic style in its most pregnant form.  That
chapter concluded by focusing on religious experiences as expressions of hope.
     While this thesis acts as an outline of the pragmatic political style, it is, of course,
only a step toward understanding what pragmatism can offer politics and rhetoric.  Much
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still remains unclear about the pragmatic political style.  For example, this thesis locates
the pragmatic political style in classical American pragmatism—specifically, the
pragmatism of James and Dewey.  It is still unclear what happens if one grounds the
pragmatic political style in contemporary pragmatism, or neopragmatism, as it is often
called.  What, for example, does Richard Rorty’s pragmatism offer politics and rhetoric?
And while this thesis has briefly touched on the conflict between pragmatists and
postmodernists, what happens if one frames the conflict not in terms of classical
American pragmatism and postmodernism but in terms of neopragmatism and
postmodernism?  Is neopragmatism more congenial to postmodernism?
     What is also unclear about the pragmatic political style is the extent to which it
“travels.”  This thesis deals with pragmatism as a particularly American mode of
operation.  James and Dewey—Americans—provide the ground for understanding the
rhetoric of Brandeis—an American.  And each one of them—James, Dewey, and
Brandeis—had passion and hope for American democracy as a way of life.  But it is
unclear what “international import” the pragmatic political style may have.  The style
seems particularly operative in American politics, but will it prove fruitful in other
political, social, economic, and cultural systems?
     These issues fall beyond the scope of this thesis.  But James, Dewey, and Brandeis do
provide a starting point for thinking about the further implications and possibilities of the
pragmatic political style.
     In 1910, the same year of his death, William James compared his philosophy to “an
arch built only on one side.”33  James somewhat lamented that fact, but it seems all too
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appropriate that pragmatism should be built on a one-sided arch.  Pragmatism is best left
unfinished, best left to the individual to fill in, best left eternally open to the creation of
meaning.  Likewise, the pragmatic political style is best left to the individual to carry out
in the moment, best left to emerge fruitfully in specific contexts, facing specific
problems.  The pragmatic political style offers only a starting point; it offers an
approach, which the individual has to enact as a tool in larger undertakings.  Like
James’s philosophy, the pragmatic style is a tool for moving in and through concrete
problems.  But the resolution to those concrete problems will only become apparent
while experiencing those problems, while dealing with those problems pragmatically.
But at least the pragmatic political style provides a place to start.
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